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ABSTRACT 
The atrocities committed by American GIs at Abu Ghraib shocked the collective 
moral conscience of the U.S.  Guilty of inhumane treatment of its prisoners there, Abu 
Ghraib did immeasurable damage to America’s international credibility and made clear 
that American detainee policy is off-track and needs to be corrected to comply with 
objective standards of law, morality, and operational effectiveness.  The shock and 
emotional aftermath of 9/11 created a politically permissive environment within which 
the bureaucratic and organizational structures of the military were unsuited for the critical 
tasks assigned to them relative to the context of the Bush Administration’s “new 
paradigm.”  Two issues sit at the forefront of the political and socio-cultural context of 
U.S. detainee policy: war powers and human rights.  This thesis will utilize a synthesized 
decision-making model to analyze the President’s decisions leading to the current 
detainee policy.  Potential policy alternatives require smaller corrections to bureaucratic 
process rather than requiring a major reorganization of bureaucratic structure.  This thesis 
will provide policy-makers with a moral and legal framework for the categorization and 
treatment of enemy prisoners.  Adoption of the full framework of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, including U.S. ratification of Additional Protocols I and II (1977), provides 
the best available framework to combat transnational insurgency, while retaining the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The Abu Ghraib Prison scandal sent shockwaves across the globe as the United 
States of America, the world’s foremost champion of human rights, was found guilty of 
inhumane treatment of the detainees interned there.  Significantly, the scandal damaged 
America’s prestige as a defender of the rights of man.  Perhaps equally important, the 
scandal shed the bright light of international and domestic scrutiny on the inability of 
United States’ national policy and current international law to effectively deal with wars, 
or armed conflicts, undertaken by a nation-state against sub-state organizations and non-
state actors, specifically the War on Terrorism.  Particularly in the post-9/11 
environment, when al Qaeda proved it could truly harm the governments and populations 
of nations through spectacular brutality and murderous violence, states must have the 
ability to act in self defense, not only to preserve their own system of governance, but 
also to protect the entire international system of governance from extremism and 
repression. The challenge then, relative to wartime detainees, is for states to operate 
within an internationally recognized legal framework that acknowledges the inherent 
legal, security, and ethical challenges posed by a nation versus sub-state conflict. To date, 
such adequate framework exists, but has not been ratified and accepted as an integral part 
of Geneva Conventions and the greater body of the international Law of War.  
 
B. PURPOSE AND RELEVANCY 
Within the context of the shift in the conduct of warfare—from state-against-state 
to a lesser defined state-against-non-state actors— the purpose of this thesis is to provide 
policy-makers with a moral and legal framework for the categorization, detention, 
treatment, and interrogation of enemy prisoners.   Although volumes have been written 
about the international Law of War and the laws’ impact and influence (or lack thereof) 
on nation-states engaged in armed conflict, relatively few documents have tackled the 
tougher issue of how states involved in self-defense and self-preservation against 
terrorists or an insurgency must act during the course of that conflict.  Fewer documents 
still prescribe how the Law of War needs to adjust, relative to the accepted international 
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framework already in place, in order to effectively to govern the conduct of wars between 
recognized governments, and to prevent the unnecessary escalation of indiscriminate 
violence against armed forces, unlawful combatants, civilian populations, and other 
prisoners captured on or near the “fields of battle.”  The problem facing governments is 
the lack of conceptual understanding of transnational insurgency and the networked 
organization executing that insurgency in an effort to seize power in one state and destroy 
the regional influence and hegemony of another state.  The derivative problem from the 
shift in the framework of warfare is that the traditional laws, treaties, and conventions 
guiding how states treat enemy prisoners during war is neither completely relevant, nor 
operationally effective for the state in power. 
1. Primary Research Questions 
This thesis will address two primary questions resulting from the lack of an 
effective conceptual, moral, and legal framework in combat against transnational 
insurgents. 
a. With the increasing number and intensity of wars between states and 
non-state actors, does insurgency require a different approach to 
detainees than conventional war? 
b. With no defined frontlines, no rear areas, and civilian populations as 
the primary center of gravity, how should the United States revise its 
policies and practices with respect to Enemy Prisoner of 
War/Detainee/Civilian Internee classification and detention?  
2. Secondary Research Questions 
c. Why is an update to Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW)/Detainee/Civilian 
Internee policy needed? 
d. What are the legal ethical/moral/practical implications of treating 
transnational terrorists as common criminals? What are the 
implications of bestowing them too much status? 
e. How can the U.S. revise its EPW/Detainee rules and regulations to 




intelligence from them while simultaneously maintaining (or 
regaining) the moral high ground and its posture as the defender of 
human rights? 
f. How should the U.S. propose changes to International Law/Law of 
Armed Conflict/Geneva Conventions/Hague Conference rulings to 
recognize and legitimate the changes in warfare from state versus state 
to a more unconventional state versus non-state actor? 
g. Does relinquishing the highest standards of protection of human rights 
in all cases lead down a slippery slope toward a national erosion of 
human rights protections over time? 
h. What methods of interrogation can be consistently applied to 
effectively influence prisoners of war/detainees to cooperate and 
provide information without interrogators having to resort to torture, 
abuse, or inhumane treatment?  Are there any scientifically proven 
methods to influence people that do not rely on physical coercion? 
 
C. TERMS 
Definitions of key terms will be critical to properly frame the conceptual 
differences between traditional conventional conflict between states and the emerging 
type of asymmetric warfare between states and non-state actors, like the global 
insurgency being waged by al Qaeda. Additionally, specifically and accurately defining 
the category of a prisoner for either a privileged or unprivileged status requires a high 
degree of accuracy in an unstable, complex, and dynamic environment.  Within such a 
context, the following terms will be defined and addressed in support of the proposed 
conceptual framework: 
War 
Insurgency (and Transnational Insurgency) 
Terrorism 
Unlawful Combatant 
Militia versus Armed Forces of a State 
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Prisoner of War  
Detainee  













Since the Abu Ghraib prison scandal was the watershed event igniting the 
international firestorm of criticism over America’s treatment of detainees in the War on 
Terrorism, a central part of this thesis will be to review the official Department of 
Defense reports regarding what happened, how it was handled, and what impact the event 
had on U.S. policy and practice.  Further, this thesis will review a number of legal cases 
in which federal courts, to include the U.S. Supreme Court, have issued contradictory 
opinions on the classification of detainees as either civilians or Prisoners of War, as well 
as the military tribunal decisions regarding the necessity of their detention (Elsea, 2005, 
p. 2).  The author also plans to research detention operations, prisoner treatment, and the 
prevalence of abuse or inhumane treatment in an inherently violent environment.   
Additionally, research into the processes of the U.S. Department of Defense 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (Elsea, 2005, p. 2) and their decisions regarding the 
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classification and designation of detainees as either enemy combatants or some other 
category, will provide important insight into the effectiveness of the existing system to 
accurately categorize prisoners captured in the course of an asymmetric conflict into the 
appropriate and correct status.  Primary sources will include two Office of Legal Counsel 
Memoranda for Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, the General Taguba Report 
on the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse incidents, the Schlesinger Panel Report, the Geneva 
Conventions, the Leiber Code, the Uniform Code of Military Justice and several key 
Supreme Court cases.  Other key sources will include the 1971 Stanford Prison 
Experiment, a  study on prisoner abuse by students, the Milgram Studies on the effects of 
authority on behavior, the DoD Joint Regulation on EPWs, Detainees, and Civilian 
Internees, and the 9/11 Commission’s final report on Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United 
States.  
Critiques of decision making focus on choice. My decision in formulating a 
framework for analysis and presentation of U.S. national security policy decision making 
was to choose the process-oriented approach, explained by James Q. Wilson in his book, 
Bureaucracy. The benefit of a process-oriented framework is its focus on the process of 
decision making so that, by identifying and influencing the elements of the process in 
making the choice, the choice should become easier (Gustaitis, lecture, 2006); or in this 
case, easier to analyze.  An approach synthesized by Naval Postgraduate School 
Professor Peter Gustaitis describes the elements of Process —> Choice —> Output —> 
Outcome (Gustaitis lecture, 2006).   I will analyze this national security policy decision 
process according to how each of these steps describe the impact of the President’s policy 
decision.  Under Process, I will apply Amy Zegart's National Security Agency Model, but 
will adapt it for an analysis of the contributing organizational inputs that recommended 
this particular National Security Policy, rather than as an organizational entity.  
Synthesizing Graham Allison’s Organizational Process paradigm with James Wilson’s 
examination of the roles of Operators and Executives in a bureaucracy within Zegart's 
model, I will analyze the process by which the President reached his decision regarding 
the "Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees," which rejected the 
application of the legal bounds of the Geneva Conventions upon these “unlawful 
combatants” (Detter, 2000, p. 987, as cited in Bybee, 7 Feb 2002, p. 6).   
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Choice represents the rational actor (Allison, 1971) within this synthesized model 
and is based on a desire to achieve both power and security.  The rational actor relies on a 
consistent set of preferences, value maximizing actions and known constraints in order to 
make his or her decision.  In this section, I will analyze the key elements of President 
Bush's decision as explained in his 7 February 2002 memorandum and will expound on 
the moral reasoning that ought to have been part of the policy decision-making process. 
 In discussing Outputs, I will analyze the other two key decisions resulting from 
the President’s decision not to apply Geneva Conventions protections to Al Qaeda and 
Taliban detainees: to authorize coercive interrogation measures at GTMO for detainees in 
the War On Terror (WOT), and to authorize importation of these measures into the 
broader theaters of war against Iraq and Afghanistan.  Other outputs implemented these 
policies: establishment of specific detention/interrogation facilities, approved coercive 
interrogation methods, and the importation of these methods in Iraq, where the 
application of the Geneva Conventions has been less defined.   
In Outcomes, I will describe why these decisions resulted in outcomes such as 
Abu Ghraib, the military intelligence hard sites, the CIA secret prisons, and extraordinary 
rendition.  Citing the findings of Doctors Stanley Milgram, Philip Zimbardo, and Robert 
Cialdini, I will relate the influences of authority and a lack of accountability to explain 
not only how such abuses can happen, but how they should have been predicted and if 
not intended by the policy decision-makers, prevented.  This section will reference 
elements of other decision-making models and renew the ethical analysis as well.   
Finally, based on a study of case law, historical precedent, ethics, and operational 
requirements, this thesis will aim to develop and recommend an improved conceptual 
framework from which to develop effective amendments to the Geneva Conventions, and 
to United States policy regarding the appropriate categorization, and treatment of 
captured transnational insurgents, without legitimizing their use of violence to the level 




II. TRANSNATIONAL INSURGENCY: THE EVOLUTION OF 
UNCONVENTIONAL WAR 
What is war?  This seemingly obvious and simple question has generated 
uncounted volumes of study and analysis which have not yet produced the definitive 
answer.   Beyond any kind of philosophical abstract to describe the nature of war, a 
composite definition must first break down the concept of war into its relevant parts, 
analyzing the types of war in which man engages.  Carl von Clausewitz (1873) has 
probably written the best definition of war, which he called “an act of violence intended 
to compel our opponent to fulfill our will . . . .  If our opponent is to be made to comply 
with our will, we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the 
sacrifice which we demand” (Weigley, 1973, p. xxi). While this definition is sufficient 
for a relatively timeless understanding of war in the abstract, it does not fully describe 
how modern warriors experience it.  Warfare is changing.  While this paper will not 
attempt to improve upon Clausewitz’s definition of war, it will attempt to provide some 
context to the nature of warfare the world has observed developing since the end of the 
Cold War.  The broader issue this paper will address is that warfare is evolving from the 
exclusive activity of nation-states to an increasingly violent competition between states 
and sub-state factions for political control over contested civilizations.  More specifically, 
this paper will delve into the phenomenon of transnational insurgency: what it is, what 
differentiates it from more conventional warfare, and how it should be fought in order to 
win.  But before one can understand why such an evolution to transnational insurgency is 
occurring, the reader needs to understand what defines this type of warfare, relative to the 
broader concept, and why it must be understood, countered, and overcome. 
In understanding the origins of modern warfare, one needs to understand the 
development and evolution of the nation state.  Max Weber principally defined the state 
as the governing polity having a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.  This definition 
is supported by Joel Migdal (1988) who observes, "Our [academic]view of the state, then, 
corresponds to Max Weber's notion of the state as institutional -- an organization -- 
enforcing regulations, at least in part through a monopoly of violence" (xii).  
Correspondingly, the key variable defining a nation-state’s strength (whether internal or 
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externally projected) is “the struggle for social control, the actual ability to make the 
operative rules of the game for people in the society” (Migdal, p. 261).  The purpose of 
social control is the effective political mobilization of society toward specific ends 
defined by the leaders of the state.  To simplify further, social control “is the currency 
over which organizations in an environment of conflict battle one another (Migdal, p. 32).  
In pursuing social control, however, state leaders cannot just spout rhetoric; they must 
deliver on promises to improve conditions for the society.  If the state can honor its 
pledges, the bureaucracy must then measure its effectiveness in distributing the new 
social controls.  “Increasing levels of social control are reflected in a scale of three 
indicators: Compliance (the ability to control dispersal of a broad scope of state 
resources, such as the police); Participation (repeated voluntary use of and action in 
state-run or state-authorized institutions); Legitimation (an acceptance of the state’s rules 
of the game, its social control, as true and right)” (Migdal, 1988, pp. 32-33).  These are 
the factors which governed the rise of the nation-state in Europe and which were exported 
to Europe’s colonies between 1648 and 1945.   
To compare the emergence of the nation-state in Europe with forms exported 
elsewhere, however, one must understand that European states evolved in a vacuum 
without significant external intervention.  Consequently, the new order was established 
through blood (The Black Death), battle (the 30-Years War), catastrophic institutional 
change (global market expansion) and by usurping the universal authority of the Pope, 
through the Reformation, to make the rules of the society and confer legitimate 
sovereignty upon its rulers (Robinson lecture, 2005).  This chain of events demolished 
the existing social order--primarily through massive loss of human life--and enabled the 
establishment of new social rules and strategies for peasant survival.  Combined with the 
Enlightenment ideology, each European nation-state successfully concentrated its 
institutional social controls under an accepted, single set of rules.   
The underlying theme of these monumental changes to a country’s system of 
governance is that timing and circumstances matter.  “The foundation of power in the 
global system,” ‘wrote Kugler and Domke,’ “is the relationship between state and 
society.  Governments acquire the tools of political influence through mobilization of 
human and material resources for state action” (as cited in Migdal, 1988, p. 22).  Such 
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favorable circumstances and timing have rarely been replicated for those to whom the 
nation-state was exported.  Third World states responded to entirely different social and 
environmental variables, particularly under the influence of colonialism, which prevented 
the natural rise of stronger regional powers (Robinson lecture, 2005).  No one can be 
certain how, or even if, the state will ultimately lose its monopoly on legitimate use of 
violence and the subsequent ability to make and enforce the rules.  With the tide of 
history as a guide, however, the matter will most likely find resolution from some 
manifestation of Clausewitz’s abstract concept of war. 
Perhaps the most perfect manifestation to date of Clausewitz’s definition of 
“Trinitarian War” (Van Creveld, 1991, p. 40), defined as war between the army, the 
government, and the people, has been what historian Russell Weigley termed “the 
American Way of War: war that annihilates the enemy; war that relies on advanced 
technology and massive firepower to minimize casualties among U.S. forces; war that 
calls on dozens of legions of citizen soldiers; war that results in total victory” (as cited in 
Boot, 2002, p. xiv).  Across history, there has been no other armed force so skilled, so 
well-educated, and so lethal as the Armed Forces of the United States.   
Soldiers often claim that their general wartime mission is to “kill people and 
break stuff.”  However, economist-strategist Thomas Schelling provides a more complete 
purpose of American forces: “To seek out and destroy the enemy’s military force, to 
achieve a crushing victory over enemy armies, [is] still the avowed purpose and the 
central aim of American strategy” (Weigley, 1973, p. 475).  The irony, and design, of the 
American Way of War is that there are no other nations in the First World, much less the 
Third World, who could hope to defeat the United States in conventional combat.  The 
problem with the American Way of War is that “conventional warfare is a method 
designed for an empty battlefield, populated only by the professional soldiers of the 
contesting armies” (Adams, 1998, p. 22).  Unfortunately, there are few places left in the 
world where such a battle could take place and not impact a supporting or resident 
population.  The result of these two hard facts is that the only way for nearly all states 
and sub-state organizations to challenge the United States’ military might is through a 
strategy of unconventional or revolutionary war.  
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Unconventional war is principally a contest for the effective political control of a 
population.  “Even more than conventional war, revolutionary war is a form of politics 
carried out by violent means” (Guillen, 1973, p. 322).  As explained by a Vietnamese 
National Liberation Front central committee leader, “The real problem of revolutionary 
war is not primarily military . . . it is political” (Van Thieu, 1968, p. 316).  As such, the 
National Liberation Front recognized one of the most important elements of their 
strategy: “We absolutely had to have cadres who knew and understood the peasantry . . . 
the main thing is to stick to a village” (Van Thieu, 1968, pp. 311-312) to carry out 
political propaganda.  However, propaganda is not enough to mobilize the population, 
they must be made aware of the “need for armed struggle” (Van Thieu, 1968, p. 312).  
Unconventional war is non-Trinitarian in the fact that effective social and political 
control of the people is the ultimate objective.  Unconventional, or revolutionary, war 
necessarily results from a challenge to a state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence and its authority to make the rules.  Typically characterized by the circumstance 
where a weaker challenger competes against a stronger state, these types of wars are 
often referred to as “small wars.”   
British Army Colonel C.E. Callwell was the first to really define the term small 
war.  “The expression ‘small war’ has in reality no particular connection with the scale on 
which any campaign may be carried out; it is simply used to denote, in default of a better, 
operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, 
forces” (Callwell, 1906, p. 21).  An absence of commonly understood rules and principles 
is a primary difference between great wars and small ones.  Great campaigns are 
governed by rules that are understood and accepted by its participants, “But in small wars 
all manner of opponents are met with, in no two campaigns does the enemy fight in the 
same fashion” (Callwell, 1906, p. 29).   
The most common types of small wars pit weaker adversaries against a stronger, 
incumbent state and are considered unconventional campaigns of terrorism and 
insurgency.  Terrorism is generally defined as a tactic and insurgency is a strategy by 
which a weaker organization undertakes a violent action in an attempt to seize political 
control from a stronger adversary.  The two are not mutually exclusive; neither are they 
necessarily complimentary.  “Terrorism has been defined as the sub-state application of 
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violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even 
overthrow the incumbents, and to bring about political change” (Laqueur, 1996, p. 150).  
The importance of terrorism as a tactic is to disorient the population, create a popular 
perception of systemic insecurity, and prove the regime cannot protect the people it 
governs.  In this context, terrorism can be considered “the activity of insurgents who wish 
to disrupt the existing order and achieve power” (Thornton, p. 72). 
Historically, terrorism has had very little real political influence; however, several 
recent acts of terrorism have achieved limited political aims.  “Although terrorism has 
plagued civilization from its inception, there has been a heightened awareness since the 
end of 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the start of Israeli occupation of captured territory, at 
which point terrorism assumed a greater transnational character” (Enders and Sandler, 
2001, p. 2). Enders and Sandler (2001) defined transnational character of terrorism as 
when the “actions and reactions of terrorists and states impose uncompensated costs or 
benefits upon the people or property of another country  . . . or when an incident is 
planned in one country but executed in another, it is a transnational event” (p. 5).  Enders 
and Sandler (2001) further contend “Transnational terrorism poses an important threat to 
the stability of the global community . . . By increasing cross-border interactions, 
globalization can augment the ramifications of catastrophic transnational terrorist events” 
(p. 5). 
“Transnational terrorism has become much more prevalent during the last thirty 
years as terrorists have taken advantage of improvements in communication, 
transportation, and technology to intimidate a global community with threats of violence 
unless their political demands are met” (Enders and Sandler, 2001, p. 4).  Additionally, as 
terrorism expert Walter Laqueur points out, "Society has also become vulnerable to a 
new kind of terrorism, in which the destructive power of both the individual terrorist and 
terrorism as a tactic are infinitely greater. The possibilities for creating chaos are almost 
unlimited even now, and vulnerability will almost certainly increase.  If the new terrorism 
directs its energies toward information warfare, its destructive power will be 




biological and chemical weapons" (Laqueur, 1996, pp. 156-157).  Because of the 
expansion of its power and scope of its threat, transnational terrorism has gained greater 
international political influence. 
Several recent terrorist attacks clearly illustrate both the transnational character 
and asymmetric power of an individual or small group to influence or affect populations.  
The 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks on the United States caused epic destruction, disrupted air 
travel, and pushed the global economy into recession (Enders and Sadler, 2001, p. 5).  
The 3/11 Al Qaeda attacks against Spain influenced the outcome of Spain’s national 
elections and led to their subsequent withdrawal of troops from Iraq.  The 1983 suicide 
bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon drove the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from the Middle East.  The 1979-1981 Iran Hostage Crisis, during which 52 
Americans physically and an entire nation symbolically were held captive for 444 days 
by Iranian revolutionaries, caused the U.S. to suffer the dual humiliation of 
powerlessness and the bitter failure of an aborted rescue attempt.   
These examples illustrate the transnational terrorists’ need and growing capability 
to “disrupt the inertial relationship between incumbents and mass” (Thornton, p. 74).  
Explicitly political in nature, “This process is one of disorientation, the most 
characteristic use of terror. . . . and must remove the structural supports that give the 
society its strength” (Thornton, p. 74).  The most significant danger facing the United 
States and other democratic governments is not from terrorism itself; rather, the real 
threat is posed by transnational insurgents who seek to use terrorism and guerrilla warfare 
in the “conquest of political power” (Guevara, 1963, p. 182). 
While the political power of existing states is not necessarily declining, 
transnational insurgents have demonstrated their ability to exert control over some 
populations (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) while effecting significant political change in 
others (such as Spain and Italy).  Their efforts have been facilitated by an increased 
“civilization consciousness” (Huntington, 1993, p. 6), economic and social change, a de-
Westernization of elites, and perhaps most significantly, by the revival of fundamentalist 
religion, which “provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national 
boundaries and unites civilizations” (Huntington, 1993, p. 6).  The alternative to 
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American hegemony for many nations is “to attempt to balance the West by developing 
economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against 
the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions” (Huntington, 1993, p. 16).  
Particularly in the Islamic World, which has experienced the failure of colonialism, 
socialism, nationalism, and despotism, the radicals participating actively in the 
transnational insurgency are convinced that their real unifying agent, the truly effective 
strategy to counter Western influence in their sphere, is fundamentalist Islam.  
Unlike terrorism, a strategy of insurgency has led the weak to victory over the 
strong on multiple occasions.  Examples of insurgent victories against dominant major 
conventional powers include the British in Israel, the Russians in Afghanistan, the Israelis 
in Lebanon, Americans in Somalia, and the North Vietnamese Army in Cambodia 
(McCormick lecture, 2005).  The two dominant characteristics of insurgency are 1) 
protractedness and 2) ambiguity, both of which are problematic for the great powers 
because they tend to mitigate the effectiveness of their conventional military and 
bureaucratic superiority (Metz & Millen, 2004, p. vi).  Insurgency is defined as: 
A strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives 
through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power.  It is used by 
those too weak to do otherwise.  Insurgency is characterized by protracted, 
asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain, psychological 
warfare, and political mobilization – all designed to protect the insurgents 
and eventually alter the balance of power in their favor.  Insurgents may 
attempt to seize power to replace the existing government or they may 
have more limited aims such as separation, autonomy, or alteration of a 
particular policy.  They avoid battlespaces where they are weakest – often 
the conventional military sphere – and focus on those where they can 
operate on more equal footing, particularly the psychological and political.  
Insurgents try to postpone decisive action, avoid defeat, sustain 
themselves, expand their support, and hope that over time, the power 
balance changes in their favor (Metz & Millen, 2004, p. 2). 
The critical elements of insurgency are: 1) political mobilization of the 
population, 2) control over the population and political space, 3) insurgent groups are 
normally significantly larger in size than terrorist groups, 4) insurgency is a strategy, 
terrorism a tactic, and crime an activity (Byman, et al., 2001, pp. 5-6).  5) A common 
terror campaign is waged at a critical juncture as armed propaganda (Metz & Millen, 
2004, p. 8).   
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Although this insurgency model essentially describes the 20th century Maoist 
People’s War, according to Metz and Millen (2004), 21st century insurgency has already 
evolved from the Maoist model so the United States and its allies must adjust to the 
changes adopted by the transnational insurgents or risk a violent and dangerous social 
and political disruption.  Several important trends describe the innovative evolution of 
Mao’s model.  First, the Maoist model is still the most important insurgent strategy 
invention from which further innovation is possible (p. 12).  Second, insurgency is 
mutating from a rural based movement and becoming reliant on an urban population for 
sanctuary and support (p. 12).  Third, insurgents are diversifying their logistics and 
operational support, relying less on state sponsors and increasingly on coalitions with 
organized crime (p. 13).  This partnership with criminal organizations is particularly 
helpful when the insurgents have to go underground to survive and can utilize the 
criminal lines of communication and supply to bypass the traditional means controlled by 
the state, thereby remaining invisible.  Fourth, insurgents are increasingly taking 
advantage of the internet and distributed communication systems for interconnected 
communication and information links between cells and sub-elements of the insurgency, 
permitting effective operational affiliations with lower risk of discovery by the state (p. 
13).  Fifth, continuing advances in technology permit insurgents and terrorists to generate 
increasingly asymmetric effects in their attacks on the state (p. 13).  Sixth, insurgent 
ideology has shifted from Marxist-Leninist ideology to radical extremist Islam (p. 14).  
Seventh, the transparency of the insurgent network and organization allows for easier and 
more effective psychological war, enabled by instant global communications (p. 14).  
Finally, Al Qaeda “may be trying to engage in ‘strategic swarming’ – an effort to strike 
simultaneously, or with close sequencing, at widely separated targets . . . . But, so far, his 
ability to mount operations of strategic significance seems limited” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 
2000, p. 53).   
Complicating the incorporation of these trends into a more appropriate and 
responsive defense by the state is the transformation of the Al Qaeda organization from a 
more hierarchical terrorist group to an even more powerful and ambiguous idea, 
something resembling “a venture-capitalist firm, sponsoring projects submitted by a 
variety of groups or individuals in the hope that they would be profitable” (Burke, 2004, 
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p. 13).  Particularly for Al Qaeda as a “loose network of networks” (Burke, 2004, p. 13), 
the implication of these trends illustrates the evolution to transnational insurgency 
whereby insurgent groups are increasingly networked, decentralized organizations, and 
unified by a common ideology (religion), with improved linkages and alliances with local 
political organizations to support increasing local population control (p. 14).  The bottom 
line is that the increasing sophistication and distributed nature of insurgent organizations 
is even more pronounced for a transnational network like Al Qaeda, making them even 
more difficult for the state to identify, target, and eliminate. 
The danger for the United States in combating religious fanatics as the 
perpetrators and cadre of a transnational insurgency lies in the possibility of being 
provoked into an overreaction and crackdown on the resident Muslim populations and 
Diaspora, reinforcing the belief for many that this war is a religious war, rather than a 
political one.  In order to prevent or mitigate the vulnerability to that kind of 
psychological and information warfare, the United States and its allies, Western and 
Muslim, need to implement an effective political solution and to adopt the mindset of the 
National Liberation Front in their treatment of the Vietnamese peasantry: we absolutely 
need to have political and military cadres who understand the Muslim masses down to the 
village level.  Without a relevant, meaningful, and valued political solution, the politics 
of violence will only breed more insurgents. 
In describing the paradox of counterinsurgency, and referring specifically to 
America’s dislike for protracted conflict, Dr. Henry Kissinger noted “the guerrilla wins if 
he does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win” (Kissinger, 1994, p. 
214).  Particularly in an insurgency against an occupying power, such as the United 
States in Iraq, time is on the side of the insurgents.  For the occupying power, however, 
insurgency is a timed event (McCormick lecture, 2005).  It is imperative for the occupier 
to achieve victory quickly to show they have the legitimate authority and power to make 
the rules.  For the occupier the war is one of national interest. However, the stakes are 
higher for the insurgent than the occupier.  To the insurgent the war is a contest for their 
very existence, both physically and ideologically.  Additionally, they are fighting with 
limited resources, versus the occupier’s relatively unlimited source of supply..  What 
many powerful states have learned through experience, however, is that “the power of 
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interest-type war is limited by definition, and pitting it against non-instrumental war, in 
many cases, does little more than invite defeat” (Van Creveld, 1991, p. 149). 
While American armed forces are the most effective and lethal conventional 
military force in history, “the United States has been far less impressive in its use of more 
subtle tools of domestic and international statecraft, such as intelligence, law 
enforcement, economic sanctions, educational training, financial controls, public 
diplomacy, coalition building, international law, and foreign aid” (Cronin, 2003, p. 31). 
In his book Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, Rear Admiral J.C. 
Wylie argued against the basic Clausewitzian dictum that “War is the continuation of 
politics by other means,” asserting instead that “War for a nonaggressor nation is actually 
a nearly complete collapse of policy” (as cited in Weigley, 1973, p. 476).  Admiral Wylie 
questioned the wisdom of a strategy which actively promoted the use of military violence 
to preserve the international status quo because “war and the use of military violence 
inevitably cripple the policies in whose name they are invoked and shape new policies. 
War creates a momentum of its own; the use of violence cannot be so nicely controlled 
and restrained as strategists . . . would have it” (as cited in Weigley, 1973, pp. 475-476).  
Published in 1967 and reflective of the contradictions in national security policy he 
undoubtedly witnessed in Vietnam, Wylie’s insight remains prescient today.  The danger 
to contemporary governments who overly rely on the violent side of politics is, “If states 
are decreasingly able to fight each other, then the concept of (political-military) 
intermingling already points to the rise of low-intensity conflict as an alternative.  The 
very essence of such conflict consists in that it circumvents and undermines the 
Trinitarian structure of the modern state, which is why that state in many ways is 
singularly ill-suited for dealing with this kind of war” (Van Creveld, 2002, p. 194).   
Modern states, to include the U.S., are poorly equipped to combat both pure and 
trans-national insurgencies because the inefficiency, momentum, and status quo of the 
state’s bureaucratic processes have a difficult time overcoming the insurgents’ more rapid 
cycle of change, their decentralized network with few real centers of gravity, and their 
relative invisibility to the state.  Not only is western bureaucracy not designed to combat 
insurgency and revolution, but doctrine is inappropriate for the fight at hand because 
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Contemporary revolutions have been occurring in the non-western world, 
yet all the counterinsurgency theorists are westerners . . . . Hence the 
counterinsurgent ideology seldom develops in response to local needs; it is 
mechanically manufactured or imported and characteristically lacks not 
only native roots but even the necessary adaptations to the local culture 
and values (Ahmad, 1970, p. 260).   
This doctrinal imbalance is the result of the American military’s inward looking 
focus on achieving victory by concentrating superior resources and overwhelming 
firepower in order to destroy the enemy, or attrition warfare.  However, to “the degree 
that intensity declines, the relevance of attrition must decline also, simply because the 
targets become less and less defined and more and more dispersed” (Luttwak, 1983, p. 
337).   
What is needed instead is an outer-regarding approach Luttwak called “relational 
maneuver” (p. 336), in which “victory is to be obtained by identifying the specific 
weaknesses of a particular enemy and then reconfiguring one’s own capabilities to 
exploit those weaknesses” (p. 336).  Because the United States already has a standing, 
trained, experienced force that specializes in relational maneuver, in Army Special 
Forces, what is needed more than anything else is a mind-set change.  The new mind-set 
must abandon the traditionally accepted idea, epitomized by General Maxwell D. Taylor, 
that counterinsurgency is “just another form of small war” in which “Any well-trained 
organization can shift the tempo to that which might be required in this kind of situation” 
(Vandenbroucke, 1993, p. 177).  The new mind-set must embrace the idea that counter-
insurgency is the analytical opposite of conventional war (McCormick, 2005), and 
requires an appropriately sized force (Army SF), with the skills required to utilize 
relational maneuver, and the freedom from bureaucratic bonds in order to be flexible 
enough to adjust to the situation. 
As this paper has shown, warfare is evolving from the exclusive activity of 
nation-states and is becoming an increasingly violent competition with sub-state, loosely 
networked factions, like Al Qaeda and Jamaa Islamiya, for effective political control of a 
fixed political space in the unlimited medium of international politics and public opinion.  
In contrast to a pure insurgency, however, today’s transnational insurgency against the 
incumbent governing regimes in the Middle East, as well as Israel and the United States, 
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is being led by Al Qaeda and perpetrated by its networked, information-based, 
transnational insurgent organization.  As history has shown, conventional war and 
traditional military violence is not the approved solution for this problem.  What is 
urgently needed is a strong political solution, supported by a true counterinsurgent 





















III. THE LAWS OF WAR, U.S. WAR POWERS, AND DETAINEE 
POLICY IN THE WAR ON TERROR AND BEYOND 
When there is a visible enemy to fight in open combat . . . many serve, all 
applaud and the tide of patriotism runs high.  But when there is a long, 
slow struggle with no immediate, visible foe, your choice will seem hard 
indeed.  
President John F. Kennedy’s Address to the Graduating Class,          
United States Naval Academy, June 1961 
 
On the eve of the long, slow struggle that was to become the Vietnam War, 
President Kennedy’s warning to America may have lacked the context it eventually came 
to encompass, although that context has become abundantly clear to us now.  Having 
recently eclipsed the three-year anniversary of the beginning of the War in Iraq, and 
approaching four years since the start of the War on Terror, Americans have begun to 
perceive the current conflict in a political and social context resembling that of its long 
involvement in South Vietnam.  The ambiguities surrounding America’s justification for, 
and prosecution of, these conflicts have contributed to both a crisis of conscience and a 
re-examination of policy decisions.  The most enduring and effectual of those choices 
leading the United States to its current position resided at the policy-making level – 
within the Executive and Legislative branches.   
Of all the potential outcomes of the American foreign policy process, the resultant 
competition for domestic political power should have been easily anticipated. The 
struggle between Congressional and Presidential power can be understood nicely in the 
context of a statement made by Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii to President George 
H.W. Bush in the period leading up to the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  Senator Inouye said, 
“Mr. President, do what you have to do.  If it is quick and successful, everyone can take 
the credit.  If it is drawn out, then be prepared for some in Congress to file impeachment 
papers against you” (Bush & Scowcroft, 1999, p. 435). This is not a new phenomenon; 
rather this tradeoff between Executive and Legislative power has existed, as intended, 
since the U.S. Constitution was written.  As Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist 8, "It 
is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative 
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authority" (Hamilton, 1787, p. 68).  The intent of this analysis is not to make a value 
judgment either about which branch of government should have the preponderance of 
emergency power or whether the War on Terror and the War in Iraq were justified; 
rather, the intent is to analyze the policy governing the conduct of United States Armed 
Forces during these conflicts as well as the influence of the legal implementation of 
American war policy on the participants.  To do so, this chapter will examine the 
capability of Constitutional War Powers to effectively frame the war against terrorists 
and transnational insurgents, the applicability and suitability of international Laws of 
War, and the implications of rejecting the political, strategic, and social contexts (Gray, 
2006) of an ad hoc policy of armed conflict.  But before progressing into the analysis of 
these issues, it is important to examine one fundamental assumption upon which the 
analysis of this paper is based: whether or not America is at war.  
There has been much debate over the nature of war and whether war can be 
conducted between states and non-state actors.  Of particular concern has been whether 
the United States is truly at war with the transnational network of al Qaeda and its 
affiliates. In his 2006 monograph, Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary 
Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of Context, Colin Gray emphasized the primacy of 
the political context.  Supporting Clausewitz’s 1832 contention that “war is the extension 
of politics by other means,” Gray states, “If there is no political context, there can be no 
war.  Organized violence may be criminal, or recreational-sporting, but if it is not about 
the relative power of political entities, not only states, it is not warfare” (Gray, 2006, p. 
17).  Therefore, despite the fact that it is specifically non-territorial, because al Qaeda 
considers itself a transnational political entity, seeking definite political objectives on 
behalf of a specific identity group, it is both logical and necessary to recognize a state of 
war with the entity of al Qaeda.  As noted by distinguished historian and professor Alvin 
H. Bernstein 
Before we can fashion effective … strategies for the various contingencies 
of sub-conventional conflict, we must in each case ask ourselves the most 
basic of questions: Are we at peace or are we at war?  When American 
citizens have been killed at the direction of heads of state, we should 
consider abandoning the restrictions we have imposed on ourselves by  
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using the model of domestic law enforcement.  We should admit that a 
state of belligerency exists between us and those (states) that kill our 
citizens (Bernstein, 1989, p. 158). 
Whether that state of war is conducted within the legal framework established by 
international law, custom, and practice, is a subsequent question which will also be 
addressed in this chapter, specifically as it relates to the combatants. 
 
A. WAR POWERS 
The delegation and execution of emergency powers in defense of the Constitution, 
the territory and citizens of the United States, and the national interest, has been a 
contentious and divisive issue between the Executive and Legislative branches since the 
birth of the nation.  Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, having had a 
significant hand in the framing of the Constitution, left us with a number of incredibly 
valuable insights into the specific meaning and intent of the framers of the Constitution in 
the form of the Federalist Papers.  In Federalist 23, Hamilton addresses the framers’ 
intent behind the delegation of specific powers: 
The principal purposes to be answered by union are these--the common 
defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well as 
against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of 
commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence 
of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries. The 
authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise armies; to 
build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to 
direct their operations; to provide for their support.  These powers ought to 
exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or to define the 
extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent 
and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.  The 
circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this 
reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to 
which the care of it is committed.  This power ought to be coextensive 
with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be 
under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside 
over the common  defense (Hamilton, 1787, p. 153). 
Hamilton understood in the eighteenth century what organizational theorist Henry 
Mintzburg confirmed through his research and writings two centuries later: that in any 
significant crisis or emergency, an organization will naturally and automatically 
centralize its power and decision-making authority to its leader/chief executive in order to 
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simplify communications and unify the response effort until resolution of the crisis 
(Mintzburg, 1981).  The primary point of contention has not been that such a process 
occurs or is necessary; rather the struggle has been to what degree such power and 
authority should be vested in a single executive, namely the president.  Although 
Hamilton and the other framers of the Constitution left future American governments 
with good instructions, these instructions did not resolve all the issues.  One of the most 
contentious issues between the Congress and the President has been over which branch 
has primacy in war powers. 
Congress has declared war only eleven times for American participation in just 
five armed conflicts (Wikipedia, 2005).  Congress has also authorized the President to 
use military force, short of a declaration of war on a great many more occasions 
throughout U.S. history, to include extended deployment of combat troops for 
intervention in the Russian Civil War, for the protection of Lebanon, for the defense of 
South Vietnam against Communist aggression, for the liberation of Kuwait, and for 
regime change in Iraq (Wikipedia, 2005).   As a result, precedent and premise derived 
from Congress’ ‘necessary and proper’ powers and from the President’s implied powers, 
“which may be invoked in order to respond to an emergency situation” (Relyea, 2006, p. 
2).  “Until the crisis of WWI, Presidents utilized emergency powers at their own 
discretion.  Proclamations announced the exercise of exigency authority” (Relyea, 2006, 
p. 1).  Thereafter, Congress developed a growing body of statutory delegations of “stand-
by emergency authority,” (Relyea, 2006, p. 1) which Presidents used at their discretion 
until the end of the Vietnam War.  Congress statutorily limited Presidential discretion in 
his use of military forces through the War Powers Resolution in 1973.  The purpose of 
the War Powers Resolution was “to insure that the collective judgment of both the 
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed 
Forces into hostilities” (War Powers Resolution, 1973), and to frame the Constitutional 
powers of the President as Commander in Chief.   
In 1976, Congress further curtailed Presidential discretion for use of the armed 
forces with the passage of the National Emergencies Act (Relyea, 2006, p. 1).  However, 
the passage of these laws failed to resolve the struggle for political primacy during 
national emergencies.  One relevant question derives from this struggle, namely do 
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Executive Powers during national emergencies differ from those during war?  Not 
necessarily. “An eminent constitutional scholar, the late Edward S. Corwin, explained 
emergency conditions as being those ‘which have not attained enough of stability or 
recurrency to admit of their being dealt with according to rule’” (as cited in Relyea, 2006, 
p. 4). “In the American governmental experience, the exercise of emergency powers has 
been somewhat dependent upon the Chief Executive’s view of the Presidential office” 
(Relyea, 2006, p. 2).  The words of Albert Sturm remain as true today as the day they 
were written: “In the last analysis, the authority of a President is largely determined by 
the President himself” (Sturm, 1949, pp. 125-126, as cited in Relyea, 2006, p. 3). 
 
B. LAWS OF WAR 
In an effort to explain why the provisions on irregular forces from the 1907 Hague 
Conventions migrated to the 1949 Geneva Conventions virtually unchanged, the late 
professor Julius Stone described the provisions as “an uneasy compromise between the 
views of smaller land Powers liable to be overrun, and of the greater land Powers who 
have usually done the overrunning” (Stone, 1954, p. 565, as cited in Aldrich, 2000, p. 
44).  The great powers’ defense of the status quo became overwhelmingly forceful, 
though, when they “stressed that irregular armed forces unnecessarily endanger innocent 
citizens because they make it difficult and sometimes dangerous for regular armed forces 
fully to respect the immunity of civilians when some enemy combatants are disguised as 
civilians” (Aldrich, Jan. 2000, p. 44).   
The United States has used the same forceful justification for its position against 
legitimizing irregular armed forces, especially terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.  This 
argument was supported particularly vigorously by both Presidents Reagan and Clinton 
when requesting the Senate’s advice and consent for ratification of Protocols (I & II) 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions.  Because these Additional Protocols upset the 
international status quo, despite ratification by 163 and 159 states (ICRC, 4 Dec 2005) 
respectively, they were deemed unacceptable to those great powers who risked the most 
in terms of sovereignty by their ratification.  President Reagan’s 29 January 1987 
Message to the Senate Transmitting a Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions is 
especially enlightening on this point: 
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Whether such wars are international or non-international should turn 
exclusively on objective reality, not on one’s view of the moral qualities 
of each conflict. To rest on such subjective distinctions based on a war’s 
alleged purposes would politicize humanitarian law and eliminate the 
distinction between international and non-international conflicts. It would 
give special status to “wars of national liberation,’’ an ill-defined concept 
expressed in vague, subjective, politicized terminology. Another provision 
would grant combatant status to irregular forces even if they do not satisfy 
the traditional requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population and otherwise comply with the laws of war. This would 
endanger civilians among whom terrorists and other irregulars attempt to 
conceal themselves. These problems are so fundamental in character that 
they cannot be remedied through reservations, and I therefore have 
decided not to submit the Protocol to the Senate in any form, and I would 
invite an expression of the sense of the Senate that it shares this view. 
Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also concluded that a number of the 
provisions of the Protocol are militarily unacceptable. 
It is unfortunate that Protocol I must be rejected. We would have preferred 
to ratify such a convention, which as I said contains certain sound 
elements. But we cannot allow other nations of the world, however 
numerous, to impose upon us and our allies and friends an unacceptable 
and thoroughly distasteful price for joining a convention drawn to advance 
the laws of war. In fact, we must not, and need not, give recognition and 
protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian       
law (Reagan, 29 Jan 1987). 
President Reagan’s message contends that international legal distinctions between 
international and non-international conflicts ought to be based on objective reality rather 
than subjective and politicized distinctions.  “Yet experience … has demonstrated beyond 
doubt that resistance movements will not be deterred by the law but, instead, will operate 
outside the law if necessary, thereby placing noncombatant civilians as much at risk as if 
the law did not exist” (Aldrich, Jan. 2000, p. 45). The objective reality of these 
Additional Protocols is that they provide a real framework within which powers great and 
small can more appropriately conceptualize and legally deal with insurgency, internal 
war, and wars of national liberation.  The subjective political reality is that these 
protocols have been stuck amongst other pending treaties despite ratification 
recommendations from two Presidents for Protocol II (THOMAS, 16 March 2006). 
In 1996, Osama bin Laden demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that 
resistance movements would not be deterred by international law, but would willingly 
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operate outside it to achieve their objectives.  “Bin Laden is an activist with a very clear 
sense of what he wants and how he hopes to achieve it.  Those means may be far outside 
the norms of political activity … but his agenda is basically a political one, though it is 
couched, of course, in religious language and imagery” (Burke, 2004, p. 23).  “The 
Declaration of War” was Bin Laden’s “political manifesto” (Burke, 2004, p. 162) to the 
Muslim world, stressing the duty of jihad for all Muslims in order “to end the repression 
of the Islamic world by the hypocrite governments and the ‘Crusader-Zionist’ alliance 
supporting and manipulating them” (Burke, 2004, pp. 162-163).  By framing his jihad as 
a defensive struggle, Bin Laden was able to justify, in both political and socio-cultural 
contexts, terrorism as a legitimate counter-attack against the West’s aggression.  The 
most important point of this declaration is the marked shift in the political violence from 
local regimes to the international powers in order to indirectly weaken the support of the 
hegemons and to unseat the local regimes from power (Robinson lecture, 2006).   
Al Qaeda’s long term strategy, released by ideologue and Bin Laden deputy 
Ayman Al Zawahiri in January 2005, is “based upon three foundations: 1) ‘The Quran 
Based Authority to Govern,’ which supports the creation of an Islamic state governed 
solely by sharia law; 2) ‘The Liberation of the Homelands,’ which emphasizes the 
liberation from oppressive regimes and control over energy resources; 3) ‘The Liberation 
of the Human Being,’ which articulates a duty for Muslims to overthrow rulers who 
violate Islamic law” (Blanchard, 2005, p. 8).  Although Bin Laden’s long-term political 
vision is for the Caliphate to re-emerge across the Islamic world, the central and 
animating principle to al Qaeda’s ideology is to liberate the Muslim world from what 
they see as the illegitimate occupation by the West (Burke, 2004; Robinson lecture, 
2006).  Additionally, one of al Qaeda’s primary weapons in this war against the west, 
suicide terrorism, is successful because it has come to be seen as pursuing legitimate 
nationalist goals aimed at political coercion to end occupation of Muslim lands by non-
Muslims (Pape, 2005, pp. 21-23).     
Perhaps the most interesting and crucial aspect of this war is that al Qaeda is not 
fighting for specific territorial gain.  Their central political goal is to compel the United 
States and other Western states to withdraw from Islamic lands.  Bin Laden is not using 
al Qaeda to fight for personal political power over any particular Islamic state; rather they 
26 
are fighting against (Simons lecture, 2005) regimes that either control, or influence 
control, over specific societies and cultures.  Although this warfare is to a degree non-
territorial, the fighting primarily occurs in territory other than the ultimate political target.  
al Qaeda leaders subordinate to Bin Laden “refer to Iraq as an opportunity for the global 
jihadist movement to take advantage of insecurity in the heart of the Arab world and to 
spread into neighboring areas” (Blanchard, 2005, p. 7).  In other words, al Qaeda’s 
lieutenants generally seek to fight the West in the West, or in some proxy state, which 
they seek to liberate from Western influence.  They seem to regard Iraq as only a 
foothold, whereas Bin Laden views it as the main floor of the house.  As a striking 
illustration of his strategic rhetoric, “Bin Laden identified the insurgency in Iraq as ‘a 
golden and unique opportunity for jihadists to engage and defeat the United States, and 
he characterized the insurgency in Iraq as the central battle in a ‘Third World War, which 
the Crusader-Zionist coalition began against the Islamic nation’” (Blanchard, 2005, p. 6).  
This statement is significant because it implies Bin Laden’s adaptability to relevant 
political circumstances; it identifies Bin Laden’s primary enemy and target; and though 
the focus is on Iraq, Bin Laden’s characterization of the struggle as a world war, despite 
being obvious political rhetoric, confirms his disregard for state boundaries and 
sovereignty. The relevant question then becomes whether this new conduct of warfare 
forms a necessary basis for a different definition of, and standard of treatment for, the 
combatants?    The most appropriate answer to governing this type of warfare through 
limitations and inducements can be found in the existing Geneva Conventions 
framework, but requires conformity to the full framework and ratification by all 
signatories to Protocols I and II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  
Although a pseudo-state of war has arguably existed between al Qaeda and the 
United States since 1996, the 9/11 attacks provided the clear and unequivocal 
justification for Americans.  The current President argues that the United States has 
effectively declared war against a highly irregular adversary, namely al Qaeda, its 
affiliates and its sponsors.  Specifically, on 14 September 2001, Congress authorized the 
President:  
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 
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or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001, or harbored 
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons (107th CONGRESS, 2001) 
Further, in his Presidential Order dated 13 November 2001, President Bush 
asserted, “International terrorists, including members of al Qaida (sic), have carried out 
attacks on United States diplomatic and military personnel and facilities abroad and on 
citizens and property within the United States on a scale that has created a state of armed 
conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces” (Bush, 13 Nov 2001).  
Although a state of war did not formally exist between the United States and Al Qaeda, 
President Bush “proclaimed a national emergency on September 14, 2001” (Executive 
Order 13223, 14 Sep 2001).  Considering that Congress had immediately and almost 
unanimously granted him this power in response to the 9/11 attacks, President Bush’s 
proclamation served as “collective judgment” for both branches regarding the 
introduction of armed forces into hostilities: 
Having fully considered the magnitude of the potential deaths, injuries, 
and property destruction that would result from potential acts of terrorism 
against the United States, and the probability that such acts will occur, I 
have determined that an extraordinary emergency exists for national 
defense purposes, that this emergency constitutes an urgent and 
compelling government interest, and that issuance of this order is 
necessary to meet the emergency” (Executive Order 13223, 14 Sep 2001).    
 Because of Congressional deferment to Executive Powers and despite his claim to 
unlimited autonomy and Executive authority, President Bush met the letter and intent of 
the 1973 War Powers Resolution.  
While this state of conflict may not rise to the level of warfare on all occasions, it 
was recognized as the legitimate use of force by such international bodies as the United 
Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which in an unprecedented show of 
unity and support, invoked the provision in Article 5 stating an attack on one is 
equivalent to an attack on all members.  Article 5 of the NATO Treaty (1949) states: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defence 
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recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area (NATO,1949). 
Such declarations for self-defense to a transnational armed threat, the use of 
military force on an international scale, and the unification necessary to ensure the 
security and stability of the international system demonstrate to a degree beyond even 
most other just wars, that this particular armed conflict had risen to the legitimate level of 
war.   
Typically the laws governing why and when states go to war are distinct from 
how the parties to the conflict conduct themselves during the war.  That line becomes 
blurred when states declare war against a non-state actor, such as al Qaeda, whose actions 
define its raison d’etre.  The tremendous emotions driving America’s response to the 9/11 
attacks by al Qaeda members contributed greatly to the blurring of that distinction and 
complicated the identification of legitimate parties to the conflict.  The blurred distinction 
is reflected in three American policy decisions: 1) the decision to go to war against 
groups operating beyond the accepted margins of legitimacy, 2) the linkage of al Qaeda 
to the Taliban to justify the invasion of Afghanistan, and 3) simultaneously using the 
same political/operational linkage to deny their legitimacy as lawful combatants.  The 
Law of War attempts to clarify those distinctions and, when taken within its full context, 
provides a solid and honorable framework for the conduct of warfare between all types of 
belligerents.  The purpose of the Law of War is to prevent an uncontrollable spiral of 
violence and retribution between each side.  “Parties to an armed conflict retain the same 
rights and obligations without regard to which party initiated hostilities and whether that 
conduct is justifiable under international law.  Otherwise, each party would routinely 
regard its enemy as unlawfully engaging in war and would thus feel justified in taking 
whatever measures might be seen as necessary to accomplish its defeat” (Elsea, 2002, pp. 
10-11).  In short, parties to a conflict don’t automatically lose their rights and protections 
simply for unlawful conduct; they must be given due process under the law.  However, 
due process is only required to take place before prosecution and punishment for war 
crimes, and POWs can be legally and legitimately held until the end of hostilities. 
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Colin Gray has written with a degree of skepticism about the conception of “war” 
against terrorism and Al Qaeda.  He writes, “The United States declares that it is a 
country at war, a commitment that flatters the contemporary foe more than a little.  No 
matter how impressed one may be by the prowess of whatever al Qaeda is today, its 
menace does not, and will never, bear even a remote resemblance to that posed by the 
Soviet Union” (Gray, 2006, FN 16, p. 50).    Gray’s entire monograph reinforces the little 
understood fact that war and warfare (the conduct of war) is determined and driven by 
context.  To emphasize the importance of context, Gray says “War is about politics and 
warfare always is about people” (Gray, 2006, p. 27).  This is undoubtedly true; however, 
the degree of the threat does not inter alia determine the existence of a state of war.  The 
degree of the threat, particularly in low intensity warfare, is neither fixed, nor definitive.  
Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, the conclusion of this author is that the armed 
conflict with al Qaeda does in fact rise to the level of war.  
The argument presented by the Bush Administration for not categorizing Al 
Qaeda members as Prisoners of War could therefore be considered illogical and 
inconsistent at a primary level.  Nevertheless, the United States has presented and 
justified two primary reasons for treating al Qaeda members, and essentially all detainees 
in the War on Terror, as “unlawful enemy combatants” (Bybee, 2002): 1)al Qaeda and its 
affiliates are not a state, are neither signatories to, nor compliant with, the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, and, therefore, not entitled to its protections, and 2) If the United States 
bestowed Geneva Conventions privileges and protections upon parties to conflicts with 
the United States who were not entitled to them, then there would be no motivation for 
said parties to comply with them.  Yet neither of these two arguments logically stands on 
its own merit.  Taking a historical view, the U.S. policy toward Vietnamese POWs alone 
renders both of the current arguments obsolete.  The Viet Cong and its supporters did 
comprise a state, they were not lawful combatants and neither they nor the NVA, 
complied with the Laws of War.  Despite these facts, the U.S. treated all prisoners 
captured in South Vietnam as privileged POWs precisely because America’s adversary 
did not comply with the Geneva Conventions (Aldrich, 2000).   
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To make a logical argument regarding whether detainees should hold protected 
status as POWs, one must consider the entirety of Article 4 of the Third Geneva 
Convention, which states: 
4.A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention (III), are 
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into 
the power of the enemy: 
4.A.1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as 
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
4.A.2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, 
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party 
to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this 
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, 
including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following 
conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance; 
 (c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war. 
4.A.3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a 
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.  
4.A.4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being 
members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war 
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services 
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have 
received authorization, from the armed forces which they accompany, who 
shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the 
annexed model.  
4.A.5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the 
merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the 
conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other 
provisions of international law.  
4.A.6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the 
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without 
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having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided 
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.  
4.B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the 
present Convention:  
4.B.1. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the 
occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason 
of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated 
them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in 
particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin 
the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, 
or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to 
internment (Geneva Convention III, 1949).  
Applying the documented evidence of what the U.S. knew about al Qaeda and the 
Taliban to the complete framework of the Third Conventions (GPW), Article 4 can 
reasonably lead one to a different conclusion than that of the Bush Administration’s 
policy regarding the categorization and treatment of al Qaeda and the Taliban in the War 
on Terror.   But since the central issue regarding detainee status derives from a small 
portion of the Third Geneva Convention, Article 4.A(2), the question of combatant status 
must be answered first.  The essential elements of analysis for this determination are 
found in the conditions of Article 4A.  The four criteria established in Article 4A “are 
meant to ensure that only persons authorized to fight on behalf of a higher authority who 
is responsible for their conduct will participate, excluding civilians as both combatants 
and targets” (Elsea, 2005, p. 28).    
Essentially, based in some immeasurable degree upon the emotional response to 
the 9/11 attacks, President Bush and his cadre of legal advisors appear to have prejudged 
America’s enemies from Washington, D.C., and effectively ruled as the competent 
tribunal in Afghanistan by deciding that neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda were lawful 
combatants, and were therefore unworthy of the protections guaranteed by the Geneva 
Conventions.  The President’s decision was based on the 22 January 2002 
recommendation from the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice 
(OLC) “that the Third Geneva Convention as a whole does not apply to al Qaeda since 
(1) ‘Al Qaeda is not a State’ and (2) the members of al Qaeda failed to satisfy the four 
basic criteria for POW status for persons who are no part of a regular armed force” 
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(Murphy, 2004, p. 821).  On 7 February 2002, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee 
further “asserted that a Presidential determination that members of the Taliban as a whole 
fall outside the Third Geneva Convention would remove any doubt as to their status, thus 
obviating the need for individualized determinations by a competent tribunal (Murphy, 
2004, p. 823).  This was a bold move, but arguably not in accordance with the law, since 
the President could never know, with any degree of legal certainty, that every member of 
both Al Qaeda and the Taliban was culpable to the same degree.  Further, it was 
impossible for the President to determine that every person captured on the battlefield, or 
in the theater of war, was actually a combatant.  These are precisely the situations for 
which Geneva requires a competent tribunal -- to make those individual determinations of 
combatant status whenever there is “doubt.”   
Although the Congressional Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) did not 
specifically identify against whom the United States would go to war, Congress did 
authorize the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force” for reprisals against 
those the President identified as responsible, and for the purpose of preventing future 
attacks against the United States.  President Bush, in his 13 November 2001 Presidential 
Order, specifically identified al Qaeda as the primary party responsible for creating “a 
state of armed conflict requiring the use of United States Armed Forces” (Presidential 
Order, 13 Nov 2001). The Taliban were involved only because they had “knowingly 
harbored one or more of the individuals described” (Presidential Order, 13 Nov 2001.), 
and because they refused to turn them over to the United States.  Hence the war against al 
Qaeda came to be inextricably linked with the Taliban. 
Whether because of misconstrued moral certainty or inaccurate legal counsel, “the 
President maintained that the Taliban’s actions in violating the laws of war and closely 
associating itself with al Qaeda had the effect of stripping Taliban members of their rights 
to POW status” (Decision Not to Regard, 2002, p. 477).  The Taliban became the focus of 
military force for several reasons within the political context.  First, as the de facto 
government of Afghanistan, the Taliban, though not diplomatically recognized 
internationally, were held responsible for supporting the murderous actions of its 
“guests.”  However, as both Ruth Wedgwood and George Aldrich note, “Providing 
sanctuary to al Qaeda and sympathizing with it are wrongs, but they are not the same as 
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failing to conduct their own military operations in accordance with the laws of war.  A 
nation that assists an aggressor thereby commits a wrong, but its armed forces should not, 
as a consequence, lose their entitlement, if captured to POW status” (Aldrich, 2002, p. 
895).   
Second, Afghanistan was a “High Contracting Party” to the Geneva Conventions; 
al Qaeda was not.  Additionally, President Bush concluded “By its terms, Geneva applies 
to conflicts involving ‘High Contracting Parties,’ which can only be states” (Bush, 7 Feb 
2002).  Because al Qaeda was not considered either to be part of the Taliban or the 
Armed Forces of Afghanistan, and because they were characterized as a terrorist 
organization, they were not considered to be a formal party to the conflict.  However, 
Douglas Cassel, in his Feb. 3, 2002 Chicago Tribune article Case by Case: What Defines 
a POW?, “notes that at least one al Qaeda battalion was reportedly incorporated into the 
Taliban armed forces, possibly entitling those soldiers to POW status upon capture” 
(Elsea, 2002, FN 127, p. 24).   If true, this report further demonstrates the need for an 
Article 5 Tribunal to determine the appropriate status of detainees as soon as practicable 
after capture. 
These were the primary reasons for President Bush’s conclusion that “none of the 
provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere 
throughout the world” (Bush, 7 February 2002).  In order to justify the conflict as one of 
an international character, the United States felt compelled to acknowledge the de facto 
sovereignty of the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, rather than declare the 
separate belligerency of al Qaeda (Elsea, 2002, p. 15).   However, President Bush 
described the War on Terror as part of a “new paradigm”—acknowledging the 
belligerency of armed, transnational groups—and which “requires new thinking in the 
law of war” (Bush, 7 February 2002).  Michael Schmitt and Jennifer Elsea describe this 
paradigm as: 
forging new international law by recognizing or creating a new form of 
armed conflict, in which a state is authorized to use armed force against 
members of a para-military group in self-defense outside its own territory 




obligations of belligerents appear to be severed, so that a state may wage a 
full-fledged war against persons not entitled to participate” (Elsea, 2002, 
p. 15)  
In seeking to give the President the broadest possible authorities to combat what 
they perceived as a new paradigm, the Department of Justice and White House Legal 
Counsel failed to properly account for the fact that the Geneva Conventions already 
account for this paradigm, supported by judicial decisions and customary international 
law (Elsea, 2005, FN 26, pp. 7-8).  Common Article 3, although expressly applicable 
only to conflicts “not of an international nature,” and Article 75, Protocol I Additional to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions (1977) are now “widely considered to embody the 
minimum set of rights applicable to persons in international armed conflicts … and to be 
universally binding as customary international law” (Elsea, 2005, FN 26,28, pp. 7-8).  
Further, the International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on the Geneva 
Conventions notes “This minimum requirement in the case of a non-international armed 
conflict, is a fortiori applicable in international conflicts” (Pictet, 1960, p. 14).  Had the 
U.S. ratified the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the complete 
framework for conceptualizing and acting on this new paradigm would have been 
available. 
As historian John Vincent noted, “History is about evidence.  It is also about other 
things: hunches, imagination, interpretation, guesswork.  First and foremost, though, 
comes evidence: no evidence, no history” (as cited in Gray, 2006, p. 29).  The process by 
which OLC analyzed the first criteria for defining whether either the Taliban or al Qaeda 
met the standard for a regular armed force or militia seems to have been made in the 
absence of evidence.  The 22 Jan OLC Memorandum noted “that the Justice Department 
has not been appraised of how the Taliban units were organized and operated, and thus 
the Department was not in a position to apply its legal analysis to the Taliban” (Murphy, 
2004, p. 822).  OLC finally did consider the issue after the Defense Department provided 
“facts” regarding the Taliban’s modus operandi to the Justice Department (Murphy, 
2004, p. 823).  Assistant Attorney General Bybee subsequently recommended to the 
President in his 7 February 2002 Memorandum “that no members of the Taliban militia 
were entitled to POW status” (Murphy, 2004, p. 823).  Because the Taliban described 
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themselves as militia, rather than the armed forces of Afghanistan, Mr. Bybee’s analysis 
appeared to be mostly guesswork based on the four criteria listed in the Third Geneva 
Convention, Article 4A(2).  In his own memorandum of 7 February 2002, President Bush 
proclaimed that he accepted the legal conclusions of the Office of Legal Counsel and that 
neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda qualify as lawful combatants and Prisoners of War, but 
that as a matter of policy, they would be treated humanely and “in a manner consistent 
with the principles of Geneva (Bush, 7 Feb 2002).     
Regarding the organizational effectiveness and capability of al Qaeda, the 9/11 
Commission reported several interesting facts that contradict one of the key elements in 
the Bush Administration’s justification not to treat al Qaeda as POWs.  According to the 
9/11 report, bin Laden drove the creation and development of an organization whose 
“9/11 attacks … were far more elaborate, precise, and destructive than any earlier 
assaults” (9/11 Report, 2004, p. 3).  Having built a dynamic, sophisticated, and lethal 
organization upon an ambitious political and radical Islamist ideological foundation, Bin 
Laden forged a close alliance with the Taliban, a regime providing sanctuary for al Qaeda 
(9/11 Report, 2004, p. 4).  More importantly, the 9/11 Commission reports that by 
September 11, 2001, al Qaeda possessed: 
• Leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and 
direction of a major operation; 
• A personnel system that could recruit candidates, indoctrinate 
them, vet them, and give them the necessary training; 
• Communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of 
operatives and those who would be helping them; 
• An intelligence effort to gather required information and form 
assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses;  
• The ability to move people great distances; 
• The ability to raise and move the money necessary to finance an 
attack (9/11 Report, 2004, p. 4). 
“Between 1996–2001, Al Qaeda acted in a similar way to a venture-capitalist firm, 
sponsoring projects submitted by a variety of groups or individuals in the hope that they 
would be profitable.  Together these links … allow us to speak of a loose ‘network of 
networks’” (Burke, 2004, p. 13). Clearly then, al Qaeda were more capable, 
sophisticated, and formal an organization than the Taliban.  Taking the idea a step 
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further, Bin Laden and Zawahiri have always ensured that al Qaeda claimed 
responsibility for an attack that al Qaeda either executed or sponsored.  Doing so was in 
their best political interest because they generated recruits, funding, support, and even 
more options for future attacks.  The implication of this analysis is that the bureaucratic 
team of legal advisors, tasked to make sure the President had the best information 
possible, made an arbitrary legal determination that al Qaeda had no formal chain of 
command primarily because they failed to understand it. 
With regards to the three other conditions that must be fulfilled to receive 
protections as POWs under Geneva, namely having a fixed or distinctive insignia, of 
carrying arms openly, and of complying with the laws of war, “it seems insufficient for 
the United States merely to assert an absence of distinction without adducing evidence, 
and it appears most unlikely in any event that all units of the Taliban’s armed forces were 
indistinguishable from civilians” (Aldrich, 2002, p. 895). 
As a matter of record, Secretary of State Colin Powell did ask President Bush to 
reconsider his position on the combatant status and POW issue.  In a draft Memorandum 
from Secretary of State Powell to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales on 26 January 
2002, Secretary Powell’s opinion was that the President’s policy would “reverse over a 
century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine 
the protections of the law of war for our troops, both in this specific conflict and in 
general, would have a high cost in terms of negative international reaction, and would be 
challenged in international forums, such as the International Court of Justice” (Powell, 26 
Jan 2002, as cited in Murphy, 2004, p. 822).   
Analyzing Secretary Powell’s concerns beyond their bounded legal parameters, 
there is no historical basis for the assertion that other Parties to Conflict with the United 
States will treat U.S. prisoners in contravention to the Geneva Conventions based solely 
on whether or not the United States grants those protections to the prisoners it captures in 
combat.  The treatment other states have afforded U.S. POWs has been dependent 
primarily upon the political and strategic contexts (Gray, 2006, pp. 17-19) within which 
the war is fought.  While context matters, state practice has also played an important role 
in terms of international legitimacy. Specifically: 
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State practice does not appear to support the conclusion that the armed 
forces of states have been categorically denied eligibility for POW status 
on the basis that the army did not comply completely with the law of war.  
Indeed, U.S. practice has been to accord POW status generously to 
irregulars, to support such status for irregular forces at times, and to raise 
objections whenever an adversary has sought to deny U.S. personnel POW 
status based on a general accusation that the U.S. forces were not in 
compliance with some aspect of the law of war (Elsea, 2005, pp. 8-9). 
One of the most defining wars for the U.S. Army, among the multitude of low 
intensity conflicts throughout America’s history, was the Vietnam War.  Even though the 
Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas and their civilian sympathizers were not technically lawful, or 
privileged, combatants, and although neither the VC nor the North Vietnamese Army 
(NVA) complied with the laws of war, United States policy was to treat all detainees in 
the Vietnam War as privileged POWs (Aldrich, 2002).  The political objective behind 
that decision was arguably to demonstrate the contrast between the legal and customary 
treatment of Vietnamese prisoners by the U.S. with the illegal and torturous treatment of 
American POWs by the North Vietnamese.  However, because of the increasing 
complexity of irregular warfare, the Vietnam conflict marked the first implementation of 
written procedures for the Third Geneva Convention (GPW) Article 5 tribunals designed 
to categorize and adjudicate POW status (Elsea, 2005, p. 35).  They were not needed 
previously, because U.S. policy was that all captives were afforded POW status upon 
capture.  Vietnamese captives were also treated as POWs until and unless the Article 5 
Tribunal soon after adjudicated their status based on three categories of irregular enemy 
combatants: guerrillas, self-defense forces, and secret self-defense forces (Elsea, 2005, p. 
35).  These combatants were denied privileged POW status if they were captured 
performing acts of terrorism, sabotage, or espionage, but “those not treated as POWs 
were treated as civil defendants, and were accorded the substantive and procedural 
protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC).  This approach met with the approval 
of the ICRC” (Elsea, 2005, p. 35).   
In the Philippines during the Spanish-American War (1898-1902), “U.S. policy 
was to accord POW status to members of the insurgent army, recognized by the 
Philippine government, who complied in general with the four conditions required by 
Geneva Conventions” (Elsea, 2005, p. 27).  In Grenada, where U.S. forces fought Cuban 
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and Grenadian armed forces, the conflict was characterized as international in nature and 
all captives were treated as POWs until or unless a more accurate determination was 
made (Elsea, 2005, p. 35).  “In U.S. operations in Somalia and Haiti … captured persons 
were termed ‘detainees’ and were treated ‘in accordance with the humanitarian, but not 
administrative or technical standards of the GPW’” (Elsea, 2005, p. 37).  In Panama 
during Operation JUST CAUSE, members of the Panamanian Defense Forces were 
categorized as “detainees,” but were treated as POWs (Elsea, 2005, p.37).  After 
hostilities terminated, a three-officer Tribunal conducted more than 4,000 detainee 
classifications and turned over all but 100 to the new Panamanian government (Elsea, 
2005, p. 37).  And finally, during the 1991 Gulf War, the United States did not set up any 
POW camps; rather they processed the thousands of POWs who either surrendered or 
were captured, and turned them over to the Saudi Arabian Army for detention (Elsea, 
2005, p. 38).  After Saddam capitulated, the Army conducted 1,191 Article 5 Tribunals 
(Elsea, 2005, p. 38).  Logically and legally then, historical precedent provides that should 
the United States declare “war” against an irregular enemy (an individual, such as bin 
Laden, a group such as the Taliban, or a networked organization such as al Qaeda), that 
as a matter of policy, the U.S. also should treat the captives taken in that complex, 
irregular conflict as POWs.   
In another example during the Korean War, while the North Koreans brutalized 
American POWs, the Chinese Communist forces, “specifically avoiding the appearance 
of brutality, engaged in what they termed their ‘lenient policy,’ which was in reality a 
concerted and sophisticated psychological assault on their captives” (Cialdini, 1993, p. 
70).  “It is important to understand that the major intent of the Chinese was not simply to 
extract information from their prisoners.  It was to indoctrinate them, to change their 
attitudes and perceptions of themselves, of their political system, of their country’s role in 
the war, and of communism.  And there is evidence that the program often worked 
alarmingly well” (Cialdini, 1993, pp. 74-75).   
Why did the Chinese and North Koreans treat American POWs so differently?  
Because they each had different political and strategic goals, for which the American 
prisoners had a role.  The North Koreans were fighting for survival and political 
domination over the whole of the peninsula, so they treated American prisoners as 
39 
leverage with which to gain political concessions after the war.  The Chinese, however, 
were fighting for ideology and their strategic reputation.  As a result, they took a long-
term approach knowing that the small concessions they convinced American POWs to 
make served to slowly indoctrinate those prisoners who would carry home a more 
positive view of China and of communism (Cialdini, 1993, p. 71, 75).   
Further evidence for the “sovereignty of context” (Gray, 2006) regarding POW 
treatment can be found by examining the treatment of American POWs by its enemies in 
wars since ratification of the Geneva Conventions in 1949.  Although this analysis is 
based somewhat on anecdotal evidence, it is strikingly evident that virtually none of 
America’s adversaries have complied with the legal and customary rules for the conduct 
of warfare and the protections afforded prisoners of war.  During the Cold War,  
all of the then-Communist states made a reservation to Article 85 of 
Geneva Convention No. III to the effect that they refused to accept 
continued POW status for prisoners of war who were tried and convicted 
of war crimes or crimes against humanity.  North Korea and North 
Vietnam, however, denied POW status to all American prisoners solely on 
the basis of the allegation that they were all war criminals (due to 
American military aggression) (Aldrich, 2000, p. 896).   
Further, none of the American service-members who were captured in the Persian Gulf 
War, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, or the War in Iraq received Geneva Conventions 
protections expected for lawful combatants.  Rather, they have been subjected to torture, 
rape, mutilation, disappearance, and murder, among other inhumane treatment and 
humiliation.  In every one of those conflicts, one could argue, the treatment of prisoners 
was based on the political, strategic, or socio-cultural context of the fight.  Finding a 
direct correlation between American treatment of enemy prisoners and the enemy’s 
treatment of our prisoners would be difficult.  Therefore, Secretary Powell’s argument 
that the U.S. cannot afford to provide Geneva Conventions protections to illegal enemy 
combatants because no one else will comply with them contradicts the evidence and fails 
to interpret or understand the different contexts of each and every war; however, it does 
demonstrate his unwavering support for the moral principles upholding the GPW.    
The irony of President Bush’s policies toward al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Iraq is 
that they seem only to represent a symptom of a larger political problem. The 
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fundamental disagreement that a growing number of Americans have with the Bush 
Administration’s policies seems to be less focused on the intended political outcomes of 
the wars against al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Iraq, but rather more focused the 
governmental structures and processes developed to achieve those outcomes.  In other 
words, Americans seems to understand that how we fight is as important to identity and 
ideology as winning the fight.  One of the underlying concerns felt by many citizens is 
that we likely risk losing the very things that make us uniquely “American” by pursuing 
the wrong policies, or by pursuing the right policies wrongly.  It may be somewhat easier 
to relate this irony to the most recent American military experiences by reflecting once 
again on Clausewitz: 
In short, at the highest level the art of war turns into policy—but a policy 
conducted by fighting battles rather than by sending diplomatic notes. . . . 
No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of 
political factors; and when people talk . . . about harmful political 
influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they 
mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. 
If the policy is right—that is, successful—any intentional effect it has on 
the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect, 
the policy itself is wrong (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 168).  
This particular quote is relevant to our analysis because Senator Inouye’s warning 
to President George H.W. Bush about the political effects of a drawn out conflict seem 
especially prescient given the drawn-out, open-ended nature of both the Iraq War and the 
War on Terror.  A clear illustration of this effect is provided by the multitude of daily 
polls reporting, as of this writing, that the President’s approval rating has reached a new 
low.  Each new poll, whether from Pew, Gallup, or Zogby, is striking for the increasing 
contrast of the results of American approval for the war at its outset.  In his article, 
“Notes on Low Intensity Warfare,” Edward Luttwak makes a convincing case for a 
causal link between the manner in which a war is fought and the subsequent increase or 
decline in public support (Luttwak, 1983, p. 334).  Adding his own considerable weight 
to this notion is Colin Gray, who wrote “revolutionary change in warfare may be less 
important than is revolutionary change in attitudes toward war and the military.  The 
future American way(s) of war, singular or plural, will be shaped by the social and 
cultural context which defines the bounds of acceptable military behavior …” (Gray, 
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2006, p. 33).   Each of these ideas can be cause for concern if, at some point in the future, 
the American public deems the U.S. military’s prosecution of war against both 
transnational and sub-national insurgents, as being beyond the boundaries of acceptable, 
American behavior.  
Particularly in its second term, the Bush Administration encompasses not only the 
Executive Branch, but it also seems to have been able to exert significant political control 
over the Republican-controlled Congress, and has, through the Republican majority in 
Congress, shaped the future decisions of the Supreme Court through the confirmation of 
avowedly conservative Justices, to include the Chief Justice.  In short, the backlash of 
public opinion against the President and his wielding of Executive power and political 
influence seem to reflect the perception of his increasingly unchecked power in what 
could be described as developing into what James Madison warned Americans about ... 
“a tyranny of the majority.”  Madison wrote in Federalist # 47, “The accumulations of all 
powers in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny” 
(Madison, 1788, p. 301).  “The problem of majority tyranny arises, however, when the 
self-interested majority does not need to worry about defections.  When the majority is 
fixed and permanent, there are no checks on its ability to be overbearing.  A majority that 
does not worry about defectors is a majority with total power” (Guinier, 1994, p. 560). 
Madison’s solution to this danger was through a diverse system of checks and balances 
intended “not to transcend different interests but to reconcile them” (Guinier, 1994, p. 
560).   The problem has seemed, at least intuitively to some Americans, to be precisely 
that the system of checks and balances was no longer able to reconcile interests; instead 
the system appeared to be united by common ones.  The problem, in a word, is factions. 
In Federalist # 10, Madison also warned about the dangers of factions, which he 
described as “a number of citizens … who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent 
or aggregate interests of the community” (Madison, 1878, p. 78).  There are a number of 
Congressional representatives, in both the House and the Senate, who have worked hard 
to align their political platforms to appeal to the growing number of radical Christian 
factions which have increasingly intruded into government and politics (Brinkley, 2006).  
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This relationship was made clear recently in a speech to the Georgetown University Law 
School by retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who spoke about the 
“direct threat posed to our Constitutional freedoms and the independence of the judiciary 
from attacks by some Congressional Republicans … motivated by nakedly partisan 
reasoning” (O’Connor, 2006, as cited in Totenberg, 2006).  O’Connor implied that the 
partisan reasoning may have much to do with campaign monies received from religious 
political action committees.  She supported her warning by quoting a Texas Congressman 
who called for mass impeachments of the Judiciary at a meeting of a conservative 
Christian group last year because of rulings on a number of issues with which religious 
factions have vigorously disagreed (O’Connor, 2006, as cited in Totenberg, 2006).  One 
Texas Senator even spoke of a connection between violence against judges and court 
decisions the Senator disagreed with  (O’Connor, 2006, as cited in Totenberg, 2006).  
Justice O’Connor concluded her remarks with a definitive warning against permitting a 
rise in the power of factions: 
I am against judicial reforms driven by nakedly partisan reasoning. 
Pointing to the experiences of developing countries and former communist 
countries where interference with an independent judiciary has allowed 
dictatorship to flourish, we must be ever-vigilant against those who would 
strongarm the judiciary into adopting their preferred policies. It takes a lot 
of degeneration before a country falls into dictatorship, she said, but we 
should avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings (O’Connor, 2006, as 
cited in Totenberg, 2006). 
Although an apparent majority tyranny appeared to be developing across the highest 
levels of American government, two external events seem to have provided sufficient 
fuel for an effective competition to regulate and reconcile American political power.  The 
first was the destruction of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, Iraq and the second 
event was the Republican initiation of the 2008 Presidential election campaign.   
The destruction of the Golden Dome Mosque by sectarian forces represents a 
“tipping point” (Gladwell, 2002) in the Iraq War, potentially as politically potent as the 
1968 Tet Offensive was to President Lyndon Johnson’s term during the Vietnam War.  
The loss of the Golden Dome Mosque is important politically because it clearly 
demonstrated to the American public and the world that the situation in Iraq was much 
worse than was being reported and portrayed by America’s political and military 
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leadership.  The public has developed a healthy skepticism of government officials due 
primarily to the Tet Offensive, Watergate, the Iran-Hostage (and failed rescue) Crisis, 
Iran-Contra Affair, Somalia, Bosnia, and Clintongate/Monicagate.  America has 
developed this skepticism of its political leaders because of their periodic 
misrepresentation of the facts regarding individual leadership and policy failures. The 
“spin” has frequently failed to match the facts.   
Equally important, the destruction of the Golden Dome Mosque seems to mark 
the beginning of a sectarian civil war.  Regardless of the Coalition success in building the 
framework of a legitimate and functioning Iraqi democracy out of the vacuum left by 
toppling the Saddam Hussein regime, the basic fact is that neither the armed forces nor 
the police have been able to provide the first and most basic need for the Iraqi people – 
security (McCormick lecture, 2005).  Whether the increasing violence in Iraq is directly 
related to a regional security situation that seems to be spiraling out of control has yet to 
be seen.  But the common thread that many seem to be weaving into this nightmare 
scenario is that it has been directly caused by U.S. intervention.  Further, and even more 
disturbing, the power vacuum created by regime change in Iraq seems to have created an 
opportunity for Iran to act on both its nuclear aspirations and its drive to become the 
regional hegemon.   The problems associated with regime change were precisely the 
reason that President George H.W. Bush did not invade Iraq in 1991. Says former 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft of the decision: 
Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the United 
Nations’ mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international 
response to aggression that we hoped to establish.  Had we gone the 
invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying 
power in a bitterly hostile land.  It would have been a dramatically 
different – and perhaps barren – outcome (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, p. 
489).    
However, the current political reality seems to stem primarily from the resultant 
permissive political context in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.  That political reality 
today reflects the clear political mandate that was given in 2004 to both the President and 
the Republican-controlled Congress to continue the policies implemented in reaction to 
9/11.   
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The second event that has begun to fuel the competition for power and influence 
in Washington, DC and beyond, was the initiation of the 2008 Presidential Election 
campaign by the Republican caucus in Memphis, Tennessee.   Perhaps by coincidence, 
this event followed soon after the destruction of the Golden Dome Mosque.  Of all the 
top issues to be addressed in the upcoming campaign, it seems both logical and likely that 
one of the most crucial to victory will be the continued struggle for primacy of 
constitutional powers of each branch.  In the wake of these two events, Congress seems 
to be attempting to assert greater control, or at least oversight, over the conduct of both 
U.S. national security policy and foreign policy, both of which have traditionally been 
within the realm of Executive powers. 
What should be clear in the context of this broad swing in public support, 
particularly within Congress, is that the constitutional system of checks and balances 
works.  Whether or not there was a credible attempt to establish governmental tyranny 
may never be known because the stability of American government has succeeded once 
again due to the homeostatic process of republican democracy, which ensures a return to 
equilibrium whenever disruptive factors influence the values or environment in society 
(Johnson, 1982, p. 55).  James Madison would likely agree, but would contribute this 
political homeostasis to “controlling the effects of faction” (Madison, 1787, p. 78).  
Although the initial political context of the War on Terror and the Iraq War reflected a 
broad unity across all branches of government, the conduct and prosecution of the war 
has eroded that support (Luttwak, 1983, p. 334).  What should be clear at this point is that 
the conflict with Al Qaeda is not a law enforcement enterprise.  It is war, with political 
objectives dominating the policies of both sides.  Within the framework of American 
policy, two issues are at the forefront of the political and socio-cultural context: war 
powers and human rights.  With respect to these issues, as public support goes, so goes 
political support for policies by elected officials, particularly in preparation for elections. 
The reason for these changes, says Bernard Brodie, is “The only empirical data we have 
about how people conduct war and behave under its stresses is our experience with it in 
the past, however much we have to make adjustments for subsequent changes in 
conditions” (Brodie, 1976, as cited in Gray, 2006, p. 1).   
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 IV. STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING ANALYSIS OF 
UNITED STATES DETAINEE POLICY  
A. INTRODUCTION  
The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer – 
often, indeed, to the decider himself . . . . There will always be the dark 
and tangled stretches in the decision-making process – mysterious even to 
those who may be most intimately involved. 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy (as cited in Allison, 1971) 
Communicated in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, considered by many 
to be the most dangerous moment in all of human history, President Kennedy’s words 
remain an appropriate reminder that the ways and means of the strategic decision-making 
process at all levels of government are neither always rational, nor are they clearly 
always consistent with the ends broadly believed to define the national interest.    “It has 
been noted that national security decisions are so important that they ought to be ‘above’ 
politics, personalities and organizational self interests . . . Careful study of the national 
security decision-making process reveals, however, that this ‘ideal’ is not always 
achieved” (Naval War College, An Introduction to the Input-Output Model).   
Particularly when nations are at war, history notes the failures of policy to achieve 
the “ideal.”  In associating wartime policies to the national interest, the wisdom of 
Clausewitz’ words retain their historic eloquence, relevance and truth: 
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to 
the given case.  As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always 
make war a remarkable trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, 
and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play 
of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; 
and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which 
makes it subject to reason alone (Clausewitz, 1832, as cited in Gray, C., 
2006, p. 1). 
One could argue that the subordination of war as an instrument of policy derives from the 
other parts of the trinity.  Policy must be subject to reason alone precisely because the 
influence of such “blind natural forces,” combined with the interplay of randomness and 
probability, would cause the conduct of warfare in pursuit of the superior policy to 
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devolve into the kinds of primordial violence that the Geneva Conventions and the other 
customary laws of war were supposed to prevent.  Subordination of these “dominant 
tendencies” in war must be accomplished by some stronger force(s) which can control the 
public’s “noncognitive passion, guided by an instinctive faith that a population invests in 
the intellectual judgment and wisdom of its trusted political leaders” (Darley, 2005, p. 
126).  These “dominant tendencies” are controlled, and successful political conditions 
established, by what Clausewitz called the moral elements: 
The moral elements are among the most important in war.  They constitute 
the spirit that permeates the war as a whole, and at an early stage, they 
establish a close affinity with the will that moves and leads the whole 
mass of force. . . . One might say that the physical seem little more than 
the wooden hilt, while the moral forces are the precious metal, the real 
weapon, the finely-honed blade. . . . So policy converts the overwhelming 
destructive element of war into a mere policy instrument.  It changes the 
terrible battle-sword that a man needs both his hands and his entire 
strength to wield, and with which he strikes home once and no more, into 
a light, handy rapier—sometimes just a foil for exchange of thrusts, feints, 
and parries (Clausewitz, 1832, pp. 184-185, 606). 
Thus, Clausewitz equated superior policy with strong and clear moral elements, both of 
which served to control the instrument of war with intentional precision.  He conversely 
warned that weak policy mirrors a weakness of the moral forces of a state, ultimately 
leading to lack of public support and national will (Darley, 2005, p. 127).  What this 
chapter intends to show is that the decision not to regard the Taliban and Al Qaeda as 
protected under the Geneva Conventions was a causal variable in the reprehensible 
abuses that happened to detainees at Abu Ghraib.  Specifically, the United States’ 
detainee policy was constructed seeking “actionable intelligence” as “an antidote” (Gray, 
2006, p. 45) to the revolutionary transnational insurgency led by Al Qaeda; and applied in 
the permissive political environment after 9/11, this specific policy decision drove a 
fundamental change in the core tasks of the military, which were unsuitable for producing 
the desired “antidote” within the existing organizational structure.  The implications of 
this policy decision are far-reaching, opening a Pandora’s Box of moral and legal pitfalls 
that run the risk of eroding the sense of obligation which drove America, as a nation of 




Anyone familiar with the process of coordination between and within government 
bureaucracies will immediately recognize the improbability of accurately predicting the 
final results of any intra-governmental coordination.  More to the point, a careful 
examination of the detainee policy decision-making process only reinforces the 
unpredictability of these final policy outcomes in consonance with each other.  Rather 
than picking any particular element of the process for examination in order to reduce the 
process to a single causal variable, this model embraces the complexity of the correlating 
factors influencing the President’s ultimate decision.  And while the bureaucrats utilize 
the weight, influence, and processes of the organizations to which they belong to battle 
the President over the structure, participants, and intended outcomes of policy decisions, 
what has become apparent through exhaustive study of American bureaucracy is “People 
matter, but organization matters also, and tasks matter most of all” (Wilson, 1989, p. 
173).  In the end, however, “The best analysts of . . . policy manage to weave strands of 
each of the . . . conceptual models into their explanations” (Allison, 1971, p. 259).  The 
adaptation of Amy Zegart’s National Security Agency Model to explain national security 
policy will attempt to weave together just such a conceptual model.  
According to the Schlesinger Panel Report, “Although there were a number of 
contributing causes for detainee abuses, policy processes were inadequate or deficient in 
certain respects at various levels: Department of Defense (DoD), CENTCOM, Coalition 
Forces Land Component Command, and the individual holding facility or prison” 
(Schlesinger Panel, 2004, p. 33). As this Independent Panel was chartered to review only 
DoD policy and operations, they declined to examine the origins of the policy at its 
source.  However, because this was a presidential policy, one can only achieve a true 
understanding of the decision-making process by examining the actual decision which 
caused the action to occur.  A crucial aspect of Abu Ghraib is not that torture and/or 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners can actually happen.  The 
experiments of both Dr. Stanley Milgram and Dr. Philip Zimbardo, as well as a host of 
real-world cases demonstrates the proclivity of human nature to perpetrate such abhorrent 
acts, whether done under authority, or in order to gain some perverse sense of pleasure or 
power.  What their experiments also demonstrate is that people will exponentially 
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increase the intensity of this cruel and degrading treatment in the absence of 
accountability.  These facts are not of primary concern.  Rather, the critical aspect for one 
to consider is that a specific policy was developed for the purpose of degrading the 
individual as the means toward the political, military, and strategic end of gathering 
information.   This policy was developed using limited analysis and a flawed decision-
making process, which permitted and encouraged the notion that these “unlawful 
combatants” (Detter, 2000, p. 987, as cited in Bybee, 7 Feb 2002, p. 6) had somehow 
forfeited their unalienable rights as human beings for their association with sworn 
terrorist enemies of the United States, and further, that upon capture, they should be 
treated at some level below the standard set by the Constitution and the entire body of 
international human rights and humanitarian law.  What this section will show, through 
the detailed analysis of the national security policy-making process, is that the legal 
opinions used to justify the President’s decision to withhold the application of Geneva 
Conventions protections from al Qaeda and Taliban detainees as a matter of policy may 
have been insufficiently reasoned and may have created significant legal and moral 
consequences for the military and the country. 
1. National Security Agency Model Framework Adapted for National 
Security Policy Analysis 
The development of national security policy, much like the development of 
national security agencies, is simultaneously a matter of organization, ongoing interests 
of relevant political actors, and exogenous events (Zegart, 1999, pp. 7, 42-44).  In her 
National Security Agency Model, Amy Zegart asserts that “national security 
organizations are not rationally designed to serve the national interest” (Zegart, 1999, p. 
8) (defined as “an objective that is expected to contribute to the national security or 
general welfare of the nation” (Zegart, note 5, p. 248)).  She derived her assertion from 
the development of five propositions that explain the design and evolution of three 
national security agencies which “grew out of political conflicts and compromises among 
self-interested players” (Zegart, 1999, p. 8).  The five propositions of Zegart’s National 




1) The Executive Branch drives initial agency design. 
2) Agencies reflect conflict between contending bureaucrats and the 
president.  As a result, agencies are not well designed to promote the 
national interests. 
3) The executive branch drives agency evolution. 
4) Congress exercises only sporadic and ineffectual oversight; legislators 
have weak incentives and blunt tools. 
5) An individual agency’s evolution can be explained by three factors.  
They are, in order of descending importance: initial agency structure, 
the ongoing interests of relevant political actors, and exogenous events 
(Zegart, 1999, p. 10).  
The reasons, Zegart contends, that national security agencies are not designed to 
serve the national interest are perfectly rational: The key players have more incentive to 
consider their own organizations than the national interest; only presidents have the 
incentive to think primarily of the national interest (Zegart, 1999, p. 8).  As a result, the 
national security apparatus within the political context of the executive branch is a 
suboptimally performing bureaucracy, within which the incentives, interests, and 
capabilities of its major players, among whom national security policy is primarily 
developed, are designed to serve the bureaucratic organizations they represent and lead 
(Zegart, 1999, p. 9).  Because the development of national security agencies and national 
security policy occur at the same political level and amongst the same self-interested 
players, applying Zegart’s National Security Agency model to national security policy, 
the output of these agencies, is the next logical step in analysis.   
a. Proposition 1: The Executive Branch Drives Initial Policy 
Design (Zegart, 1999, p. 10). 
President Bush’s Military Order of 13 November 2001, Detention, 
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Bush, 2001) 
defined the parameters of the war against members of al Qaeda and set the conditions for 
detainee treatment as “unlawful combatants” (Detter, 2000, pp. 136-137, as cited in 
Bybee, 7 February 2002, p. 6) in the war in Afghanistan, or wherever in the world this 
war against terror would take them.   The impact and implications of this Military Order 
have been extensive.  This order, and the policy that proceeded, initiated changes and 
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backlash in political, military, and socio-cultural contexts that, because of the innate fear 
inspired by both the 9/11 attacks and America’s response, have been heretofore 
incomprehensible.  For President Bush, and for much of America, al Qaeda really had 
ushered in a “new paradigm” (Bush, 2002), and presented a significant challenge to the 
means by which America was bound to respond.  The President sought a way to 
transcend those bounds in order to overcome the terrorists opening advantage. 
In his book, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They 
Do It, author James Q. Wilson presents an extraordinary explanation of the role of 
executives within a bureaucracy and the influence they wield in their leadership over it.  
What is of particular relevance to this model is the primacy of what he calls “Turf” 
(Wilson, p. 179), and an executive’s autonomy, defined in two aspects as both 
“independence of action and jurisdiction within their domain” (Wilson, p. 182), and 
“identity or mission—a widely shared and approved understanding of the central tasks of 
the agency” (Wilson, p. 182).  Because organizational maintenance is the “special 
domain of the executive” (Wilson, p. 181), he or she has a different relationship with the 
organization than every other member within it. “To a government executive, an increase 
in autonomy lowers the cost of organizational maintenance” (Wilson, p. 183) in both 
aspects of his or her domain.  This is particularly true for the President. 
While domestic policy is often developed using a bottom-up process, 
“national security policy is presidential policy.  And bureaucrats—from soldiers to 
diplomats to spies—have a stake in how the overall national security apparatus is 
designed” (Zegart, 1999, p. 39).  Zegart further explains the inter-relationship of these 
stakeholders: “But in national security affairs, presidents and bureaucrats are the primary 
players, battling over agency structure . . . suggest[ing] that the politics of bureaucratic 
structure takes place even in the absence of interest groups” (Zegart, 1999, p. 7).    
(1) Bounded Rationality.  In order to “understand the basic 
features of organizational structure as they derive from the characteristics and human 
problem-solving” (Allison, 1971, p. 71), one needs first to understand at least some of the 
basic theory underlying organizational processes.  For this Graham Allison sheds some 
light on the concept of “bounded rationality” developed by organization theorist, Herbert 
Simon.  Bounded Rationality, by simplifying the variables comprising human problem-
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solving capacity, explains why “the physical and psychological limits of man’s capacity 
as alternative generator, information processor, and problem solver constrain the 
decisionmaking (sic) processes of individuals and organizations” (Allison, 1971, p. 71).   
Simon defined five human bounds which limit the “powers of prescience and capacity for 
computation” (Simon, 1957, p. 3, as cited in Allison, 1971, p. 71): 
Factored Problems. Problems so complex that only a limited number of 
aspects of each problem can be attended to at a time.  The structure of an 
organization thus reflects the problems that its subunits factor (Simon, 
1957, p. 3, as cited in Allison, 1971, pp. 71-72).   
Satisficing. Maximization or optimization is replaced by satisficing.  In 
choosing, human beings do not consider all alternatives and pick the 
action with the best consequences.  Instead, they find a course of action 
that is good enough—that satisfies (Simon, 1957, p. 3, as cited in Allison, 
1971, p. 72). 
Search. Where satisficing is the rule—stopping with the first alternative 
that is good enough—the order in which alternatives are turned up is 
critical (Simon, 1957, p. 3, as cited in Allison, 1971, p. 72). 
Uncertainty Avoidance. People in organizations are quite reluctant to base 
actions on estimates of an uncertain future.  Thus choice procedures that 
emphasize short-run feedback are developed. . . . with alternate 
consequences of action by estimating probabilities of possible outcomes 
(Simon, 1957, p. 3, as cited in Allison, 1971, p. 72). 
Repertoires.  These constitute the range of effective choice in recurring 
situations (Simon, 1957, p. 3, as cited in Allison, 1971, p. 72). 
What makes this particular national security policy decision, not to 
regard detainees as POWs,  so unique is that virtually every element described in this 
synthesis of conceptual models was demonstrated in the decision-making process; yet 
bound within the traditional rationality of realpolitik.  Perhaps within this political 
context, then, the permissive political environment in the aftermath of 9/11 enabled a 
rapid consolidation of the President’s political power as the entire nation turned to 
George W. Bush for leadership to see it through the crisis.  As noted by organization 
theory icon Henry Mintzburg, during a crisis, organizations tend not to be bureaucracies.  
Rather, as environmental hostility increases, along with complexity and instability, 
organizations tend to systematically centralize information flows, control, and decision 
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making to the organization’s leader (Mintzburg, 1981).  Even in a bureaucracy as 
massive as the United States Government, the fact that this dynamic held true in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda created a temporary opportunity for the 
President and the Secretary of Defense to implement radical changes to the core tasks of 
the organizations responsible for combating al Qaeda and the Taliban.  Until that point in 
the Bush Administration’s term, any such attempts to change the Department of Defense 
had been effectively rejected.  Since that point in his term, it could be argued that the 
President has been reluctant to release his grasp on the reins of power and authority he 
wielded (admittedly by design) during the legitimate national emergency in the aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks.  
b.  Proposition 2: Policy Decisions Reflect Conflict Between 
Contending Bureaucrats and the President.  As a Result, Policies 
May Not Be Well Designed to Promote the National Interest 
(Zegart, 1999, p. 10). 
“Struggles over autonomy are visible when the organizations involved 
have similar tasks” (Wilson, 1989, p. 185).  Within the executive branch, these struggles 
over autonomy within the realm of both national security, foreign policy, and compliance 
with international law and treaty obligations were uncommonly intense between the 
Department of Defense, Department of State, and Department of Justice in the months 
following the 9/11 attacks.  However, because agency executives are most often selected 
to serve the political needs of the President (Wilson, 1989), the weight of political 
influence is not equal between them. Those who wield the greatest influence on policy 
decision-making have developed their constituency with the primary action channels 
(Allison, 1971) within the Administration and seek primarily to align their organization’s 
mission with the jurisdiction of those key players within those action channels, while 
simultaneously defending their niche against outside intrusions.  As noted by both 
Graham Allison and Amy Zegart, “The key to understanding this process (policy 
development) is to realize that no one, not even the president, has a monopoly on power” 
(Zegart, 1999, p. 19).   
The result of this bureaucratic and political “pulling and hauling” (Zegart, 
1999, p. 20) is what organization theorists call the principal-agent problem, which 
explains why presidents are frequently unable to get the policy or agency they desire.  
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“Presidents (principals) have no choice but to rely on bureaucrats (agents) who do not 
completely share their interests; this necessity, coupled with the president’s inability to 
monitor agency activity fully, provides fertile ground for bureaucratic non-compliance” 
(Zegart, 1999, p. 47).  
The implication of “pulling and hauling” (Zegart, 1999) between the 
principal and his agents on the policy outcome is that “process matters” (Zegart, 1999, p. 
19).  The lessons about the “inherently chancy” outcomes of organizational processes 
which Graham Allison drew from his extensive study of the Cuban Missile Crisis are as 
follows:  
The information and estimates available to leaders about the situation will 
reflect organizational goals and routines as well as the facts.  The 
alternatives presented to the leaders will be much narrower than the menu 
of options that would be desirable.  The execution of choices will exhibit 
unavoidable rigidities of programs and SOPs.  Coordination among 
organizations will be much less finely tuned than leaders demand or 
expect.  The prescription: considerable thought must be given to the 
routines established in the principal organizations before a crisis so that 
during the crisis organizations will be capable of performing adequately 
the needed functions. In the crisis, the overwhelming problem will be that 
of control and coordination of large organizations (Allison, 1971, p. 260). 
In trying to understand the process of coordination and decision making 
within a bureaucracy, one first must grasp that a bureaucratic organization’s success 
depends on how well it managed three key issues from the beginning of policy 
coordination.  “First, each had to decide how to perform its critical task.  By critical task, 
I mean those behaviors which, if successfully performed by key organizational members, 
would enable the organization to manage its critical environmental problem” (Wilson, 
1989, p. 25).  For President Bush and the relevant senior members of his administration, 
the critical task in the War on Terror was to generate actionable intelligence in order to 
kill or capture international terrorists.  As stated in his 13 November 2001 Military Order, 
Section 1, paragraph (d),  
The ability of the United States to protect the United States and its 
citizens, and to help its allies and other cooperating nations protect their 
nations and their citizens, from such further terrorist attacks depends in 
significant part upon using the United States Armed Forces to identify 
54 
terrorists and those who support them, to disrupt their activities, and to 
eliminate their ability to conduct or support such attacks (Bush, 2001). 
The critical task upon which the ability to protect American citizens depended was to 
identify terrorists and their supporters; and identifying the terrorists required intelligence.   
Another critical task within the executive branch, which influenced the 
initial design and evolution of American detainee policy, hinged not on intelligence 
collection, but rather on interpreting the law.  According to former Counsel to the 
President and current United States Attorney General, Alberto Gonzalez, “The Attorney 
General is charged by statue with interpreting the law for the Executive Branch.  This 
interpretive authority extends to both domestic and international law.  He has, in turn, 
delegated this role to OLC” (Gonzales, 2002).  One should recognize in his statement, 
“OLC’s interpretation of this legal issue (that GPW does not apply to the conflict with al 
Qaeda) is definitive” (Gonzales, 2002), Gonzales is clearly attempting both to protect the 
Attorney General’s turf and OLC’s core task of interpreting the law for the President.  
Not only does Alberto Gonzales represent a key action channel (Allison, 1971) within the 
Bush Administration through which critical information flowed to the President as “the 
decider” (Bush, 2006), he also sought to overcome the President’s principal-agent 
problem in trying to combat this “new paradigm” (Bush, 2002) introduced by al Qaeda.  
Through this specific example, we can see and understand  how Mr. Gonzales sought to 
serve the political needs of the President by justifying an increase in the political 
autonomy of the Office of the President by minimizing his rivals (Congress) and 
constraints (international law and treaty obligations) (Wilson, 1999, p. 188).    
The second key issue of bureaucratic coordination is the organization must 
agree and endorse the way the critical task is defined. . . . “When that definition is widely 
accepted and endorsed, we say the organization has a sense of mission” (Wilson, 1989, p. 
26).  As a matter of United States’ policy, President Bush directed Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld to “take all necessary measures” (Bush, 2001) in the prosecution of 
“effective military operations in the prevention of terrorist attacks” (Bush, 2001).  
Additionally, the President obligated, “to the maximum extent permitted by law . . . all 
other departments, agencies, entities, and officers of the United States to provide such 
assistance as the Secretary of Defense may request to implement this order” (Bush, 
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2001).  There can be little doubt that the Department of Defense, at least, had the 
broadest possible support, endorsement, and flexibility to perform its critical task in the 
War on Terror.   
The problem Secretary Rumsfeld realized in trying to match the new and 
complex critical tasks with the recently expanded jurisdiction was that he violated nearly 
all the necessary conditions for achieving increased autonomy for an existing 
organization.  The first rule is, “Avoid tasks that are not at the core of the organization” 
(Wilson, p. 190).  The military’s task of detaining combatants was changed to make the 
Iraqi prison system more focused on interrogation by adopting Major General Geoffrey 
Miller’s recommendation that “detention operations must act as an enabler for 
interrogation” (Miller, 2003, as cited in Taguba, 2004, p. 8).   
The second rule is, “be wary of joint or cooperative ventures” (Wilson, p. 
190). In striving to better coordinate the increasing demand for actionable intelligence, 
the military formed an uneasy joint venture between military intelligence, military police, 
Special Forces, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
in the effort to produce such information (Hersh, 2004).  As a result of this poorly 
controlled joint venture without the right focus on high value targets, the senior 
leadership of the CIA ended its involvement at Abu Ghraib (Hersh, 2004).  
Third, an organization should “avoid tasks that will produce divided or 
hostile constituencies” (Wilson, p. 191).  Instead, Secretary Rumsfeld changed the rules 
on how the United States deals with terrorism and terrorists, and “created the conditions 
where the ends justify the means” (Hersh, 2004).  As a result, the senior officers of each 
military service’s Judge Advocate General Corps challenged the “atmosphere of legal 
ambiguity being created as a result of a policy decision at the highest levels of the 
Pentagon” (Horton, 2003, as cited in Hersh, 2004).  
The final rule which the Pentagon disregarded is, “avoid learned 
vulnerabilities” (p. 191). Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Commander, Combined 
Joint Task Force Seven, accepted Major General Miller’s recommendation that “it is 
essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful 
exploitation of the internees” (Miller, 2003, as cited in Taguba, 2004, p. 8).  By 
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approving and then importing a series of coercive interrogation techniques from the 
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay to Abu Ghraib in Iraq, the United States ignored 
the outcome of Ireland v. United Kingdom (1977), the first interstate case ever brought 
before the European Court of Human Rights (Heymann and Kayyem, 2005, p. 132).  
Despite the United Kingdom’s (disputed) claim that the “five techniques” employed by 
the British during coercive interrogations produced “a considerable quantity of actionable 
intelligence” (Heymann and Kayyem, 2005, p. 132), the European Court found in 
December 1977 that these “five techniques,” all of which were approved by both 
Secretary Rumsfeld and Lt. Gen. Sanchez for use in American interrogations, to be 
“’cruel, inhuman and degrading,’ and thus breaches of Article 3 of the (Geneva) 
convention” (Heymann and Kayyem, 2005).  With careful consideration given both to 
Article 3 of the Convention and a February 1976 report to the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe (Heymann and Kayyem, p. 131), the British Attorney General 
announced in February 1977, prior to the European Court’s decision, that his government 
made a commitment that the “‘five techniques’ will not in any circumstances be 
reintroduced as an aid to interrogation” (Jackson, 1994, as cited in Heymann and 
Kayyem, 2005, p. 132).    
The third key issue involved in bureaucratic coordination which an 
organization must solve is how to acquire sufficient autonomy, defined as “freedom of 
action and external political support (or at least non-opposition) to permit it to redefine its 
tasks as it saw best and to infuse that definition with a sense of mission” (Wilson, 1989, 
p. 26).  In this respect, the Department of Defense was given the broadest possible 
autonomy under the law to implement the provisions of the President’s Military Order of 
13 November 2001.  In Section 6, President Bush determined that the Secretary of 
Defense “shall issue such orders and regulations as may be necessary to carry out any of 
the provisions of this order” (Bush, 2001).  With the exception of reserving the right of 
final review and decision for himself (Bush, 2001), President Bush granted Secretary 
Rumsfeld full, and essentially unchecked, authority and autonomy to prosecute the war 
against al Qaeda and the Taliban, wherever in the world he took the fight.  Despite the 
successful resolution of each of these three critical organizational issues, however, as the 
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delegated principal executive in this war, the Secretary of Defense found himself facing 
several constraints for which he lacked the capability, or support, to overcome. 
The foremost constraint faced by Secretary Rumsfeld was the principal-
agent problem.  In this constraint, “Presidents (principals) have no choice but to rely on 
bureaucrats (agents) who do not completely share their interests; this necessity, coupled 
with the president’s inability to monitor agency activity fully, provides fertile ground for 
bureaucratic non-compliance” (Zegart, 1999, p. 47).  Particularly in the coordination and 
integration of the military, the CIA, and the FBI as the primary bureaucracies and front-
line “operators” (Wilson, 1989), the interests of the President and Secretary of Defense in 
the production of actionable intelligence as a common core task to all three organizations 
did not appropriately correlate to each organizations’ standard operating procedures, 
rules, and cultures.  As a result, organizational interests took primacy over national 
interests and resulted in significant pulling and hauling for compliance.  Demonstrating a 
nearly flawless example of Governmental Politics (Allison, 1971), Secretary Rumsfeld 
reportedly used the authority granted him by the President to win one of the most intense 
fights of the war, which occurred within the Pentagon over critical military tasks.   
Rumsfeld and Franks stifled the free exchange of ideas, and shut out the 
National Security Council. They dismissed concerns about the insurgents 
and threatened to fire the one general, William Wallace, who dared to state 
the obvious in public. . . .Debate inside any administration is less 
sophisticated and realistic than the debate among experts outside. The 
people inside have access to a bit more information. But they are more 
likely to self-censor for fear of endangering their careers. Debate inside is 
much more likely to be warped by the egotism, insecurity, power lust and 
distracting busyness of people at the top (Brooks, 2006).  
This problem of stifled debate and the free flow of ideas and information became more 
significant with the passage of time, and the further removed each of the organizations 
noted above became from the 9/11 attacks.  
The second constraint faced by the Bush Administration was time.  The 
maximum amount of time President Bush has to achieve victory in Afghanistan and Iraq 
is until the end of his term as President (Zegart, 1999, p. 48).  However, in many ways, 
the clock began ticking away at an accelerated rate in the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, and 
because of his Administration’s lost credibility with the nation and the world over the 
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specific justifications used to invade Iraq. This phenomenon is consistent with Dr. 
Gordon McCormick’s Zen Principle of Insurgency, which states how much time a 
government has to fight a guerrilla war or insurgency is a function of cost: the higher the 
cost, the less time allowed (McCormick lecture, 16 Aug 2005).  In other words, if 
counterinsurgency is done correctly, it costs less, and the government is allowed more 
time, but needs less to win; if counterinsurgency is done wrong, it costs more, the 
government is allowed less time, but it needs more time to win (McCormick lecture, 12 
July 2005).   
The third constraint, which magnified the impact of time limits, was 
bureaucratic drift.  The Department of Defense has developed its rules, regulations and 
procedures since 1949, always keeping the Geneva Conventions and Law of War as 
primary justifications.  The United States has always acted in compliance with the Law of 
War as a matter of principle, policy, and law.  However, the harsh reality of political time 
restraints in the War on Terror did not permit President Bush equal time to justify his 
“new paradigm (Bush, 7 Feb 2002).   Rather, he and Secretary Rumsfeld chose to change 
the military’s core tasks with respect to taking prisoners and extraction of intelligence as 
previously defined by law, policy, and practice.   
c.  Proposition 3: The Executive Branch Drives Policy Evolution 
(Zegart, 1999, p. 10). 
As the branch of government constitutionally vested with the 
responsibility to execute the laws created by the Congress, the executive branch has an 
obligation to develop policies that do not derive from the first course of action that is 
“good enough” (Allison, 1971, p. 72).  As a legal standard and judgment, then, if based 
upon Kant’s Categorical Imperative, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) may have failed 
to fully consider the relevant legal standards of “abuse” or “cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment” available under United States common law.  Rather they demonstrated a 
“bounded rationality” (Simon, 1957, as cited in Allison, 1971, p. 71), by “Satisficing” in 
their “Search” for sufficient legal interpretation and justification within the context of this 
“new paradigm” (Bybee, 22 Jan 2002) of war.  Specifically, OLC did not seek to 
establish or define the lower threshold of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by 
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considering the appropriate level of physical and mental suffering as defined in U.S. 
common law regarding domestic violence/abuse. 
Interestingly, OLC does reference U.S. common law in defining and 
justifying its interpretation of “specific intent” (Bybee, 1 Aug 2002, p. 4).  Further, OLC 
had no reservation in referencing and citing U.S. common law and medical law in the 
process of defining what constitutes “severe pain and suffering” (Bybee, 1 Aug 2002, p. 
5), as well as in  each of the physical and mental elements contributing to that suffering.  
Additionally, in defining torture, or in establishing a threshold level of violence and 
suffering necessary to be considered torture, OLC directly cited state law (from Idaho, 
North Carolina, Maine, Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New 
Jersey, Tennessee, Alaska, and specifically California) (Bybee, 1 Aug. 2002, p. 13).  
Finally, OLC declined to decisively interpret what differentiates the lowest threshold for 
torture with the threshold range of what is considered as “cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment.”  This omission is significant, as both types of treatment are explicitly 
forbidden under both international law and United States federal law.  OLC does attempt 
to define the lower legal threshold for torture as established by U.S. judicial and 
legislative interpretation, as found in the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) and in a 
U.S. District Court opinion for Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, (N.D. Ga 
2002) (Bybee, 2002, August, p. 24).  Content to abide by the court’s analysis and 
categorization of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as acts “that do not rise to the 
level of torture” and “do not have the same purposes as ‘torture’” (Mehinovic v. Vukovic, 
as cited in Bybee, 1 Aug 2002, p. 25), OLC never attempted to define a specific lower 
threshold for what acts would rise to the level of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.  
Such a threshold can and should be established through a rigorous legal and ethical 
analysis of U.S. domestic violence laws, military law and judicial decisions.   
If one agrees with the principle that one ought to treat all humans with an 
inalienable dignity and respect, then applying the U.S. common law standard of physical 
and mental suffering from domestic violence/abuse legislation should be acceptable for 
establishing the minimum threshold for cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.  A more 
uncomfortable, though equally reasonable, way of resolving the problem of defining the 
lowest threshold of such treatment is to refer to the deontological approach of Immanuel 
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Kant’s Categorical Imperative: “act in such a way that I can also will that my maxim 
should become a universal law” (Kant, 1785, as cited in Lober, 2000), and as a “supreme 
practical principle . . . act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means,  but always at the 
same time as an end” (Kant, 1785, as cited in Lober, 2000).  In accordance with Kantian 
thinking, in setting the standard for all of humanity for perpetuity, one must be prepared 
to apply the same standard of treatment to oneself, one’s mother, or one’s own child as to  
a member of al Qaeda or the Taliban.  Kant’s bottom-line criteria for evaluating the moral 
worth of a contemplated action: “Is there a principle that I would want everyone to follow 
regardless of its consequences?” (Lober lecture, 2006). Assessing the threshold level 
through the Kantian lens would thus never deprive another human being of his or her 
dignity through cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as a matter of principle. 
Although a definitive lower threshold could be established by such 
analysis, applying domestic violence laws within the context of the military social 
contract of combat (French, 2005) may not provide the most relevant basis for 
establishing a baseline. Perhaps the best place to begin such an analysis within the 
context of the military social contract is with the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) and the Manual for Courts-Martial of the United States (MCM). The Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) prohibits cruelty and maltreatment and bars physical 
assault and threats of injury. Article 93, Cruelty and Maltreatment, of the UCMJ specifies 
the nature of the offense as: 
Nature of act. The cruelty, oppression, or maltreatment, although not 
necessarily physical, must be measured by an objective standard. Assault, 
improper punishment, and sexual harassment may constitute this offense. 
Sexual harassment includes influencing, offering to influence, or 
threatening the career, pay, or job of another person in exchange for sexual 
favors, and deliberate or repeated offensive comments or gestures of a 
sexual nature. The imposition of necessary or proper duties and the 
exaction of their performance does not constitute this offense even though 
the duties are arduous or hazardous or both (MCM, 2005, pp. IV-25). 
In seeking to develop a legal standard for general conduct, the context and 
social contract within which that conduct is evaluated becomes very important.  
However, in developing human rights standards, one finds that the context and social 
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contract may play much less of a role in determining right and wrong . . . many argue that 
since human rights are unalienable, there can never be a context in which the violation of 
those rights is permissible.  In accordance with this Kantian viewpoint and the rule of 
law, a government and its leaders ought to identify what limits of conduct are considered 
acceptable, and clearly define the boundary of acts and intentions that would justify a 
state’s violation of a person’s human rights.  Identifying the upper limits of the boundary 
between cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and torture is necessary and useful, but 
it is equally necessary and useful to determine when conduct crosses the line into cruel, 
inhuman and degrading.  Using the legal standard for Cruelty and Maltreatment in the 
UCMJ would be an appropriate place to begin such a determination. 
d.  Proposition 4: Congress (and the Supreme Court) Exercise Only 
Sporadic and Ineffectual Oversight; Legislators Have Weak 
Incentives and Blunt Tools (Zegart, 1999, p. 10). 
While President Bush and his Administration have asserted quite 
forcefully that Presidential authority, as Commander-in-Chief, during wartime is 
essentially unlimited under the Constitution and unhampered by international law 
(Bybee, 22 Jan, 7 Feb 2002), this position is neither entirely true, nor entirely false. The 
struggle over Constitutional authority within government is described as something of a 
political zero-sum game: “The president’s gain is the legislature’s loss; the growth of 
presidential preeminence in foreign affairs has helped to ensure that congressional 
oversight of foreign policy agencies and their outputs remains sporadic and relatively 
weak” (Zegart, 1999, p. 31).  Amy Zegart notes that Congressional oversight powers are 
often overstated.  In reality, she says, “Evidence suggests that, like the national security 
intellectuals, most average legislators feel strongly that national security . . . fall(s) within 
the president’s purview” (Zegart, 1999, p. 33). She further contends that even if 
legislators felt the need to challenge the president’s national security turf, they would be 
unlikely to do so.  There are two key reasons they would decline to assert such authority.  
Primarily, “Voters hold the president, not their local representative, accountable for the 
successes and failures of American foreign policy” (Zegart, 1999, p. 31).  Secondarily, 
but directly resulting from the first reason, “the political system naturally favors any 
political actor who defends the status quo” (Zegart, 1999, p. 34). This Nietzschean 
perspective within Congress prevents most legislators from transcending the conventional 
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and contemporary morality (Lober lecture, 2006) because by so doing, they submit 
themselves to greater risk of losing elections and of losing political capital within the 
system.  As a result, although there are systemic constitutional checks and balances, 
“foreign policy has become the president’s turf” (Zegart, 1999, p 30). “Whereas the 
ultimate power to formulate domestic policy resides in Congress, the primary 
responsibility for the formulation and implementation of national security policy falls on 
the president” (Tower Commission Report, 1987, p. 87, as cited in Zegart, 1999, p. 31).   
Nowhere does the president defend this turf more vigorously than in the 
exercise of his Commander in Chief authority.  Though the Constitutional authority 
granted to presidents in this domain is largely implicit, “the Constitution gives presidents 
the unified office, information, and potential to develop a broad foreign affairs role” 
(Zegart, 1999, p. 29), the advantages of which presidents throughout American history 
have utilized in order to advance the strength and flexibility of this authority.  Although 
presidents have the strongest incentives and the track record to defend their foreign 
policy turf, they do not always succeed in asserting or expanding that authority.  
Congress has not been completely impotent in checking and balancing the President; 
however, it achieved a significant limitation on the president’s commander-in-chief 
authority in November 1973 with the passage of the War Powers Resolution.  In the 
political context of American withdrawal from Vietnam, it was “the purpose of this joint 
resolution to . . . insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the 
President will apply to the introduction, involvement, and continued use of United States 
Armed Forces into hostilities” (War Powers Resolution, 1973).  In addition to requiring 
consultation with Congress and imposing reporting deadlines on the President, this 
legislation also defined the bounds of the President’s authority as Commander In Chief as 
“exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, 
or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or 
possessions, or its armed forces” (War Powers Resolution, 1973).    
Despite the overwhelming passage of this Joint Resolution of Congress, 
the executive branch has continued to fight for the powers gained by the Office of the 
President since George Washington first held and established the office.  The Bush 
Administration has fought harder than most, seeking the maximum authority possible for 
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the Office of the President.  OLC has served this purpose with more vigor than other 
agencies, and “has consistently held during this Administration and previous 
Administrations, Congress lacks authority under Article I to set the terms and conditions 
under which the President may exercise his authority as Commander in Chief to control 
the conduct of operations during a war” (Bybee, 1 August 2002, pp. 34-35).  This 
perspective may not be consistent with the Constitution, with federal law and with 
judicial interpretations of each.  Under Article I, Section 8, Congress is charged with 
making the rules concerning captures on land and water; making rules for the government 
and regulation of the land and naval forces; and to provide for the calling forth of the 
militia (in terms of organizing, arming, and disciplining) to execute the laws of the union, 
suppress insurrections, and repel invasions (Federalist 41, 1961, p. 256; Federalist 29, 
1961, pp. 182-187).  Even to someone who is not a Constitutional law scholar, the 
credibility of OLC’s interpretation of the law seems questionable not only in this 
particular case; in justifying elements of the detainee policy, they routinely cite Supreme 
Court opinions out of context in order to present an interpretation consistent with 
assertions of executive authority.   
For example, in making their case that the “Supreme Court has recognized 
. . . the President’s complete discretion in the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief 
authority and in conducting operations against hostile forces” (Bybee, 1 Aug.2002, p. 
33), OLC cites the 1874 opinion rendered in Hamilton v. Dillin as identifying “the 
President alone who is constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile 
operations” (emphasis added by Bybee) (88 U.S., 1874, (21 Wall.) pp. 73, 87 as cited in 
Bybee, 1 August 2002, p. 33).  This citation presents a false justification of executive 
authority by taking both the case and the specific reference out of context.  Mr. Justice 
Bradley delivered the actual opinion of the court, abbreviated below:  
The war was a public one. The government in prosecuting it had at least 
all the rights which any belligerent power has when prosecuting a public 
war. That war was itself a suspension of commercial intercourse between 
the opposing sections of the country. . . . The war power vested in the 
government implied all this without any specific mention of it in the 
Constitution. In England this power to remit the restrictions on 
commercial intercourse with a hostile nation is exercised by the crown. . . . 
By the Constitution of the United States the power to declare war is 
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confided to Congress. The executive power and the command of the 
military and naval forces is vested in the President. Whether, in the 
absence of Congressional action, the power of permitting partial 
intercourse with a public enemy may or may not be exercised by the 
President alone, who is constitutionally invested with the entire charge of 
hostile operations, it is not now necessary to decide, although it would 
seem that little doubt could be raised on the subject (88 U.S. 73, 1874).  
It seems from the context in which OLC selectively presented their justification, they 
interpreted that executive authority is exercised as the equivalent of the crowned 
sovereign of England.  In reality, the case as decided by the Supreme Court regards the 
extent of the government’s authority to regulate commerce in time of war.   
In another seminal case, Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer (1952), the United 
States Supreme Court did, in fact, both recognize and implement Constitutional limits on 
Presidential authority to act as Commander in Chief during wartime.  While American 
forces were engaged in combat in Korea, “To avert a nation-wide strike of steel workers 
in April 1952, which he believed would jeopardize national defense, the President issued 
an Executive Order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most of the 
steel mills” (343 U.S. 579, p. 580). Although the action and context of President Harry S. 
Truman’s Executive Order did not mirror President George W. Bush’s 13 November 
2001 Executive Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism, the assertion of unlimited, if implied, Presidential authority as 
Commander-in-Chief, was almost identical.  In fact, the Court’s record in 1952 shows 
“The Order was not based upon any specific statutory authority but was based generally 
upon all powers vested in the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States 
and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces” 
(343 U.S. 579, 580).  President Bush relied on the interpreted opinion of the Office of 
Legal Counsel, which cited the same powers granted in Article II of the United States 
Constitution (Bybee, 22 January 2002, pp. 11-13); however, OLC drew a different 
conclusions regarding this particular judicial decision.  In the Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer 
opinion written by Justice Black, the Supreme Court concluded: 
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it 
must be found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed 
that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The 
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contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate 
of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on 
provisions in Article II which say that "The executive Power shall be 
vested in a President . . ."; that "he shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed"; and that he "shall be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States."  The order cannot properly be 
sustained as an exercise of the President's military power as Commander 
in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing 
a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders 
engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not 
concern us here. Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, 
we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such 
to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from 
stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its 
military authorities.  
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several 
constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. In 
the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the 
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. 
The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the 
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks 
bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall 
make laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first 
article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States . . . ." After granting many powers to the 
Congress, Article I goes on to provide that Congress may "make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof."  
The President's order does not direct that a congressional policy be 
executed in a manner prescribed by Congress - it directs that a presidential 
policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President. The preamble 
of the order itself, like that of many statutes, sets out reasons why the 
President believes certain policies should be adopted, proclaims these 
policies as rules of conduct to be followed, and again, like a statute, 
authorizes a government official to promulgate additional rules and 
regulations consistent with the policy proclaimed and needed to carry that 
policy into execution. The power of Congress to adopt such public policies 
as those proclaimed by the order is beyond question. It can authorize the 
taking of private property for public use. It can make laws regulating the 
relationships between employers and employees, prescribing rules 
designed to settle labor disputes, and fixing wages and working conditions  
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in certain fields of our economy. The Constitution does not subject this 
lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or 
control.  
It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority have taken 
possession of private business enterprises in order to settle labor disputes. 
But even if this be true, Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive 
constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the 
powers vested by the Constitution "in the Government of the United 
States, or any Department or Officer thereof."  
The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the 
Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall 
the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay 
behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding that this 
seizure order cannot stand. [343 U.S. 579, 588-589] 
There should be little doubt in reading the above opinion of the Supreme 
Court that presidents are vested neither with complete discretion, nor unbound authority 
in the exercise of the duties of the office.  In the process of executing the laws of the 
United States, the President is also bound by them.  Although one can find specific cases 
of both congressional and judicial limitations on presidential authority, the reason they 
demonstrate ineffectual oversight is inconsistent application and because of political 
realities and incentives in the exercise of power.  The advantages of the unified office, 
control of information, and maneuverability in the foreign policy domain (Zegart, 1999, 
p. 29) give the Office of the President the “institutional upper hand” (Zegart, 1999, p. 29).   
e.  Proposition 5: An Individual Policy’s Evolution Can Be 
Explained by Three Factors: Initial Policy Structure, the 
Ongoing Interests of Relevant Political Actors, and Exogenous 
Events (Zegart, 1999, p. 10). 
(1) Initial Policy Structure.  During the transition of an 
organization’s core tasks, the principal challenge during implementation is to carefully 
define these tasks and to find the right “incentives that will induce operators to perform 
those tasks as defined” (Wilson, 1989, p. 174).  One of the most crucial ways the Bush 
Administration has succeeded in managing the intentional “performance ambiguity” 
(Ouchi, 1980, as cited in Wilson, 1989, p. 174) has been to assign new and specific tasks 
to military units or government agencies that have been formed by an intense 
socialization and that correspondingly have developed a strong sense of mission, such as 
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Special Forces, Military Intelligence, Military Police, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency.  Changing these tasks and demanding immediate results required innovation by 
members of the military.  By innovation, I refer specifically to the alteration and 
adaptation of critical or core tasks (Wilson, 1989).  The reason the military was forced to 
innovate is because the procedural Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the 
categorization and treatment of combat prisoners, which had been so pervasive in U.S. 
military culture since Francis Lieber developed the first codified law of land warfare in 
1863 for President Lincoln (Donald, 1996, pp. 531, 537), actually got in the way of 
producing the outcomes desired and rewarded by President Bush and Secretary 
Rumsfeld. Because military innovation in support of the President’s detainee policy has 
had little, if any, measurable benefit toward victory in the Global War on Terror, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq, and with increasingly negative implications of the policy, the 
degree of political and bureaucratic dissent with the policy is increasing in both breadth 
and depth.   
(2) Ongoing Interests of Relevant Political Actors.  The result of 
this increase in bureaucratic and political dissent for the war in Iraq overall, and for 
detainee policy in particular, has been the steady erosion of public support for each.  
According to a May 10, 2006 New York Times/CBS News poll of 1,246 people 
randomly selected from a sample of 42,000 Americans nationwide, only 31 percent of 
Americans now approve of the way President George W. Bush is handling his job as 
President (Nagourney and Thee, 2006).  His approval has declined from just over 50 
percent at the beginning of his second term as President, and has declined from an 
approval rating of nearly 90 percent since late 2001 (Nagourney and Thee, 2006).  In 
many Americans’ minds, political rhetoric has not been reconciled with the visible effects 
of policy.  Perhaps because the ideas of peace, democracy and free markets have 
functionally conquered significant portions of the world, the two key tasks necessary for 
succeeding in this grand strategy render the unparalleled American military might both 
irrelevant and inadequate (Mandelbaum, 2002).  The domestic task is to convince the 
public that the value gained by fulfilling our responsibility is worth the expenditure in 
blood and treasure (Erdmann, 1986, p. 62).  The international task is to convince both our 
allies and enemies that the accomplishment of peace, democracy, and free markets is in 
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everyone’s best interests.  The use of the military as the primary pillar of this strategy 
contradicts the strategy’s intended message.  The domestic public fails to benefit from the 
military’s use because the cost in blood and treasure exceeds the benefit and the 
international public rejects the justification for action and questions the legitimacy of the 
message when the attempt to impose peace, democracy, and free markets is through the 
use of force.  As a result, the U.S. has fallen short in convincing these key stakeholders 
that their interests are best served in the accomplishment of these two tasks 
(Mandelbaum, 2002).  
(3) Exogenous Events.  In the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib 
scandal, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction, the growth of both the Iraqi and 
Afghan insurgencies, the inability to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, the international 
furor over the alleged secret CIA prison system and the practice of extraordinary 
rendition, the National Security Agency’s warrantless wiretapping program and domestic 
telephone database, the emerging nuclear threat and potential military showdown in Iran, 
the explosion of the budget deficit, Congressional corruption, the immigration and border 
control debates, the CIA leak investigation, the failed response to Hurricane Katrina, and 
a massive shuffle of Presidential staff members, among the most recent political bombs, 
the major challenge for the Bush Administration to overcome in reconciling rhetoric with 
policy, particularly with regard to the misuse of military power, is to concentrate less on 
its own actions and more on the likely reactions of the enemy (Bernstein, 1989), or the 
intended policy target.  Some of the most significant reasons Americans are dissatisfied 
with the President’s performance is his incapability to effectively communicate his policy 
decisions to the public, his nearly total absorption with the war in Iraq, and his seemingly 
continuous drive to gain more and more authority for the Office of the President.  Many 
Americans perceive a distinct disconnect between the President’s goals and the goals of 
the American public, and it is one he apparently does not feel the need to address.  
The reason America has fumbled the use of its military power in 
low intensity wars, particularly since Vietnam, is because its self-absorption has rendered 
it incapable of accurately gauging the perceptions and determinations of those it is trying 
to influence/coerce (Bernstein, 1989).  As a result of using the military as the first choice 
tool of coercive diplomacy, the U.S. often overestimates its impact on the enemy by 
69 
wishful thinking; it focuses more about the negative diplomatic effects of military 
operations on friendly or unaligned regional powers; and too often focuses on being 
loved rather than being feared (Bernstein, 1989).  Unfortunately none of these choices of 
action will be successful in achieving grand strategy objectives.  Rather, says noted 
historian and professor Alvin Bernstein, “The cornerstone of success in coercive 
diplomacy and limited conflict is the demonstration of America’s will and ability to use 
its power effectively in support of its interests and the larger interests of international 
decency and order. . . . The very best psychological operation, we should remind 
ourselves, is the reputation of a great power for acting like one” (Bernstein, 1989, pp. 
155, 158).  
 
C. CHOICE 
I have come across men of letters who have written history without taking 
part in public affairs, and politicians who have concerned themselves with 
producing events without thinking about them.  I have observed that the 
first are always inclined to find general causes, whereas the second, living 
in the midst of disconnected daily facts, are prone to imagine that 
everything is attributable to particular incidents, and that the wires they 
pull are the same as those that move the world.  It is to be presumed that 
both are equally deceived. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, as cited in Allison, 1971 
The choice to act like a great power does not come without a great number of 
dilemmas.  The strategic dilemma faced by President Bush and the United States is 
simply “either to release militant detainees who pledge to kill Americans and whom the 
United States cannot convict, or confine them for life without trial.  America’s ability to 
find alternatives will shape the future” (Norwitz, 2005, p. 82).  On the one hand, it is a 
practical dilemma in terms of deciding what rules to apply to detainees and what to do 
with them if continued detention holds no strategic value.  On the other hand, it is an 
ethical dilemma in terms of how to treat detainees with respect to the existing laws and 
what means to use in order to overcome our enemies’ “asymmetry of morality” (Ignatieff, 
2001, p. 7).  The inability to find alternatives to the problems of a dilemma often results 
in resolution by force.  Much like driving a car or flying an airplane, the paradox of the 
exercise of power is that the more force one applies to a political problem, the faster the 
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masses upon whom force is applied will accelerate toward an outcome that cannot 
necessarily be controlled by the state.  The outcomes of the exercise of power depend on 
the choice of policy governing the use of that force and also the goals and expectations of 
the target of that force.  If the inclinations and choices of politicians as decision-makers 
are influenced by flawed recommendations drawn from an insufficient analysis of the 
causes and effects of a problem, then the policy itself will be disconnected from the 
relevant context within which the state’s power should be applied.  As discussed earlier, 
identifying the elements of the problem is both a variable and a product of the process 
oriented approach.  The strategic consequences of political choice often begin with the 
application of the decision-making process.   
While the national security policy decision-making process is best described 
through the adjusted lens of Amy Zegart’s National Security Agency Model, the actual 
policy decision, the Choice, represents the rational actor (Allison, 1971) within this 
synthesized model and is based on the President’s desire, at the grand strategy level, to 
achieve both power and security (Gustaitis lecture, 2006).  The President, as the unitary, 
rational actor, is the only agent within the governmental bureaucracy who has the most 
incentive to act in the national interest (Zegart, 1999, p. 8) and relies on a consistent set 
of preferences, value maximizing actions and known constraints in order to make his or 
her decision (Allison, 1971, p. 30).  This value maximizing approach can help the 
President to rationally reject the known constraints of international law, moral principle 
and treaty obligations in favor of grand strategic choice and selected national interest.  
Because the principal-agent problem limits a president’s ability to get the results he or 
she may want from the national security policy apparatus, “all presidents will seek to 
overcome the principal-agent problem in ways that minimize their political costs” 
(Zegart, 1999, pp. 48-49).  In simplest terms, presidents seek to overcome this problem 
by bypassing the normal bureaucratic process. 
Bypassing institutional steps in the process invariably result in consequences to a 
greater or lesser degree.  In order to bypass the traditional bureaucratic hurdles 
encountered whenever a president attempts to introduce significant change to the 
agencies of government, executives often resort to work-arounds, avoiding the 
institutional obstacles by creating either new bureaucratic organizations or new processes 
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by which to achieve most directly the results they want.    In seeking legal justification 
for dealing with the manifest threat of al Qaeda, beyond the normal and accepted bounds 
of the Law of War, the President and his closest cabinet members could not afford to be 
constrained by military lawyers and conservative commanders whose sense of mission 
was vested in the “purpose, status, and solidarity” (Wilson, 1989, p. 158) of the 
traditional paradigm reinforced by the Geneva Conventions.  From the process by which 
President Bush came to the decision that the Geneva Conventions would not apply to 
members of al Qaeda and the Taliban in the war in Afghanistan, one can conclude that 
the recommendation provided by OLC was the product of a work-around to the 
institutional principal-agent problem.  As reported by the Independent Panel to Review 
DoD Detention Operations,  
The Attorney General and the Counsel to the President, in part relying on 
the opinions of OLC, advised the President to determine the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban.  
The Panel understands DoD General Counsel’s position was consistent 
with the Attorney General’s and the Counsel to the President’s position.  
Earlier, the Department of State had argued that the Geneva Conventions 
in their traditional application provided a sufficiently robust legal 
construct under which the Global War on Terror could effectively be 
waged.  The Legal Advisor to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
many service lawyers agreed with the State Department’s initial position.  
They were concerned that to determine otherwise would be inconsistent 
with past practice and policy, jeopardize United States armed forces 
personnel, and undermine the United States military culture which is 
based on a strict adherence to the law of war.  At the February 4, 2002 
National Security Council meeting to decide this issue, the Department of 
State, Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff were in agreement that all detainees would get the treatment they are 
(or would be) entitled to under the Geneva Conventions (Schlesinger 
Panel Report, 2004, pp. 33-34).   
But because President Bush was significantly constrained by time and America’s 
demand for a forceful response to this stain upon the nation’s honor, he could not afford 
to wait for the coordination of institutional consensus across the Executive Branch.  
Taking advantage of both the environmental hostility and the organizational focus of 
government, President Bush initiated the process of change by issuing his Military Order 
for the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against  
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Terrorism on 13 November 2001.  This order served as the pretext for changes in the 
military’s core tasks of intelligence collection, counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, and 
detention operations.    
The U.S. government’s shift in perspective, described as a “new paradigm” in a 
memo written by Alberto Gonzales, then the Counsel to the President, “places a high 
premium on . . . the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and 
their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against American civilians,” (Gonzales, 
2002) giving less weight to the rights of suspected belligerents. By questioning, and 
ultimately rejecting, the applicability of the traditional international laws of war within 
the context of this “new paradigm,” the effect of the President’s work-around was to 
eliminate the institutional due process protections guaranteed by the Geneva 
Conventions.   
1. Analysis of a Presidential Decision 
In his 7 February 2002 Decision Memorandum, “Humane Treatment of al Qaeda 
and Taliban Detainees,” President Bush communicated four crucial determinations which 
influenced not only the war against unlawful combatants in Afghanistan, but also had a 
significant influence on the treatment of “security detainees” in Iraq (personal 
correspondence with Capt Kisner, C., MNF-I TF-134 legal attorney, 13 May 2006).   It is 
worth noting that even after considering the legal arguments presented by the key and 
relevant members of his Cabinet, the President’s four decisions also demonstrated an 
uncommon consistency with his 13 November 2001 Military Order.     
The four determinations made by President Bush, “relying on the opinion of  the 
Department of Justice dated January 22, 2002, and on the legal opinion rendered by the 
Attorney General in his letter of February 1, 2002” (Bush, 2002) are as follows: 
a) That none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our current conflict 
with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world 
because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting 
Party to Geneva. 
b) That the provisions of Geneva will apply to our present conflict with 
the Taliban. 
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c) That common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda or 
Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts 
are international in scope and common Article 3 applies only to 
‘armed conflict not of an international character.’ 
d) That the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do 
not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva.  I note that, 
because Geneva does not apply to our conflict with al Qaeda, al Qaeda 
detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war. 
One should note that by using the word “determination” or “determine,” President Bush 
is heeding the advice of the Attorney General and invoking a reference to the “Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Clark v. Allen (1947) providing that when a President determines that 
a treaty does not apply, his determination is fully discretionary and will not be reviewed 
by the federal courts” (Ashcroft, 2002).  Contrasted with an interpretation of treaties 
“which are confessed to apply, courts occasionally refuse to defer to Presidential 
interpretation” (Ashcroft, 2002).  As a matter of no small importance, the President was 
informed that such a distinction would provide  
the highest assurance that no court would subsequently entertain charges 
that American military officers, intelligence officials, or law enforcement 
officials violated Geneva Conventions rules relating to field conduct, 
detention conduct, or interrogation of detainees.  The War Crimes Act of 
1996 makes violation of parts of the Geneva Convention a crime in the 
United States (Ashcroft, 2002). 
Despite the potential for subsequent criminal liability for American officials acting under 
this policy, the President appears to have decided upon a compromise between the two 
semantic extremes: he invoked the strength of the word determination to describe his 
interpretation that the Geneva Conventions would categorically not apply neither to al 
Qaeda nor the Taliban.   A possibility suggested as likely by Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, the courts have refused to defer to this interpretation.  The ironic result of the 
President’s determination is that in attempting to compromise between the extremes, he 
chose the worst elements of the two options presented to him, thereby implementing a 
policy with the greatest legal liabilities for the broadest potential breach of the Geneva 
Conventions. 
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A significant reason why Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee’s legal 
interpretation could be considered “inadequate and deficient” (Schlesinger Panel, 2004, 
p. 33) is that throughout both the 22 January 2002 and 1 August 2002 Memorandums, the 
opinions he renders routinely, and often primarily, reference previous opinions of the 
Office of Legal Counsel.  Further, among the Supreme Court decisions selectively cited 
by members of OLC in support of essentially unlimited executive authority were 
Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer (1952), Hamilton v. Dillin (1874), and Johnson v. Eisentrager 
(1950).  When Mr. Bybee and OLC do make reference to these and other Supreme Court 
or federal court decisions, they frequently cite concurring or dissenting opinions which 
were not accurate representations of  the definitive opinions of the Court.  It could be 
interpreted that both the OLC and the Attorney General recommended an approach to 
achieve the President’s desired outcome, which was based on insufficient information 
considered in relative isolation (Schlesinger Panel Report, 2004).  Predictably, flawed 
judgments resulted from such an insufficient analysis within a limited range of opinion 
and expertise.  This kind of cherry picking for evidence tends toward a practice of 
deception in justifying a legal interpretation under which, thus far between 50,000-70,000 
persons have been apprehended since the beginning of combat in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq (Schlesinger Panel Report, 2004, p. 5).  This number alone is staggering when one 
considers that there were less than 500 hardcore al Qaeda (Sageman, 2004), and between 
10,000 – 15,000 Taliban militia (www.Answers.com).  Given that only “759 captives 
have been held at Guantanamo since the detention operation opened in 2002, and nearly 
300 have been released or transferred to their home nations for continued detention” 
(Sutton, 2006), the number apprehended in Iraq alone illustrates either a much more 
robust and growing insurgent movement than anticipated, or the somewhat broad and 
random net cast during cordon and sweep operations.  Even more disconcerting is the fact 
that “only one-fourth of the prisoners held at the Guantanamo naval base are interrogated 
regularly because there are not enough interrogators or translators to interrogate them all” 
(Sutton, 2006).  The situation in Iraq is worse by an order of magnitude, although the 
percentages are similar.  “Detainees being held for crimes against the coalition . . . Iraqi 
criminals not believed to be international terrorists or members of Al Qaeda (sic), Ansar 
Al Islam, Taliban, and other international terrorist organizations . . . make up more than 
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60% of the total detainee population, and is the fastest growing category” (Taguba, 2004, 
pp. 8, 25). Either way, the outcomes suggest the current American policy regarding 
detainees is more likely producing more enemy combatants than it is reducing or 
removing from the proverbial battlefield. 
Examples of this type of flawed, inadequate or misleading analysis abound in the 
legal interpretations produced by the Department of Justice regarding or influencing U.S. 
detainee policy.  In developing their legal interpretation for the President, OLC did not 
fully consider the facts from the context of the “new paradigm.”  Admittedly, very few at 
the time truly understood the nature of the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban, 
or even the level of social control exercised by the Taliban over Afghan society.  
However, in their “Search” for alternatives, they stopped at the first one that “Satisficed” 
(Simon, 1957, as cited in Allison, 1971, p. 72) their needs.  Instead of admitting the 
relative organizational sophistication and strategic success of the relationship between al 
Qaeda and the Taliban, OLC underestimated it, writing “Al Qaeda is merely a violent 
political movement . . . Because of the novel nature of this conflict, moreover, a conflict 
with al Qaeda is not properly included in non-international forms of armed conflict to 
which some provisions of the Geneva Conventions might apply” (Bybee, 22 January 
2002, pp. 1-2). In hindsight and in contrast, the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, 
recognized the asymmetric advantages held in this relationship noting, “We often talk of 
two trends in terrorism: state supported and people working on their own. In Bin Ladin’s 
case with the Taliban, what we had was something completely new—a terrorist 
sponsoring a state” (Tenet, 2004).   
The debate over whether customary international law is binding on the President 
and the executive branch under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution seems to 
strongly reflect the adage “where you stand depends on where you sit” (Wilson, 1989).  
International law academics, whose intentions follow the rule-based thinking of Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative, seek to develop laws that would treat people always as ends and 
would serve as a universal maxim for others. Accordingly, under both the Take Care 
Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, “A President may not violate 
customary international law, therefore, just as he cannot violate a statute, unless he 
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believes it to be unconstitutional” (Bybee, 2002, January, p. 32). George Aldrich 
eloquently summarizes the academics’ position as follows: 
Whenever a state chooses to send its armed forces into combat in a 
previously noninternational armed conflict in another state—whether at 
the invitation of that state’s government or of the rebel party—the conflict 
must then be considered an international armed conflict, and the rebel 
party must be considered to have been given, from the date of such 
intervention, belligerent status, which, as a matter of customary 
international law, brings into force all the laws governing international 
armed conflicts (Aldrich, 2000, p. 63). 
The lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel seem to follow more along the lines 
of ends based thinking of consequentialists like John Stuart Mill, seeking to develop laws 
which promote the idea of the greater good, and are of the notion that for the President, as 
the only one in government who institutionally acts in the national interest, there are 
consequences which just cannot be ignored, regardless of principle (Lober lecture, 2006).  
OLC contends that “Customary international law cannot bind the executive branch under 
the Constitution because it is not federal law” (Bybee, 22 January 2002, p. 32).  OLC 
began its argument in a strong Constitutional position that disputed that customary 
international law had undergone the same rigorous legislative process and review as had 
federal law (Bybee, 22 January 2002, p. 33).  This point is significant; however, Mr. 
Bybee’s argument denying the inclusion of international law and treaties under the 
Supremacy Clause loses credibility when he cites three Supreme Court cases (1842, 
1877, and 1938) and states “even during this period, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that the laws of war did not qualify as true federal law and could not therefore serve as 
the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction” (Bybee, 22 January 2002, pp. 34-35).   
During the period cited, the formal law of war did not yet even exist!  The Lieber Code, 
or General Orders No. 100, was the first codified law of land warfare written and 
implemented in 1863 by the United States government.  The Hague Conferences were 
held in 1899 and 1907 (The Avalon Project, 2006), but the Geneva Conventions were not 
held until 1949, and were not fully executed into U.S. federal law until the War Crimes 
Act was passed in 1996 (Ashcroft, 2002).    
To continue the critique of OLC’s policy justifications, Mr. Bybee cites Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 
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(1814), who regarded customary international law as “a guide which the sovereign 
follows or abandons at his will.  The rule, like other precepts of morality, of humanity, 
and even of wisdom, is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign; and although it 
cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded” (Marshall, 
1814, as cited in Bybee, 2002, January, p. 34).  Disregarding customary international law 
is not just “a bad idea” as suggested by Mr. Bybee.  The Encarta English Dictionary 
(North America) defines obloquy as 1) censure—statements that severely criticize or 
defame, and 2) disgrace—a state of disgrace brought about by being defamed (Microsoft 
Office Word 2003).  Although cited in support of a President’s authority to do so, Chief 
Justice Marshall opined that though a president may do so, disregarding customary 
international law would be a disgraceful, immoral judgment worthy of critical censure.   
Afghanistan’s status as a “failed state” was another principal justification 
provided by OLC in concluding that the Taliban militia could be legitimately deprived of 
POW status under 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War (GPW).  Secondly, and even more detrimental to the Taliban’s status as protected 
POWs, was their close association with, and even dependence upon, al Qaeda for power 
and control within Afghanistan (Bybee, 2002, January, p. 11).  This conclusion seemed 
satisfying to both the Executives at the policy making level and the Operators at the 
policy execution level, because it led them to believe they would have more jurisdictional 
autonomy in completing their mission (Wilson, 1989, p. 187).  However, this conclusion 
did not represent the political reality of Afghanistan’s international status.  The Secretary 
of State, who is statutorily responsible for making the determination for such status, 
informed the Counsel to the President and OLC that “any determination that Afghanistan 
is a failed state would be contrary to the official U.S. government position. The United 
States and the international community have consistently held Afghanistan to its treaty 
obligations and identified it as a party to the Geneva Conventions” (Powell, 2002).  The 
Secretary of State also identified “that OLC views are not definitive on the factual 
questions which are central to its legal conclusions” (Powell, 2002), with the likely result 
being a rejection of their opinion by foreign governments, courts, and international 
tribunals (Powell, 2002).    
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The Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, Mr. William H. Taft, IV, reiterated 
the Department of State’s position that the “unvaried practice of the United States in 
introducing its forces into conflict over fifty years” (Taft, 2002) had been to comply with 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  Further, Mr. Taft reminded the Counsel to the President, 
Mr. Alberto Gonzales, of the United States’ obligation to comply with UN Security 
Council Resolutions 1193 (1998), 1189 (1998), 1214 (1998), and 1267 (1999) (UNSC, 
1999), condemning the Taliban for their theocratic dictatorship, continued violations of 
human rights and international law, and unlawful protection of Usama bin Laden, as well 
as “affirming that all parties to the conflict in Afghanistan are bound to comply with their 
obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva 
Conventions” (Taft, 2002).  The argument that Afghanistan was a failed state never got 
past the rhetoric and bluster as an expedient and convenient way to explain why the 
Taliban and al Qaeda had cultivated such a relationship.  The political reality clearly was 
different for U.N. Security Council member nations. 
While the United States, like almost all other countries, refused to extend 
diplomatic recognition to the Taliban, both Afghanistan and the United 
States are parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the armed 
attacks by the United States and other nations against the armed forces of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan clearly constitute an international armed 
conflict to which those Conventions, as well as customary international 
humanitarian law, apply (Aldrich, 2002, October, p. 893). 
Another important issue raised in both the 22 January 2002 and 7 February 2002 
OLC Memoranda examines the President’s authority to selectively and temporarily 
suspend international treaty obligations as a result of a material breach by another party 
to the treaty.  The Vienna Convention on Treaties, article 60 (2)(b), specifies “A material 
breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles . . . [a] party specially affected 
by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole 
or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State” (as cited in Bybee, 22 
January 2002, p. 23).  However, “The Vienna Convention seems to prohibit or restrict the 
suspension of humanitarian treaties if the sole ground for suspension is material breach” 
(Vienna Convention on Treaties, article 60(5), as cited in Bybee, 22 January 2002, p. 23).  
Therefore, even though the President has the authority under Article II of the Constitution 
to interpret and suspend treaties (Bybee, 7 February 2002, p. 2), a decision to suspend 
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GPW “with regard to Afghanistan might put the United States in breach of customary 
international law” (Bybee, 22 January 2002, p. 23).  OLC rejected this provision of the 
Vienna Convention as incorrect (Bybee, 22 January 2002, p. 24) as well as the clearly 
defined provisions in GPW that the Convention will apply to High Contracting Parties in 
all circumstances (GPW, 1949, Article I), and that the Convention  
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, 
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention 
shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of 
a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
resistance.  Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to 
the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain 
bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by 
the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and 
applies the provisions thereof (GPW, 1949, Article II).  
Fortunately, President Bush declined to suspend the GPW, although he did accept 
OLC’s legal conclusion and reserved the right to do so in this or future conflicts (Bush, 
2002).  Unfortunately, the Office of Legal Counsel got caught in a legal conundrum of 
their own making.  Arguing process versus principle over whether humanitarian and 
human rights principles transcend traditional laws of nations, Mr. Bybee states  
A blanket non-suspension rule makes little sense as a matter of 
international law and politics.  If there were such a rule, international law 
would leave an injured party effectively remediless if its adversaries 
committed material breaches of the Geneva Conventions.  Apart from its 
unfairness, that result would reward and encourage non-compliance with 
the Conventions (Bybee, 22 Jan 2002, p. 24).     
In a subsequent opinion some three weeks later, Mr. Bybee opined “Thus, the President 
may interpret GPW . . . to find that all of the Taliban forces do not fall within the legal 
definition of POW.  A presidential determination of this nature would eliminate any legal 
‘doubt’ as to the prisoners’ status, as a matter of domestic law, and would therefore 
obviate the need for article 5 tribunals” (Bybee, 7 February 2002, p. 2).  Apparently OLC 
did not interpret the same sense of unfairness and the systemic lack of remedy to a 
material breach would apply to a blanket suspension of status for an adversary under the 
same international treaty.  In theory there should be no conflict between principle and 
practice.  However, OLC as a bureaucratic organization seeks to find and protect 
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maximum autonomy for the President within his jurisdiction, and often even beyond.  
Being bound by law other than the Constitution makes the critical task of OLC more 
difficult, even though the bedrock principles of the Constitution are represented and 
protected by the basic due process requirements of the Geneva Conventions.   
The reason application of the Geneva Conventions is essential to the social 
contract in combat is because it is the only legal framework that provides a system of due 
process relevant to the context of war.  In this respect it is every bit as important as the 
due process requirement of the judicial system within the context of the civilian social 
contract.  Due process is the critical determinant, both ethically and legally, for the 
legitimacy of a government’s restriction or deprivation of an individual’s unalienable 
rights.  In order for the governmental authority to demonstrate its Standing to Act, 
Reason to Act, and Right Intention in Acting (Kennedy, 2003), according to some 
measurable and accountable standard, the state must recognize both the right of the 
individual and the conditions under which the state has the authority to deprive the 
individual of those rights.  Doctor Robert Kennedy explained the difference between the 
existence of human rights and the extent of human rights as follows: 
As regards its existence only, the right to own property is inalienable and 
inviolable; as regards its extent, the right may be justly qualified in a 
variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. Not least of these reasons will 
be the requirements of the common good of the society.  This distinction 
between existence and extent is obscured in discussions about human 
dignity and human rights when the absoluteness of the first category is 
carelessly applied to the second. As suggested above, some human rights 
are absolute, but most are not. Human dignity is both protected by and 
governed by justice (Kennedy, 2003, p. 4). 
Without undergoing the rigors of due process required by justice, the state is incapable of 
systematically guaranteeing the protection of individual rights in all other circumstances, 
in which the state does not have the authority to violate them.   
Another interesting aspect of Presidential choice in the development of detainee 
policy is that in his 7 Feb 2002 Executive Order, President Bush cited as justification 
only OLC’s 22 January 2002 Memorandum and the Attorney General’s 1 February 2002 
Memorandum, yet either rejected or was unaware of the considerable and weighted 
opinion of the Secretary of State and the supporting opinion of the State Department.  
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Reflecting the ideas of Bounded Rationality, this fact seems fairly significant, given that 
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s objection to the condition of the President’s 13 
November 2001 Executive Order caused the Executive Branch to re-examine the legal 
justification of this policy and render a somewhat legally different (though not practically 
different) policy on 7 February 2002.  Based on principle and consequences, Secretary of 
State Powell’s interpretation of both the law and of the political climate resulting from 
U.S. implementation of the policy turned out to be accurate. In contrast, OLC’s 
recommendation could be interpreted as the selective interpretation of precedent and fact 
resulting in little more than a technical justification of a pre-determined means to an end.  
Although the majority of judicial precedent and legislative statues referenced by OLC are 
legitimate sources as a legal basis for examination of U.S. detainee policy, what troubles 
many Americans and internationals alike is whether the U.S. should pursue such a policy 
as opposed to whether it is strictly able to do so under the law.  Because American 
detainee policy violates the Kantian maxim to “never treat people as a means, but always 
at the same time as an end” (Kant, 1785), one must examine whether or not such a policy 
can be ethically justifiable. 
2. Ethical Decision-making 
William Shakespeare wrote, “O, it is excellent to have a giant’s strength, but it is 
tyrannous to use it like a giant” (Shakespeare, 1604-1605).  The abuses perpetrated at 
Abu Ghraib clearly provide an illustration of Shakespeare’s intended context.  The 
solution to this ancient moral dilemma can be resolved through applied ethics. In the 
process of applying reason to “well-based standards of right and wrong that prescribe 
what humans ought to do” (Markula Center for Applied Ethics, 2005), there are three 
types of principles upon which ethical thinking is based.  Rule-based thinking is 
associated with Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative; Ends-based thinking is 
associated with John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian, or consequentialist, thinking; and Care-
based thinking is most closely associated with the Golden Rule (Kidder, 2003, pp. 24-
25).  Since Kant’s Categorical Imperative is described in some detail in the previous 
section on Process, the focus here will be to examine how ends-based thinking and care-
based thinking influence decision-making. Suffice it to say that the Categorical 
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Imperative is a principle-driven approach that requires one to act as a universal maxim 
for others and always treat people as an end, never as means. 
Ends-based thinking, or Utilitarianism, focuses on an evaluation and assessment 
of acting in accordance with the greatest good.  The moral worth of an act, then, depends 
on the results, or consequences, it produces, in accordance with the Greatest Happiness 
Principle, defined by Mill as “an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as 
rich as possible in enjoyments, both in the point of quantity and quality” (Mill, 1861, as 
cited in Lober, 2000).  In other words, “Utilitarianism examines possible results and picks 
the one that produces the most blessing over the greatest range” (Kidder, 2003, p. 24). As 
the end of human action, the Greatest Happiness Principle is “necessarily also the 
standard of morality” (Mill, 1861, as cited in Lober, 2000). 
Examined through ends-based thinking, President Bush’s decision that al Qaeda 
and the Taliban would not receive Geneva Conventions protections as a matter of policy 
can be understood as a matter of loyalty. Loyalty given to, and received from, President 
Bush is a much-discussed issue in the mainstream media and is known to have a 
significant impact on the utility value of his decisions.  Applying that same value scale, 
the President may have viewed the conflict between the constraints of both U.S. and 
International Law with what he apparently viewed as his higher moral duty. His loyalty 
to the American people, and in his role as father figure to protect Americans as his own 
children (personal correspondence with Wyckoff, C., 2006), demanded greater obligation 
than his duty imposed by, as Kant described it, “his reverence for the law” (Kant, 1785).  
In light of his possible assessment of consequences, one would find the obligation to act 
in ways that maximize the protection of the American people to far outweigh the 
consequences of violating his duty to obey both domestic and international law.  This 
obligation would also exceed the consequences of mistreating enemy detainees in order 
to gain information about the larger enemy organization to prevent additional attacks on 
the American people and homeland.  It is at this point in the moral reasoning, however, 
that one must recognize the value in not just quantity, but also in quality.  Mill recognized 
that certain actions exist which are evil and never done for good. There are also actions 
which, “though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial, if practiced 
generally, would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to 
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abstain from it” (Mill, 1861, as cited in Lober, 2000).  Such are the circumstances under 
which President Bush had to determine the nation’s course of action in the War on 
Terror. 
Care-based thinking is the embodiment of the Golden Rule: “Do unto others what 
you would like them to do to you” (Kidder, 2003, p. 25).  Perhaps the simplest of all 
philosophies, the Golden Rule applies the feature of reversibility.  Reversibility “asks you 
to test your actions by putting yourself in another’s shoes and imagining how it would 
feel if you were the recipient, rather than the perpetrator of your actions” (Kidder, 2003, 
p. 25).  In his 26 January 2002 Memorandum to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President, Secretary of State Colin Powell made the utmost use of the Golden Rule in his 
attempts to convince the President that one significant risk of determining that Geneva 
Conventions do not apply to the conflict in Afghanistan would be to “provoke some 
individual foreign prosecutors to investigate our officials and troops” (Powell, 2002, p. 
3).  Similarly, if the President determined Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict, not 
only would it preserve the strongest moral and legal foundations for U.S. credibility, but 
also “it maintains POW status for U.S. forces, reinforces the importance of the Geneva 
Conventions, and generally supports the U.S. objective of ensuring its forces are 
accorded protection under the Convention” (Powell, 2002, p. 4).  It is significant to note 
that because of the clarity and simplicity with which Secretary of State Powell laid out 
the foreseen consequences of his argument for the application of the Geneva Conventions 
to the conflict in Afghanistan, many of his predicted consequences have come to pass 
almost exactly as he predicted in 2002. 
The purpose of examining these three different approaches to ethical decision-
making is not to make a value judgment of one over another.  It is simply unrealistic to 
expect to arrive at the perfectly moral solution by applying any or all of these principles.  
Rather, “The point is to reason. . . .the principles are useful because they give us a way to 
exercise our moral rationality.  They provide different lenses through which to see our 
dilemmas, different screens to use in assessing them” (Kidder, 2003, p. 26). 
For all the philosophical ways upon which President George W. Bush could have 
based his thinking and decision-making, he appears to have demonstrated a Nietzschean 
84 
morality in one of the defining moments of his presidential term.  Friedrich Nietzsche 
proposes that “the decisive value of an action lies precisely in what is unintentional in it” 
(Nietzsche, 1886, as cited in Lober, 2000).  He argues that intentions weaken the 
determination of morality to the point it becomes indiscernible. Because much of the 
conventional morality is fear-based, Nietzshe was suspicious of intentions and felt that 
the “morality of intentions . . . must be overcome” (Nietzsche, 1886, as cited in Lober, 
2000).  However, the individual who is able to overcome the conventional morality, 
judged “solely on the utility of the herd” (Nietsche, 1886, as cited in Lober, 2000), 
understands there is a higher moral code and acts beyond that traditional fear to do what 
he thinks is right.  The danger in attempting to transcend the community conscience is 
that the individual must be prepared to take responsibility for his actions and pay a high 
price for such a challenge to the status quo.   In his decision not to apply the provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions to either al Qaeda or the Taliban, President Bush attempted to 
transcend the conventional morality of the United States Armed Forces, the United States 
government, and the international framework established by the United Nations, by 
recognizing “the new paradigm--ushered in not by us, but by terrorists” (Bush, 2002) and 
responding with “new thinking in the law of war” (Bush, 2002).  For President Bush, this 
new thinking must be rooted in strength.  “Strength is necessary because tidily rational 
systems of morality will have to be discarded, and the darker, more dangerous, more 
passionate and mysterious aspects of human existence plumbed to the depths” (Nietzsche, 
1886, as cited in Lober, 2000).  It is in this context one can best understand from which 
Vice President Richard Cheney spoke of the strength it would require for how the United 
States would choose to respond to the new paradigm ushered in by al Qaeda’s attack:   
We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We've got 
to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs 
to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using 
sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if 
we're going to be successful. That's the world these folks operate in, and 
so it's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, 
to achieve our objective. It is a mean, nasty, dangerous dirty business out 
there, and we have to operate in that arena. I'm convinced we can do it; we 
can do it successfully. But we need to make certain that we have not tied 
the hands, if you will, of our intelligence communities in terms of 
accomplishing their mission (Cheney, 2001).  
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There can be no doubt in Vice President Cheney’s words about the strength 
necessary to overcome the moral forces in war.  However, one may find little moral 
worth in using any means necessary to achieve success within this mean, nasty, 
dangerous dirty “new paradigm.”  How is it possible to transcend conventional morality 
by sinking to the fear-infested depths of the world in which terrorists operate?  President 
Abraham Lincoln was less concerned about transcending conventional morality than he 
was about preserving it, in choosing how save the United States from a new paradigm in 
his own time: secession.  In weighing the consequences of his choice, Lincoln asked “[is] 
it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution?” (Justice Clark, 1952, p. 
662 as cited in Yoo, 2001).  In weighing the consequences of choosing how to fight the 
“new paradigm” of transnational insurgency and terrorism, President Bush needs to 
answer rather, whether it is possible to preserve the nation and yet lose the Constitution.  
 
D. OUTPUTS 
The Vice President’s determination to work through what he called the “dark side 
of the intelligence world” (Cheney, 2001), without first seeking alternative forms of 
action and resorting to the practice of lying and deceit (Bok, 1999, p. 105) has not been 
borne without consequences. Despite the President’s apparent intention that the policy he 
communicated in his 7 February 2002 Memorandum may have met the spirit and intent 
of U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions, it is only through the caveat included 
in paragraph three of that memorandum, that the United States essentially withheld a 
complete derogation of its obligations as a High Contracting Party to the Geneva 
Conventions.  Therein, President Bush declares, “As a matter of policy, the United States 
Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate 
and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of 
Geneva” (Bush, 2002). America’s word that it would treat detainees humanely was 
intended to satisfy international allies, partners and the United Nations, but its actions and 
intentions have been seen as inconsistent with its word thus far. 
This section will examine two subsequent policies which governed the conduct of 
American military forces and which derived directly from the President’s determination 
not to regard members of al Qaeda and the Taliban as lawful combatants under the Third 
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Geneva Convention.  The two specific policies in question are 1) Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld’s decision to authorize coercive interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba (GTMO) (Murphy, 2004, p. 826); and 2) the cooperative decision to import 
coercive interrogation techniques from GTMO into Iraq and Afghanistan (AJIL, 2004, 
pp. 827-828).  From examination of these policies, one will be able to see a kind of 
Gresham’s Law: “work that produces measurable outcomes tends to drive out work that 
produces unmeasurable outcomes” (Wilson, 1989, p. 161).  In other words, the 
interrogation work that produced actionable, exploitable intelligence from detainees 
became more highly valued that the mere task of detention.  As a result, the bureaucratic 
personality that developed came to value the means over the ends in a process that 
sociologist Robert K. Merton called “’goal displacement,’ a process by which 
institutional values become terminal values” (as cited in Wilson, 1989, p. 69).   
The impact of these policies, whether intended for well or ill, has been to degrade 
the credibility of the United States government by promulgating an officially sanctioned 
practice of deception, and to justify the application of one legal standard for our enemy, 
while rejecting that standard for ourselves. 
1. Decision to Authorize Coercive Interrogation Techniques at GTMO  
The purpose of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 is to mitigate the 
harmful effects of war on all persons who find themselves in the hands of 
a belligerent party. . . . Whatever status a particular detainee may be 
assigned, the Geneva Conventions prohibit torture and inhumane or 
degrading treatment in all circumstances, including for purposes of 
interrogation (Elsea, 2005, p. 2). 
The Geneva Convention’s protections of belligerents on both sides of the conflict, 
however, did not fit within the framework of the Bush Administration’s “new paradigm.”  
As Counsel to the President, Alberto Gonzales, interpreted the conflict, “It is not the 
traditional clash between nations adhering to the laws of war that formed the backdrop 
for GPW” (Gonzales, 2002).  The Bush Administration believed that the primary danger 
in the War Against Terrorism was the harmful effects to society at the hands of 
belligerent individuals and terrorist groups. “The nature of the new war places a high 
premium on other factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain information from captured 
terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against American 
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civilians” (Gonzales, 2002).  The impact of this judgment reflected the Vice President’s 
belief that the American intelligence community had to quietly get its hands dirty to be 
successful against its enemies.  But this belief that the new intelligence means were 
justified by the ends did not begin and end within the Bush Administration. 
Part of the emphasis on this need for actionable intelligence comes from a 
bipartisan imperative among American leaders not to use their military to 
its full power, not to kill a lot of people or suffer any casualties. So 
instead, we've reduced the intelligence process to try to find the silver 
bullet, the one piece of intelligence from one of these captives that will 
allow us to kill bin Laden and make all of this bad stuff go away (Scheuer, 
2005). 
Consistent with the advice of Counsel to the President Gonzales, in order to “avoid 
foreclosing options for the future, particularly against non-state actors . . . this new 
paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners” 
(Gonzales, 2002).  In accordance with the new thinking within the context of the Bush 
Administration’s “new paradigm,” information was the new currency of power and 
success. In terms of finding the so-called silver bullet, “Interrogation was key, the Bush 
administration believed, to getting immediate intelligence. Getting immediate intelligence 
was key to protecting the United States from further terrorist attacks. Therefore those 
rules on interrogation had to be loosened” (Danner, 2005).   
Upon a more rigorous examination of the “standards of conduct under the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment as implemented by Sections 2340-2340A of title 18 of the United States 
Code” (Bybee, 1 August 2002, p. 1), the Office of Legal Counsel found a narrow legal 
justification for such conduct as required in the “new paradigm.”   OLC concluded “that 
the treaty’s text prohibits only the most extreme acts by reserving criminal penalties 
solely for torture and declining to require such penalties for ‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment’” (Bybee, 1 August 2002, pp. 1-2).  OLC further opined that a 
wide range of interrogation techniques “do not produce pain or suffering of a necessary 
intensity to meet the definition of torture” (Bybee, 1 August 2002, p. 2) and thereby 
cleared a legal path for the introduction of coercive interrogation techniques.  
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The central output desired from the “new paradigm” was actionable intelligence.  
The Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations was certain that the desire 
for actionable intelligence was a causal variable in the resultant treatment of detainees: 
It is clear that pressure for additional intelligence and the more aggressive 
methods sanctioned by the Secretary of Defense memorandum resulted in 
stronger interrogation techniques.  They did contribute to a belief that 
stronger interrogation methods were needed and appropriate in their 
treatment of detainees” (Schlesinger Panel Report, 2004, p. 36). 
In October 2002, the commander of the joint task force at GTMO sent a request up the 
chain of command for permission to use three categories of interrogation techniques, 
each category more intense and severe than the last, which he believed would result in 
more exploitable intelligence (Dunleavy, 2002, as cited in Murphy, 2004, p. 826).  As a 
result of significant legal uncertainty across the DoD, Secretary Rumsfeld commissioned 
a working group of Defense Department lawyers to provide “more broadly regarding 
legal constraints on the interrogation of persons detained by the United States in the war 
on terrorism” (Murphy, 2004, p. 827). Relying heavily on the 1 August 2002 OLC 
Memorandum, which this paper has already shown to be of dubious legal value, and 
splitting hairs over the different standard of reasonableness between specific intent and 
general intent (Murphy, 2004, p. 828), the DoD working group determined that “the 
Convention [Against Torture] did not impose any greater requirements than already 
existed under U.S. law” (Murphy, 2004, p. 827). Secretary Rumsfeld subsequently 
approved the use of twenty-four interrogation techniques for use at GTMO (Murphy, 
2004, p. 828).   
2. Decision to Import HCI from GTMO into Iraq and Afghanistan  
In September 2003, the insurgency in Iraq spiked in intensity and reached a level 
of violence which demanded recognition by the Bush Administration.  At this point in 
time, however,  
the United States has essentially no idea where this insurgency is coming 
from.  They have no good intelligence. . . . So part of the migration came 
about largely because of the urgency, the extreme urgency at the highest 
levels of the American government to get intelligence and to get it any 
which way you can. And that kind of pressure came down and eventuated 
in these procedures going from one place to another (Danner, 2005).  
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Major General Geoffrey Miller, commander of the joint task force running GTMO, 
reviewed the prison system in Iraq “in order to exploit internees rapidly for actionable 
intelligence” (Schlesinger Panel Report, 2004, as cited in Murphy, 2004, p. 828).  “His 
recommendation was radical: that Army prisons be geared, first and foremost, to 
interrogations and the gathering of information needed for the war effort” (Hersh, 2004). 
The need for such information was demanded not only by Secretary Rumsfeld, but also 
by the combat commanders in Iraq.  “This is a fight for intelligence . . . to try to figure 
out how to take all this human intelligence as it comes in to us and turn it into something 
that’s actionable” (Dempsey, 2003, as cited in Hersh, 2004).  As a result, the demand 
drove the supply, and the process to import coercive techniques into Iraq was begun. 
The migration of interrogation techniques to Iraq and Afghanistan was neither as 
strictly controlled nor as specifically targeted as they had been within the confines of the 
GTMO detention facility.  Even before the final and amended list of interrogation 
techniques had been approved by Secretary Rumsfeld for use only at GTMO, the Fay 
Report found that by December 2002, interrogators in Afghanistan were using many of 
the same coercive interrogation techniques used at GTMO (as cited in Murphy, 2004, p. 
827).   Within Iraq, by the summer of 2003, “the procedures actually used on the ground 
became a combination of Field Manual (FM) 34-52 and additional interrogation 
techniques that had ‘migrated’ from earlier use at Guantanamo Bay and in Afghanistan” 
(Murphy, 2004, p. 828).  Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, commander of all ground 
forces in Iraq, did not formally approve the use of these 29 techniques, modeled after 
those used at Guantanamo Bay, until 14 September 2003 (Sanchez, 2003).   
Needless to say, there was a great deal of confusion over which policies and 
techniques were considered acceptable and legal for use in the field as a result of the 
different application of GPW between Iraq and Afghanistan, use of different versions of 
FM 34-52, and the multiple changes within the first 30 days the interrogation policy was 
approved for use in Iraq (Murphy, 2004, p. 829).  The confusion was further fed by 
combat veterans 
who had operated and deployed in other theaters in support of the global 
war on terrorism, who were called upon to establish and conduct 
interrogation operations in Abu Ghraib.  The lines of authority and the 
90 
prior legal opinions blurred . . . and is significant in that it likely 
contributed to an escalating ‘dehumanization’ of the detainees and set the 
stage for additional and more severe abuses to occur (Fay Report, 2003, p. 
28, as cited in Murphy, 2004, p. 829). 
Further contributing to the confusion over which detainees were subject to these 
coercive techniques was the inability (or failure) to adequately segregate POWs from 
unlawful combatants, and from civilian internees and criminals.  Much of the problem of 
improper classification and segregation arises from the simple fact that the United States 
does not conduct Article 5 Tribunals as required by the Geneva Conventions.  It states: 
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a 
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to 
any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the 
protections of the present Convention (GPW) until such time as their 
status has been determined by competent tribunal (GPW, Article 5, 1949). 
Article 5 Tribunals are intended to be held for any person captured (or collected) on the 
field of battle, in order to determine their actual status under the Geneva Conventions and 
to what degree they are protected by them.  The requirement ensures the application of 
such competent tribunals to those non-regular armed forces listed in Article 4; however, it 
is not limited to those listed under Article 4. It is written to apply to anyone who 
committed a belligerent act and who was captured.  Taken, as designed, in combination 
with the Fourth Geneva Convention, for the protection of civilians in war, which requires 
segregation from combatants, spies, saboteurs, and mercenaries, one should reasonably 
conclude that in a war in which the enemy combatants routinely live with and hide in and 
among the population, that the Detaining Power "ought" to feel compelled to convene 
tribunals for all persons captured in order to ensure the proper categorization, 
segregation, and safeguarding of each type of detainee under the Convention.  The 
practical purpose of this policy would also prevent unnecessary effort and the risk of 
violations during interrogations of detainees incorrectly categorized, or who otherwise 
have little or no intelligence value.   
Although the United States has not convened Article 5 Tribunals, it does conduct 
multiple reviews of each detainee’s status as a security risk within the first two weeks of 
captivity.  Upon capture, the detainees are held at the brigade interment facility (BIF). 
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Within 72 hours, an initial review must be done by a detention review authority (DRA) to 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to keep the detainee.  If determined to be a 
security threat, the detainee is then to be transferred to a division interment facility 
(DIF).  The detainee can be held up to 14 days at the DIF, at which time another review 
will be performed.  If the determination is again made that the detainee is a security 
threat, he is transferred to the theater internment facility (TIF).  At the TIF, the detainee 
can be kept for a period of up to 18 months.  During that time, the detainee’s case will 
either be presented to a Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB), or will be taken 
to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI). With regard to evidentiary standards, the 
capturing unit is required to provide witness statements and a CPA apprehension form, 
and will include interrogation reports and photos of any evidence found at the time of 
apprehension (weapons caches, cell phones, etc.) (procedures obtained from personal 
correspondence with Capt Kisner, MNF-I TF-134 legal attorney, 2006). 
Because the United States has not convened Article 5 Tribunals either in the war 
in Afghanistan or the war in Iraq, U.S. forces have acted in contravention of DoD 
Directive 5100.77, the DoD Law of War Program, AR-190-8, the Armed Forces Joint 
Instruction on Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and 
Other Detainees and the U.S. Army’s Operational Law Handbook. These regulations 
state that 
U.S. forces will comply with the [law of war] regardless of how the 
conflict is characterized. . . . all enemy personnel should initially be 
accorded the protections of the [Third Geneva Convention], at least until 
their status may be determined. . . . When doubt exists as to whether 
captured enemy personnel warrant continued [POW] status, Art. 5 [of the 
Third Geneva Convention] Tribunals must be convened (as cited in AJIL, 
2004, p. 476). 
Instead, the Army categorically classifies its detainees in Iraq as “security detainees” 
(MNF-I ROE, 2005), which seems to be a convenient catch-all category that includes 
unlawful combatants, civilian internees, criminals, and other detainees the Army 




observers have argued that this apparent inconsistency is at least partially to blame for the 
confusion with respect to the permissibility of harsh interrogation techniques in detention 
facilities in Iraq” (Elsea, 2005, pp.5-6).     
The one fact that mitigates the Bush Administration’s justification for coercive 
interrogation techniques in the urgent and continuous pressure for soldiers to produce 
actionable intelligence is that the high value prisoners – the senior members of al Qaeda, 
the Taliban, or Saddam’s regime – those who held the strategic-level intelligence, were 
never sent to the general detention facilities like GTMO, Abu Ghraib, Camp Bucca, or 
any of the standard internment facilities (Hersh, 2004; Priest, 2005).  Rather, “all of the 
high value people went into CIA hands, even the few . . . that started out in military 
hands” (Priest, as cited in PBS Frontline interview, 2005).  This assertion has been 
confirmed by the former commander of detentions at GTMO, Brigadier General Rick 
Baccus, who told PBS Frontline that he had real concerns with who was getting sent to 
Guantanamo Bay, to the degree that Major General Michael Dunleavey, a former Joint 
Task Force Guantanamo Commander, traveled to Afghanistan to sort out the vetting 
process of who was being sent to GTMO (Baccus, as cited in PBS Frontline interview, 
2005).  Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Berg, a military lawyer stationed at GTMO at the 
time, also confirmed that “we had a bunch of people there [GTMO] that had little or no 
intelligence value . . . maybe some of them aren’t quite the worst of the worst, and some 
of them are just the slowest guys off the battlefield” (Berg, as cited in PBS Frontline 
interview, 2005).  Recent admissions by Rear Admiral Harry Harris, the current 
Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo,  confirmed only 25 percent of the detainee 
population at GTMO are actively interrogated due to lack of trained interrogators and 
interpreters; others may have gone years without being questioned (Sutton, 2006).  
Further, nearly 300 of the 759 detainees ever held at GTMO “have been released or 
transferred to their home nations for continued detention” (Sutton, 2006), indicating that 
almost half of whom Secretary Rumsfeld once called the worst of the worst had no 
intelligence value at all.  When one considers these facts along with Major General 
Antonio Taguba’s confirmation that more than 60 percent (and growing quickly) of the 
detainees held in Iraq are criminals “of no intelligence value and who no longer pose a 
significant threat to Coalition Forces” (Taguba, 2004, p. 25), one is compelled to question 
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why coercive interrogation techniques were authorized as official policy and why the 
United States reversed “over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the 
Geneva Conventions” (Powell, 2002, p. 2).   
 
E. OUTCOMES 
Socrates: There are these two evils, the doing of injustice and the suffering 
of injustice—and we affirm that to do injustice is a greater, and to suffer 
injustice a lesser evil.  
Plato, Gorgias, 509c, as cited in Kennedy, 2005 
The ultimate outcome of the U.S. policy toward detainees in its wars against 
terrorists and insurgents may be another test of America’s belief in the principles of the 
Constitution; whether we ultimately do believe in the opening proclamations of the 
Declaration of Independence—that all men are created equal—or at least have equal 
protection under the law.  As a nation governed by the rule of law, Americans have put 
great consideration and weight of opinion behind the Golden Rule, which advises: “Do 
unto others as you would have done to you” (Kidder, 2003).  One of the biggest 
difficulties many Americans have with the Bush Administration’s categorical refusal to 
comply with the full framework of the Geneva Conventions is that the policy expects and 
demands a certain standard of conduct by the enemies of the United States, but seems to 
reject the application of the same standard for itself.   
It's almost a royalist idea of power; that the president, if he wants to 
interrogate a prisoner in whatever way he wants, he cannot be stopped, 
neither by the other institutions of government nor by international treaty 
nor by domestic statute, because these are under his war powers. So you 
see an untrammeled notion of executive power that's very radical in 
American history, but that happens to come forward at this time because 
of the particular administration you have in power and the event that has 
happened (Danner, 2005). 
The notion of a Presidential mandate in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was very real, to 
the degree that President Bush was obligated by duty to take decisive action not only to 
protect Americans from future attacks, but to restore our honor as a nation.  However, the 
President’s mandate was not a blank check from Congress and the American people to 
react and fight in such a way as to diminish the notion, in our own minds and across the 
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globe, of what it means to be American.  Ironically, the President’s policy for “Humane 
Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees” (Bush, 2002) serves as sort of an anti-
Golden Rule and one of its outcomes has been to diminish the prestige of American 
democracy rather than to strengthen it. 
Jane Mayer wrote in the New Yorker, “Since September 11th, as the number . . . 
terrorist suspects have been deposited indefinitely in places like Guantánamo Bay, the 
shortcomings of this approach have become manifest (Mayer, 2006). She continued by 
quoting former CIA operative Michael Scheuer, who said,  
Are we going to hold these people forever? The policymakers hadn’t 
thought what to do with them, and what would happen when it was found 
out that we were turning them over to governments that the human-rights 
world reviled. Once a detainee’s rights have been violated, you absolutely 
can’t reinstate him into the court system. You can’t kill him, either.  All 
we’ve done is create a nightmare.(Scheuer, as cited in Mayer, 2006).   
Dana Priest, who recently won a Pulitzer Prize for her reporting on this issue, 
quoted a former senior intelligence officer who said, "We never sat down, as far as I 
know, and came up with a grand strategy.  Everything was very reactive. That's how you 
get to a situation where you pick people up, send them into a netherworld and don't say, 
'What are we going to do with them afterwards?'" (Priest, 2005).  The implication of this 
comment is that the United States, beyond the point of killing or capturing and 
interrogating members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or participants in the Iraqi insurgency, 
has found itself in a dilemma.  By rejecting the institutional due process provided by the 
Geneva Conventions to all parties to the conflict, the United States could ultimately end 
up unable to exact justice on those truly responsible for the murder of nearly 3,000 
Americans and allies in the 9/11 attacks. 
Thus far, this thesis has focused on the procedural and organizational explanations 
for why and how the atrocities perpetrated at Abu Ghraib could happen at the hands of 
American soldiers in the performance of their assigned duties.   While systemic analysis 
can help to explain the conditions under which these abuses were permitted to happen, it 
is insufficient to explain why individual “GIs” were capable and enthusiastic participants 
in the abuses committed.  For an analysis of individual motivations, one must turn to the 
social sciences of psychology and sociology and the work of Doctors Stanley Milgram, 
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Philip Zimbardo, and Robert Cialdini.  In seeking to understand the motivations of the 
individuals involved, one can also hope to predict when such abuses are more likely to 
occur and to prevent the relapse of such horrific cruelty. 
In the 1960s, Doctor Stanley Milgram conducted a series of more than a dozen 
experiments on over 1,000 subjects in order to study the effects of authority on human 
behavior (APA, 2004).  Doctor Milgram concluded that ordinary people are capable of 
extraordinary acts of evil. 
This is, perhaps, the most fundamental lesson of our study: ordinary 
people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on 
their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process. Moreover, 
even when the destructive effects of their work become patently clear, and 
they are asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental 
standards of morality, relatively few people have the resources needed to 
resist authority. 
The essence of obedience is that a person comes to view himself as the 
instrument for carrying out another person's wishes, and he therefore no 
longer regards himself as responsible for his actions. Morality does not 
disappear. . . . loyalty, duty, discipline are all terms heavily saturated with 
moral meaning and refer to the degree to which a person fulfills his 
obligations to authority. . . . The most frequent defense of the individual 
who has performed a heinous act under command of authority is that he 
has simply done his duty.  (Milgram, 1974) 
Doctor Philip Zimbardo also conducted experiments investigating the influence of 
authority on human behavior.  What he discovered about human nature was equally as 
disturbing as Doctor Milgram’s conclusions. In the Stanford Prison Experiment, Doctor 
Zimbardo “randomly divided 24 normal students into groups of guards and prisoners 
within a simulated prison. Within days, all hell broke loose, as the faux guards turned to 
abuse to control the faux prisoners, stripping them, hooding them and ultimately forcing 
them to simulate sodomizing one another” (Stannard, 2004).  Although he had to shut 
down his experiment only a few days into his planned two week experiment Doctor 
Zimbardo was able to reach some important conclusions about the totality of the power 
differential between the guards and the prisoners: 
Human behavior is much more under the control of situational forces than 
most of us recognize or want to acknowledge. In a situation that implicitly 
gives permission for suspending moral values, many of us can be morphed 
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into creatures alien to our usual natures. Some of the necessary ingredients 
for stirring the crucible of human nature in negative directions are: 
diffusion of responsibility, anonymity, dehumanization, peers who model 
harmful behavior, bystanders who do not intervene, and a setting of power 
differentials.  
Those factors were apparently also operating in Iraq. But in addition there 
was secrecy, no accountability, no visible chain of command, conflicting 
demands on the guards from the CIA and civilian interrogators, no rules 
enforced for prohibited acts, encouragement for breaking the will of the 
detainees, and no challenges by many bystanders who observed the evil 
but did not blow the whistle (Zimbardo, 2004). 
Doctor Zimbardo also offers good advice on how to safeguard against losing 
control over the necessary power differential in prisons or similar type institutions: 
“When there is accountability, transparency, a clear chain of command and a respect for 
the enemy as a human combatant, this will prevent future atrocities like Abu Ghraib” 
(APA, 2004). He also identified a number of social forces that enabled the type of abuses 
at Abu Ghraib and in the Stanford Prison Experiment:  
It can start with a failure of leadership, but includes a host of social 
psychological processes, such as, diffusion of responsibility, 
dehumanization of the enemy, secrecy of the operation, lack of personal 
accountability, conditions facilitating moral disengagement, relabeling evil 
as “necessary” and developing justifications for evil, social modeling, 
group pressures to conform in order to fit a macho cultural identity, 
emergent norms that establish what is acceptable to the group in that 
setting and obedience to emergent authorities or group leaders (APA, 
2004). 
If the proper safeguards are put in place to minimize or eliminate the influence of these 
social forces on the guards, and then are carefully attended to, Doctor Zimbardo would 
disagree with OLC’s justification of the need for premeditated legal defenses.  In his 
mind, the types of justifications explained by Mr. Bybee would indicate intent to develop 
justifications for wrongdoing.  While the forces of authority, secrecy and lack of 
accountability can have a powerful influence to do wrong, these kinds of abuses are by no 
means inevitable. 
Another psychologist whose research on the power of persuasion can help 
describe why the military guards at Abu Ghraib perpetrated their infamous acts of 
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depravity and abuse against the prisoners there is Doctor Robert Cialdini.  In his book 
Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, Doctor Cialdini explains the six principles of 
psychological influence he identified during his three years of “participant observation” 
in numerous “compliance professions” (Cialdini, 1993).  What is truly fascinating about 
these principles is their “ability to produce a distinct kind of automatic, mindless 
compliance from people, that is, a willingness to say yes, without thinking first” 
(Cialdini, 1993, p. xiv).  Of Doctor Cialdini’s six principles, it appears that four were in 
effect at Abu Ghraib. 
Authority describes a deep sense of obedience and a boundless potential to 
compel peoples actions (Cialdini, 1993).  In the social context, Milgram’s experiment is 
an example of the compelling influence of authority in and of itself.  Compliance with 
authority was a common influence in the Abu Ghraib incident throughout the entire chain 
of command, and even describes the deference of the guards to the interrogators and 
military intelligence officers, whose identity was often hidden during the course of their 
duties. 
Reciprocation describes a rule “established to promote the development of 
reciprocal relationships so that one person could initiate such a relationship without a fear 
of loss” (Cialdini, 1993, p. 30).  The rule of reciprocation is “An obligation to give, an 
obligation to receive, and an obligation to repay” (Cialdini, 1993, p. 31).  Reciprocation 
was the primary means by which the Military Intelligence officers influenced the Military 
Police noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) to participate in the softening up of 
detainees for interrogation.  After he had first done it for them, the interrogators 
complimented the NCOIC for the success they had achieved as a result of his actions to 
soften up the detainees.  It was natural for the NCOIC to continue to soften up the 
detainees in order to continue receiving positive reinforcements for the job he and his 
soldiers were doing.  The MP’s sense of mission was strong at that point, matching this 
informal task with a high degree of autonomy and coupled with praise. 
Consistency is a very strong psychological drive that attempts to correlate one’s 
actions with one’s commitments.  Getting someone to make a commitment is the key and 
sets the stage for an automatic and ill-considered consistency with that commitment 
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(Cialdini, 1993).  Once the NCOIC and his guards had begun to perform these abuses and 
coercive techniques in order to soften up the detainees, they felt an obligation to continue 
to act in ways that were consistent with the commitment they had made to the Military 
Intelligence officers. 
Social Proof provides an opportunity to use role models and key communicators 
to manipulate and shorten the decision-making process of the group.  A very powerful 
group dynamic, social proof emphasizes the similarity between the subject and the 
behavior of the role model to link consistency of the desired action between the target 
and the role model (Cialdini, 1993).  This extreme case of “everybody’s doing it” served 
to reinforce the heinous behavior the group of guards observed because their leader and 
their role model had started to abuse the detainees and the majority of the guards decided 
it would be appropriate for them to abuse the detainees as well because their individual 
decision processes were manipulated by the actions of the group. The Military Police 
judged whether it was okay for them to abuse detainees by observing their leader and 
other MPs doing it.  Nobody spoke out against the abuses, so they each decided it was 
okay to participate.  From there, the principles of consistency and reciprocation only 
served to reinforce the MPs behavior as time went on. 
After considering the process by which this detainee policy was developed, how 
the President chose the nation’s course of action, and what caused the broader policy to 
produce specific outputs and why, the reasonable person may pause to consider whether 
such treatment, as is overtly authorized or secretly permitted, is worth it.  Can such a 
consequential course of action be value-maximizing for the rational actor, or does the 
Categorical Imperative obligate one to abstain from subjecting detainees to such cruel 
treatment?  While there is a pretty wide range of professional opinion on this question, in 
his paper to the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, Dr. Robert Kennedy 
presented five reasons why the United States should never resort to torture, and arguably 
such cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment that fails to rise to the level and severity of 
torture.   
First, the United States has entered into a number of international agreements 
prohibiting the use of torture as well as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.  Not 
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only are these agreements consistent with the Constitution, one could argue that America 
is compelled to comply out of duty to an honorable obligation it entered into in good 
faith.  Kant would agree that the highest principle by which one can make a decision is 
based on duty or the law.  “Fidelity to international law and agreements may be a reason 
to avoid all uses of torture” (Kennedy, 2003, p. 10). 
Second, America should not employ torture due to the force of our example.  
Following the reasoning of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, the U.S. should act as though 
its actions were a universal maxim for others.  “For the United States to employ torture, 
even in sharply limited cases, might set an example that would encourage less restraint in 
other parts of the world” (Kennedy, 2003, p. 11). 
“A third reason, and one that should not be dismissed lightly, is the effect of 
employing torture on both the interrogator and the character of the nation” (Kennedy, 
2003, p. 11).  This reason applies the second part of the Categorical Imperative, “Never 
to treat people as means, always as ends” (Kant, 1785).  “The employment of torture 
cannot fail to affect the interrogator, regardless of how clearly he or she sees the good to 
be achieved. Furthermore, the lines between interrogation and revenge or punishment can 
easily be blurred, both by the individual and by the nation (Kennedy, 2003, p. 11). 
“A fourth reason to avoid torture is that it may lead the nation and its leaders to be 
more willing to employ immoral uses of force, both within and without the context of 
war” (Kennedy, 2003, p. ).  The paradox of using “any means necessary” to protect what 
one values may cause the loss or destruction of whatever is valued (Kennedy, 2003, p. 
11).  Flawed analysis in support of the justification for torture, such as that presented by 
the Office of Legal Counsel to the President, may provoke an unnecessary escalation of 
violence (Kennedy, 2003, p. 11). 
“Finally, it may be that interrogatory torture is simply doesn’t work. If this were 
to prove to be so, then the use of torture in interrogations would fail the criterion of 
Prospect of Success, and its use would therefore be unjustified and immoral” (Kennedy, 




F. STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING CONCLUSIONS 
In his classic treatise, On War, Clausewitz wisely considered the importance of a 
state’s intent on the overall outcome of policy: 
In short, at the highest level the art of war turns into policy—but a policy 
conducted by fighting battles rather than by sending diplomatic notes. . . . 
No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of 
political factors; and when people talk . . . about harmful political 
influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they 
mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. 
If the policy is right—that is, successful—any intentional effect it has on 
the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect, 
the policy itself is wrong (Clausewitz, 1832, as cited in Darley, 2005, p. 
133) 
In order for a strategy to be good, the ways, ends, and means all must be balanced with 
respect to the risk associated with the pursuit of each.  The Bush Administration strategy 
clearly is not balanced in a way that will engender broad-based support, as can be shown 
by the President’s plummeting approval ratings in the polls (Gallup, Zogby, Pew, New 
York Times, etc.) as well as by the coordinated, international protests against the first 
pillar of the strategy, thwarting terrorists and rogue regimes.  Rather, the U.S. strategy is 
rooted in the application of its unparalleled military might.  Echoing the assertions of 
Clausewitz, the best form of public diplomacy is good policy and good policy execution; 
as a result, good public diplomacy cannot correct bad foreign policy (Blackburn, 1992). 
The feedback from the target audiences regarding the administration’s strategy and its 
rhetoric is clear: it isn’t working, at least in the short term.   
As historian John Vincent explained, “History is about evidence. . . .  no evidence, 
no history” (as cited in Gray, 2006, p. 29).  Against the tyranny of terrorism, much as it 
overcame the tyranny of fascism, communism, and racism, America has the opportunity 
to write history, not just participate in it.  If the evidence leads to outcomes that 
demonstrate moral intentions, just actions, and by proving that every person is truly equal 
under the law, then terrorism hasn’t a chance.  If the evidence leads to the kinds of 
outcomes illustrated by Abu Ghraib, secret prisons, torture, and rule by law instead of the 




In trying to define the essence of war, Colin Gray wrote, “Warfare is all about 
human behavior, ours and theirs” (Gray, 2006, p. 28).  The purpose of war is generally 
regarded as the political coercion of one state by another.  More specifically, war is about 
controlling an adversary’s will to the degree that he can be persuaded he is defeated 
(Gray, 2006, pp. 27-28).  In other words, “War is about politics and warfare always about 
people” (Gray, 2006, p. 27).   
If warfare is ultimately about the political coercion of the will of a people, then 
how is it possible that the coercion of a single person, in captivity as an official 
representative of an adversarial state or organization, is not only illegal, but also 
immoral?  Particularly when prisoners continue to resist while in captivity by any and all 
means available, to the degree that prisoners sustain a defiant atmosphere of combat, how 
is the detaining power to persuade the prisoner that he is defeated if not through the 
coercive control of his will?   As noted above, the answer is that “warfare is all about 
human behavior, ours and theirs” (Gray 2006, p. 28). 
Professor Philip Zimbardo, who conducted the Stanford Prison Experiment in 
1971, is an expert on certain aspects of human behavior.  Zimbardo makes clear that 
“prisons offer an environment where the balance of power is so unequal that even normal 
people without any apparent prior psychological problems can become brutal and abusive 
unless great efforts are made by the institution to control the expression of guards' hostile 
impulses” (APA, 2004).  Ironically, Doctor Zimbardo’s description of the power 
differential in the relationship between detaining power and captive by is also an apropos 
description of the relationship between the United States and almost every second and 
third world civilization in the world today.  Much as laws and regulations govern the 
conduct of the guards holding almost total power over the prisoners, so do the Geneva 
Conventions represent “an uneasy compromise between the views of smaller land Powers 
liable to be overrun, and of the greater land Powers who have usually done the 
overrunning” (Stone, 1954, as cited in Aldrich, 2000, p. 44).   
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Terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency are ancient styles of fighting by 
which those on the short end of the power differential have challenged the status quo 
imposed by those in control of the political and social context.  Throughout history, great 
nations have been vulnerable to those who have found ways to wield the state’s own 
power against it.  As described by Mark Danner, “Terrorism really is a kind of jujitsu. [It] 
begins with the recognition that the party you’re attacking is much stronger . . . and you 
have to use the strength of that party against himself. So you have to make him act in a 
way and do things that you do not have the power to do” (Danner, 2005).   Terrorists aim 
to provoke a regime into overreaction and repression of the entire population because the 
regime does not know exactly who the terrorists are.  The political outcome of the state’s 
repression can be the unification of the population against it, whereby the state’s use of 
its strength against itself can result in the downfall of its policy or worse (Johnson, 1981; 
DeNardo, 1985).  The 9/11 attacks on the United States by al Qaeda demonstrated that 
the smaller countries, fringe groups, and even individuals, were capable of utilizing the 
asymmetric advantage of terror to a degree previously incomprehensible, and served, in a 
fashion, to mobilize and unify radical groups across the globe who, in possession of a 
different vision for governance, would no longer allow themselves to be “overrun” by the 
great powers.   
In a strategic sense, the American detainee policy, unfortunately made infamous 
at prisons like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, represents the ideal manifestation of the 
asymmetric jujitsu contest between the world’s strongest nation and a transnational 
network of radical Islamic terrorists who are too weak to seize power in their own 
countries.  By provoking the United States to overreact with disproportionate force, al 
Qaeda is cleverly working to disrupt the balance of the status quo in the Middle East by 
manipulating the policies of the regimes in power to the degree they de-legitimize 
themselves in the eyes of the population.  If the most significant experience Afghanis, 
Iraqis, and other Arabs have with American democracy is gained by their experience and 
treatment at confinement facilities like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, then al 
Qaeda’s strategy may have a reasonable chance at success.  What the United States needs 
most at this point in time is to revise its foreign policies with respect to the Islamic world, 
first so that these policies are consistent with the fundamentally American principles of 
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Liberty, Equality, and Due Process, and second, to relate those principles to the specific 
socio-cultural context (Gray, 2006) of Islam.  If these changes are not made to the 
American National Security Policy, then the risks, as noted by Colin Gray, are of an 
historic proportion: 
The effectiveness of a revolutionary American way of war will not be 
wholly within America’s competence to ensure.  Americans may wage the 
wrong war the wrong way, or the right war the wrong way, because they 
failed to recognize and understand the political and cultural context of the 
conflict at issue (Gray, 2006, pp. 38-39). 
In order to ensure the ability of American national security policy to achieve its 
intended outcomes, particularly in the Global War on Terror and the type of low intensity 
war that has thrived in the post–WWII era, the United States should pursue three changes 
with respect to its professed policy objective to eradicate terrorism as a national security 
threat.  Within the framework of American national security policy, two issues are at the 
forefront of the political and socio-cultural context: war powers and human rights.  
“Fighting terrorism . . . does not require wholesale abandonment of national principles 
and traditions – foregoing the legitimacy that only legislative and judicial powers can 
provide and leaving individual rights to the executive branch’s discretion” (Heymann and 
Kayyem, 2005, p. 2).  Adoption of specifically ratification and adoption of Additional 
Protocols I & II (1977) combined with application of the full framework of the Geneva 
Conventions, will provide the best available framework to combat wars of transnational 
insurgency, national liberation, and terrorism while retaining the moral and legal high 
ground required of the world's only superpower.   
 
A. RATIFY ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS I AND II TO THE 1949 GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS  
In his letter to the Senate requesting their advice and consent for his 
recommendation not to ratify Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, President 
Reagan’s opposition to ratification focused on the legitimacy he believed would be 
conferred upon terrorists if the Protocol were adopted.  In his intense opposition to 
terrorist organizations and their supporters, President Reagan specifically believed, “The 
repudiation of Protocol I is one additional step, at the ideological level so important to 
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terrorist organizations, to deny these groups legitimacy as international actors” (Reagan, 
1987).  As a result, Additional Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions remain 
pending action with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Library of Congress, 
2006).  Despite the political reservations of two American Presidents and the U.S. Senate, 
Additional Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions remain the most relevant 
and practical legal framework by which States can combat wars of insurgency, national 
liberation, and terrorism.  163 out of 191 member states in the United Nations have 
ratified Additional Protocol I and 159 U.N. member states have ratified Additional 
Protocol II (ICRC, 2005).  It is time for the United States to ratify both Additional 
Protocols as a more effective framework within which to fight the Global War on Terror. 
In 1863, the Lieber Code described the relationship between a State and a 
rebellious people with respect to the laws of land warfare.  For both political and practical 
reasons, the Lieber Code noted no special relationship conferred by the application of the 
laws of war or the treatment of captured rebels as prisoners of war.   
152. When humanity induces the adoption of the rules of regular war 
toward rebels, whether the adoption is partial or entire, it does in no way 
whatever imply a partial or complete acknowledgment of their 
government, if they have set up one, or of them, as an independent or 
sovereign power.  
153. Treating captured rebels as prisoners of war . . . neither proves nor 
establishes an acknowledgment of the rebellious people, or of the 
government which they may have erected, as a public or sovereign power. 
Nor does the adoption of the rules of war toward rebels imply an 
engagement with them extending beyond the limits of these rules. It is 
victory in the field that ends the strife and settles the future relations 
between the contending parties (General Orders No. 100, 1863). 
This distinction between sovereign and rebel insurgent got blurred somewhat with 
the creation of the Third Geneva Convention.  In addition to the desire of the colonial 
powers to retain their full autonomy and sovereignty to deal with colonial insurrections 
without international interference, there are two defects of traditional categorization of 
combatants which proved insoluble to the major land powers: first, it is difficult to 
distinguish between combatant rebel forces and the civilian population, thereby putting 
the population directly at risk, and second it ignores major differences among participants 
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within each category (Bond, 1974, p. 151).  In their Commentary to Additional Protocol 
I, the International Committee of the Red Cross clarified the impact of the problems 
posed by the imprecise recognition of guerrillas: 
While Article 5(2) of GC III was an important development in 1949 for 
the protection of people taking part in hostilities, the rule remained “rather 
imprecise and at an embryonic stage”. The problems of legal recognition 
of combatants of guerrilla warfare highlighted the insufficiency of Article 
5(2). Article 45 of Protocol I was designed to remedy this insufficiency.  
The objective was to establish procedures which were more likely to 
guarantee that prisoner-of-war status would be granted. In effect, the 
provision lists the cases in which doubt regarding the status of a combatant 
must give way to a presumption of prisoner-of-war status: (1) if he claims 
that status; (2) if he appears to be entitled to such status; and (3) if the 
Party on which he depends claims such status. Where doubt remains 
notwithstanding the said presumption, the question then goes to the 
competent tribunal. The series of presumptions in Protocol I are a 
development of Article 5(2) of GC III, but in contrast to the latter 
provision the burden of proof clearly lies with the captor. By 
implementing a system of presumptions, Protocol I reverses the burden of 
proof so that it is the competent tribunal which must provide evidence to 
the contrary every time the presumption exists and is contested.  It would 
thus appear that Article 45 of Protocol I reaffirms the interpretation of 
“any doubt arises” in Article 5(2) as including instances when a claim of 
prisoner-of-war status is made either by the detainee or by the Party on 
which he or she depends. It may be concluded, on the basis of the 
interpretation of the rule in military manuals, that doubtful prisoner-of-war 
status under Article 5(2) of GC III may arise where serious doubt exists as 
to whether a captured person fits within the Article 4 categories despite a 
general (unwritten) presumption of prisoner-of-war status for those taking 
part in hostilities (Naqvi, 2002, pp. 576-577). 
The operational benefit resulting from the adoption of the Additional Protocols to 
the Geneva Conventions (1977) would be not only to provide an adequate resolution to 
the two traditional defects of combatant categorization noted by Mr. Bond, but also to 
simplify the definition of combatants and the rules for their treatment as POWs when 
they fall into the captivity of a detaining power.  Just as it was recognized in the Lieber 
Code that applying the laws of war to a rebellious people does not confer any special 
relationship or legitimacy upon them, neither would the adoption of the Additional 
Geneva Conventions Protocols serve to legitimize terrorism and insurgency to any degree 
greater than they are already accepted and used by the weak against politically and 
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militarily strong states.  To that end, asymmetries of power are not the only concerns 
regarding the relationship between the State and the terrorists/insurgents.  The essence of 
“the asymmetry between the morality of the warrior and the morality of the terrorist . . . is 
ethical discrimination.  That is what distinguishes a warrior from a bandit, a mere killer, a 
terrorist” (Ignatieff, 2001, p. 7). 
One implication of the continued implementation of U.S. detainee policy in the 
aftermath of Abu Ghraib has not been to change the policy framework or intent; rather 
the impact has been borne by the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines on the ground.  
The rules imposed on them to justify taking, processing and holding a detainee have 
become restrictive to the point as to potentially be operationally prohibitive (Personal 
correspondence with McCormick, 2005; Dyke, J., 2006).  Instead of enabling an efficient 
process to search, silence, secure, segregate and speed to the rear (AR 190-8) any 
combatant captured in hostile actions toward Coalition forces, the detainee process has 
become mired in legal determinations, the chain of custody process, and requirements for 
strict rules of evidence.  There is no small degree of irony that such strict law 
enforcement rules have been imposed upon U.S. forces who are routinely ordered to 
conduct so-called “cordon and sweep” operations, during which they accomplish what 
would amount to an unlawful search and seizure under U.S. law, yet are held to 
essentially a strict legal process by which to categorize, process, and justify holding the 
persons they capture during these raids.  Rather than change the policy to be an enabler 
for operational effectiveness for forces in theater, the policy has hamstrung soldiers’ 
efforts both to remove hostile forces from the battlefield, and to extract and utilize 
operationally relevant intelligence. Further, as discussed throughout this thesis, the policy 
has actually been counterproductive, both in terms of efficiency and its effects on the 
insurgency.  
 
B. ADOPT THE ENTIRE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS FOR UNWAVERING APPLICATION DURING WAR 
Ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II and acceptance of the 
complete framework of the Geneva Conventions should serve as the appropriate moral 
and legal standard for nation states to effectively and legitimately combat wars of 
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transnational insurgency, national liberation, and terrorism.  “The driving motive for 
ethical restraint is the obligation we have for our own moral identity and principles.  You 
cannot fight a war on terror and hope to win if you betray your own moral identity” 
(Ignatieff, 2001, pp. 9-10).   
Two key principles regarding the application of the Geneva Conventions relative 
to International Humanitarian Law are that 1) “Captivity is not a punishment, but only a 
means of keeping an adversary from being in a position to do harm; and 2) The State 
must ensure the protection, both national and international, of persons fallen into its 
power” (Bond, 1974, p. 76).  If, in fact, the Bush Administration’s “new paradigm” 
recognizes that the official U.S. position was that Afghanistan was not a failed state, and 
also, as former CIA director, George Tenet, recognized, that al Qaeda was a terrorist 
organization supporting the state of Afghanistan, then the notion that the Taliban were 
ruling over a de facto state is acceptable.  If so, then international law prescribes applying 
the law of war to al Qaeda and the Taliban as the de facto armed forces of that state.  
Specifically:  
Nations holding such beliefs (leery of international interference in internal 
affairs) would naturally reject the idea that the laws of war—international 
law—should dictate how they could treat insurgents.  Once the rebels had 
achieved the status of belligerents, however, they had become in effect a 
de facto state; as a state they were entitled to all the incidents of that 
privileged status, one of which was being accorded the benefits of the laws 
of war. . . . The doctrine of the sovereign equality of states, which remains 
a fundamental building block of the international legal order, rather than 
the demand of humanity, dictated applying the laws of war to 
belligerencies (Bond, 1974, p. 51).   
The benefit of the Geneva Conventions framework, to both states and individuals, 
is that it provides an internationally accepted and legitimized system of due process, so 
that, if and when it becomes necessary for the state to deprive combatants of the rights 
generally believed to be inalienable, the state can do so in a just and ethical manner.  The 
Geneva Conventions provide a legitimate due process system for those combatants whose 
fundamental rights have been withheld by the detaining power as a result of their official 
captivity.  “The GPW permits long-term detention without criminal charges” (Powell, 
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2002, p. 3).  No such permission exists under other international, humanitarian, or human 
rights laws, and such detention is not otherwise legal under U.S. federal law.   
If the GPW is determined not to apply, then detainees are required to receive due 
process in accordance with violations of criminal law.  The Supreme Court ruled in Rasul 
v. Bush (2004) that “the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the 
Executive’s potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly 
innocent of wrongdoing” (Justice Stevens, 2004).  Citing the Supreme Court’s 
determination in Eisentrager v. Forrestal (1949), Justice Stevens summarized six critical 
facts in the case: 
We are here confronted with a decision whose basic premise is that these 
prisoners are entitled, as a constitutional right, to sue in some court of the 
United States for a writ of habeas corpus. To support that assumption we 
must hold that a prisoner of our military authorities is constitutionally 
entitled to the writ, even though he (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never 
been or resided in the United States; (c) was captured outside of our 
territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was 
tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United 
States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United 
States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States.” 339 
U.S., at 777.  On this set of facts, the Court concluded, “no right to the 
writ of habeas corpus appears. Id., at 781.   
Petitioners in these cases differ from the Eisentrager detainees in 
important respects: They are not nationals of countries at war with the 
United States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of 
aggression against the United States; they have never been afforded access 
to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and 
for more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory over which 
the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control (542 U.S. 
466, 2004). 
In light of both the principles of the Geneva Conventions and the Supreme Court 
decisions cited above, Mr. Gonzales’ 25 January 2002 policy recommendation presents a 
contradiction in desired outcomes.  On the one hand, the U.S. needs to try terrorists and 
insurgents for war crimes in order to avoid further atrocities against Americans; on the 
other hand, however, since Mr. Gonzales believes the “new paradigm” renders obsolete 
Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning prisoners, it also practically prohibits the U.S. 
from ever bringing terrorists to trial for war crimes.  The evidence obtained from the 
109 
tainted tree of such relatively unrestricted interrogations during an indefinite detention of 
an unlawful combatant, may never be used in any kind of trial.  The irony is thick in the 
dilemma over the need to try detainees for war crimes, yet lacking the appropriate legal 
framework because of the blanket suspension of application and, therefore, the legitimacy 
of indefinite detention.  For these reasons, the United States should commit to full 
compliance with the Geneva Conventions, complete with the ratification of the two 
Additional Protocols. 
The practical effect of the detainee policy that President Bush implemented was 
that it managed to adopt the worst elements of both options presented to him.  By 
applying the Geneva Conventions to the conflict, yet categorically withholding its 
protections from the participants, the United States preserved the least flexibility under 
the law, maximized the legal liability for criminal prosecutions of its officials, 
undermined public and allied support, and abdicated the legal credibility and moral 
authority the U.S. maintained in its international relations (Powell, 2002, p. 3).   
 
C.   DEVELOP A LEGITIMATE DUE PROCESS FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
LIMITED USE OF COERCIVE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 
According to their findings reported in the Long Term Legal Strategy Project for 
Preserving Security and Democratic Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (LTLSP) 
sponsored by Harvard University, “Far too much of the present ‘war on terror’ has come 
to rely on a single weapon – interrogation – from what should be an array of intelligence 
techniques” (Heymann and Kayyem, p. 31).  
The bottom line for the lawyers and academics involved in this Harvard 
University-sponsored project is that “The President cannot legitimately violate a treaty or 
statute which was passed and is in effect. . . . there must be – without exception – a 
commitment to our treaty obligations under Article 1 against torture” (Heymann and 
Kayyem, 2005, p. 28).   
[Common] Article 3 [of the 1949 Geneva Conventions] does not forbid 
interrogation, but it does prohibit “torture.”. . . . Article 17 [of the Third 
Geneva Convention] does not bar all questioning. It does, however, forbid 
“any physical or mental torture” as well as “any form of coercion” (Bond, 
1974, p. 127). 
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The prohibition on coercion does not tie the hands of the skilled 
interrogator.  He can exploit the understandable fears of the prisoner 
through a variety of psychological techniques of interrogation.  As one 
scholar put it: “Article 17 . . . does not protect the prisoner against the 
wiles and cunning of enemy interrogators” (Bond, 1974, p. 128). 
As a result of extensive research and analysis by this international task force of 
legal experts and government officials into international humanitarian and human rights 
laws, the LTLSP “recommend[s] a regulated system of highly coercive interrogation 
(HCI) that will be consistent with [U.S.] obligations under Article 16 of the Convention 
Against Torture to ‘undertake to prevent’ cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment with 
only one extremely limited exception . . . that would require presidential authorization” 
(Heymann and Kayyem, 2005, p. 29).  They describe the authorization process for this 
singularly extreme exception by analogizing it to presidential or legislative decisions 
authorizing covert action (p. 31). 
Recognizing the criticality of the bureaucratic oversight process, Heymann and 
Kayyem write that “Inadequately monitored and regulated coercion against prisoners has 
the potential to prove a setback for our foreign and military policies and goals” 
(Heymann and Kayyem, 2005, p. 27).  They further contend that without a strict 
oversight process, the checks and balances on a President’s authority and actions 
essentially would not exist.   
With no public rules or accounting, the President’s discretion has been 
absolute and wholly delegable to any level.  This means, of course, that 
the President is not formally accountable for the decisions actually made. . 
. . Oversight in any event is essential to ensure that there is a more public 
check on the President’s determination as to what is legal and permissible 
in the way of coercive interrogation and, on lower level decisions applying 
to statutory standards, as to when coercive techniques can be used on 
prisoners. . .. . . Thus, we recommend that senior officials in the field must 
find probable cause that a specific plan threatens U.S. lives or that the 
capacity of a group or organization making such plans could be 
significantly reduced by exploiting the information, that there is no 
reasonable alternative to obtain the information, and that the person being 
interrogated under HCI tactics, is in possession of the significant 
information. (Heymann and Kayyem, 2005, pp. 30-32). 
As a means for interrogation, if governed by due process, HCI has the potential to 
aid the State in the collection and extraction of valuable tactical and strategic intelligence 
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for such long-term low intensity wars.  The important thing to understand about these 
highly coercive interrogation techniques is that they can work; however, there can be no 
guarantee that they will work.  These techniques would very likely be most useful only 
by exception. Therefore, the justification to employ such techniques, temporarily 
depriving the terrorist of his or her fundamental human rights, must be based on a 
regulated system of due process and strict oversight.  However, the oversight will only be 
as effective as the rules in place by which to evaluate the process.  The difficulty in 
making the determination about when such techniques would be justifiably expected to 
work is the essence of the moral dilemma that must be resolved.  For the development of 
these implementation and oversight rules, one must return to the realm of moral 
reasoning.   
Because human nature is prone to evil or cruel plans that seek to harm the dignity 
and property of others, Doctor Robert Kennedy contends that “the use of force, not 
excluding the imposition of pain, injury, or even death, can be justifiable according to the 
following principles” (pp. 7-8): 
Standing to Act: This means that the person or group [employing force] 
must have some responsibility for the good to be protected by the use of 
force (Kennedy, p. 7) 
Sound Reason to Act exists when real harm may be done . . . and when at 
least four additional criteria are met (Kennedy, p. 7): 
Discrimination: force may only be directed against a person who is 
known to be acting badly or to be planning to act badly . . . against 
the person or property of others 
Necessity is satisfied when there is a legitimate need for action to 
be taken and no non-coercive means are reasonably available 
Proportionality requires that the potential or actual harm to others 
or their property is sufficiently serious that the use of force is 
warranted, and also that any force employed be reasonably 
proportioned to the harm caused and to the status of the perpetrator 
Prospect for Success limits the use of force to situations in which 
there is ample reason to believe that the force employed will bring 
about the hoped-for change in plans or behavior 
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Right Intention in Acting: In general, this means that the person or group 
must intend primarily to prevent the harm being caused or about to be 
caused by the perpetrator. The principle is violated if the prevention of 
harm takes second place to a desire to exact vengeance, to exercise power, 
or to obtain some sort of advantage over others (Kennedy, p. 8). 
If the State thus determines it can sufficiently justify the use of coercive 
interrogation techniques through the application of the principles of standing, reason, and 
right intention, then as a final test to determine whether such action would be morally 
permissible, the President, as the approval authority, would need to satisfy three 
additional requirements under the principle of veracity.  The principle of veracity gives 
an initial negative weight to such an act according to the moral balance, and only where 
coercive interrogation is a last resort could the President morally justify the act (Bok, 
1999, p. 31).  To satisfy these requirements, the President ought to answer three 
questions: “first, whether there are alternative forms of action; second, what might be the 
moral reasons brought forward to excuse the [act], and what reasons can be raised as 
counter-arguments; third [he] must ask what a public of reasonable persons might say 
about such [acts]” (Bok, 1999, pp. 105-106).   
The outcomes of Abu Ghraib and the widespread abuse of detainees in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were largely the result of flawed strategic decision-making in a "permissive 
environment" (personal communication with Treverton, G., 2006) (referring to the 
domestic and international political context), and an improper application of 
bureaucratic/organizational structure relative to the established core tasks and Standard 
Operating Procedures of the United States Armed Forces.  However, understanding when 
and where the process failed has important ramifications both for the institutional 
decision-making process and the bureaucratic/organizational structure of the national 
security agencies responsible for developing and executing policy.  Knowing the 
decision-making process failed means that complex and radical organizational changes 
are not necessary in order to correct the results of bad policy.  Instead, smaller, less 
radical changes to variables within the bureaucratic process of coordination between 
national security agencies are likely to produce less costly options for the decision-maker, 
outputs less constrained by the limits of time, expertise, and political capital (Gustaitis 
lecture, 2006), and outcomes that ultimately support the national interest.   
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For Americans throughout the history of the United States, the truths associated 
with the national interest have been uniquely tied to those unalienable rights we hold to 
be self-evident: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness (Jefferson, 1776).   Much of 
the rhetoric and principle of the American political system has been centered upon these 
rights, and with America’s self-realized obligation to bestow the gift of these rights upon 
the rest of the world.   The evangelical nature of America itself has ever played a 
dominant role its foreign policy.  Although America has never been, and never will be, a 
perfect nation, one need only to read the prophetic words of John L. O’Sullivan to 
understand the grander purpose of American policy: 
Yes, we are the nation of progress, of individual freedom, of universal 
enfranchisement.  Equality of rights is the cynosure of our union of States, 
the grand exemplar of the correlative equality of individuals; and while 
truth sheds its effulgence, we cannot retrograde, without dissolving the 
one and subverting the other. We must onward to the fulfillment of our 
mission – to the entire development of the principle of our organization – 
freedom of conscience, freedom of person, freedom of trade and business 
pursuits, universality of freedom and equality.  This is our high destiny 
and in nature’s eternal, inevitable decree of cause and effect, we must 
accomplish it.  All this will be our future history, to establish on earth the 
moral dignity and salvation of man. 
John L. O’Sullivan (1839) The Great Nation of Futurity 
Whenever America has fallen short in the pursuit of these principles, it has, over time, 
admitted its faults, rolled up its sleeves, and worked hard to refocus its government on 
achieving the end affirmed by William Shakespeare, “Be great in act, as you have been in 
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